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Abstract 
This exploratory study examines the degree to which counties had carefully thought-out 
motivations for the adoption of performance pay systems, the degree to which they were using 
objective measures to gauge whether it was achieving those objectives, and the degree to which 
they believed it was achieving its intended objectives.  Results indicated that adopting a 
performance pay system is not something to be entertained lightly.  It requires more work, more 
discipline, more managerial courage, more training, more support, and will cause more heated 
internal conversations about compensation than more traditional compensation system 
alternatives.  It is equally clear that traditional compensation systems create more rewards for 
those doing the least effort and for those doing the least to advance an organization’s mission 
than a performance pay system.  The traditional system relies almost exclusively on the intrinsic 
motivation of employees who seek employ in the public service.  A well-crafted and executed 
performance management system that incorporates best management practices designed to 
thoroughly and constantly review the system’s efficacy and fairness, coupled with a market-
driven performance pay system, coupled with a robust set of additional strategies to create a high 
quality of employee worklife (recognition programs, tenure recognition and other similar 
environmental programs) does have the potential to create a higher-performing, more mission-
driven focus linking employee performance to organizational results.  But, if an organization 
cannot or will not make the necessary investments for all of that to be true, a poorly administered 
system will do more harm than good. 
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CHAPTER 1 
HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM 
Since perhaps the dawn of time, loyalty to the sovereign has been rewarded and disloyalty has 
been punished.  It’s not really that difficult to understand why.  Those with power tend to like to 
keep it; with power comes perquisites such as more lavish lifestyles, ordering of society along 
lines that most support your interests, and so on.  To those who are disloyal or actively opposed 
to what the sovereign wants done, the sovereign will takes steps, sometimes very drastic steps, to 
minimize the degree to which that disloyalty can impede what the sovereign wants.  This isn’t a 
new concept; it has likely been this way since when man first organized themselves into anything 
approaching organized clans. 
In those earliest of days, the rewards and punishments could often involve the difference 
between living relatively well or relatively poorly and even the difference between life and 
death.  As humans evolved into “higher” level creatures and organized into “civil” societies, the 
means of rewards and punishments have changed and, generally, are not as barbaric as once 
seen, with, of course, notable exceptions still present in the world today.  In more civilized 
societies, these rewards and punishments have evolved into what we understand as political 
systems today. 
This system of loyalty and punishments has existed within our own United States since its 
earliest days as well.  The original bureaucracy for the newly-minted Government of the United 
States in 1789 consisted of a small number of employees who worked in three federal 
departments:  State, Treasury, and War.  At that time, our first President, George Washington 
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promised to hire people “as shall best be qualified.”  Interestingly, however, the people he hired 
mostly belonged to the budding “faction” referred to as Federalists—the group with whom 
Washington most identified his own beliefs and policies as in alignment (The Bureaucracy:  The 
Real Government, 2014).  So, while Washington professed to be hiring on the basis of merit, it’s 
hard to conclude that was more narrowly defined to mostly be those best-qualified and in 
alignment with his views.  That’s not a shocking revelation, but maybe a revealing one for the 
President most Americans would likely identify as being above politics. 
What is more interesting is how Washington called forth in his Farewell Address a warning to 
his fellow citizens about the dangers of “factions” or political parties to the roots of liberty and to 
the republic itself: 
“All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and associations, under 
whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe 
the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this 
fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency.  They serve to organize faction, to give to 
an artificial and extraordinary force; to put, in the place of the delegated will of the nation 
the will of a party, often a small but artful and enterprising minority of the community; 
and, according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the public 
administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather 
than the organ of consistent and wholesome plans digested by common counsels and 
modified by mutual interests. 
However combinations or associations of the above description may now and then 
answer popular ends, they are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent 
engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert 
the power of the people and to usurp for themselves the reins of government, destroying 
afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion” (Washington’s 
Farewell Address, 1796). 
On the one hand, Washington had employed in federal service those who mostly agreed with his 
views and, in parting, warned Americans of associations along just such lines as injurious to the 
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health and long-term prospects for our nascent union.  His views were either motivated by 
experience with the effects of some of his own actions, an interest in cementing in place those 
whose views agreed with his own for perpetuity, or more noble expressions of philosophy about 
what he really believed to be best serving the common good.  Regardless of the motivation, it is 
difficult to read these words and not think about contemporary situations and reflect on how 
prescient his words ultimately became. 
During Washington’s term, Thomas Jefferson, a fellow Virginian, but a Democratic Republican, 
had served as Washington’s Secretary of State.  Jefferson frequently engaged in heated debates 
with then-Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, a Federalist, about what federal policy 
should be and how far-reaching it should extend, so much so that it became a source of irritation 
for President Washington.  In what is most commonly used to associate Washington with the 
Federalists, Washington most frequently came down on Hamilton’s side of the arguments, much 
to the chagrin of Jefferson (Ellis, 2005). 
Four years after Washington left office in 1800, Thomas Jefferson successfully ran for President 
against incumbent President John Adams, also a Federalist, who had served as Washington’s 
Vice-President.  Not surprisingly, then, when Jefferson assumed office, he dismissed many of the 
Federalists then serving as employees of the federal government and replaced them with people 
who were members of his own party.  In doing so, he first initiated the age-old process of 
rewarding political loyalists and punishing political opponents with jobs in the service of the 
sovereign to the American federal government.  So began the patronage system of federal 
employment, commonly referred to at the time as “rotation-in-office.” 
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Because of the size of the federal government in those early years, this was not a sizeable 
rotation.  Over time, however, as the federal government grew, this rotation-in-office based on 
political loyalty swinging on who occupied the White House and their political party preference, 
became an increasing burden on the President.  A newly-elected President was bombarded with 
requests from across the country for federal employment, consuming an ever-increasing amount 
of their time and even their schedules.  In those earlier days of the republic, it was common for 
Presidents to hold visitor hours and for many of the people who made appointments to see the 
President to implore him for a federal job.   
It was not until the time of Andrew Jackson, in 1829, however that this rotation-in-office was 
very significant.  Jackson is largely credited (or blamed) for cementing the patronage or “spoils” 
system in place.  Following the adage “to the victor goes the spoils,” when Jackson was elected, 
he brought a whole new group of “Jacksonian Democrats” into office with him.  Jackson argued 
that the spoils system brought greater rotation in office and that this was healthy to the 
bureaucracy to clear out government workers who had been employed by previous 
Administrations to protect against them becoming corrupt (The Bureaucracy:  The Real 
Government, 2014).  What was new about what Jackson did is that he had succeeded five 
Democratic-Republican Presidents before him so he was not replacing the federal workers based 
on loyalty to a party, he was replacing them on the basis of loyalty to the party as he defined it.  
Thus began the system of political appointment based largely on the basis of political support 
and work, as opposed to merit that is measured by objective criteria (Legal-Dictionary, 2014). 
During the 1800s, the size of the federal bureaucracy continued to grow, though modestly by 
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current standards.  There were, however, expanding needs that citizens were expecting 
government to provide.  As America grew westward, new federal agencies grew up to support 
the migration, land-granting, and serving new areas with postal services.  During this period, 
more and more federal jobs were filled based on patronage.  With the onset of the Civil War, 
federal jobs swelled as more and more people were needed in government positions to sustain 
the war effort.  Abraham Lincoln identified the job of filling federal jobs as a never-ending 
demand on his time that he so preciously needed for more urgent matters (Kearns-Goodwin, 
2012).  As noted by Henry Clay, after an election, government officials are “like the inhabitants 
of Cairo when the plague breaks out; no one knows who is next to encounter the stroke of death 
(Ramos, 2006, p. 1).”  And, yet the practice continued. 
To be sure, the patronage system had its defenders and detractors.  Defenders would routinely 
point to how this system would encourage greater political participation by providing incentives 
for helping in party-related activities.  They pointed out that the patronage system guarantees 
some turnover, thereby bringing in a fresh perspective which, they argued, was a healthy thing 
and encouraged new ideas and creative thinking.  In addition, the patronage system puts people 
into government positions who agree with the governing philosophy of the person ostensibly 
charged with running the government.  They also held that it minimized the possibility of 
entrenched workers becoming corrupt.  Even critics of the patronage system have agreed that 
patronage at the highest levels of government was appropriate so that an elected executive could 
implement their philosophy of government by placing political appointees as the heads of 
government departments, a practice which is still commonly used today by Presidents, 
Governors, and Mayors.  Critics, however, also pointed to the lack of qualifications needed for 
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performing what were becoming more and more specialized functions.  The high turnover also 
contributed to no institutional memory and, therefore, mistakes of the past were more frequently 
repeated than served the public’s interests.  They also argued that when someone knew their job 
was temporary, they had a greater tendency to manage their work to shorter-term purposes and 
were more likely to try to extract as much personal benefit during their tenure than if they 
enjoyed the prospect of longer-term employment. 
Widespread disapproval of the graft and corruption rampant within the public service under the 
patronage or “spoils” system grew steadily after the Civil War, but it was not until the 
assassination of President James Garfield in 1881 that the patronage system ran into any kind of 
organized resistance (Britannica, 2014).  Garfield was killed by Charles Guiteau, who was a 
deranged and disgruntled office-seeker to whom Garfield had denied a government job.  After 
Garfield’s assassination, Congress passed the Pendleton Act, which was the first institution of a 
federal civil-service system where employment was to be granted exclusively on merit.  The Act 
provided for selection of federal employees through the use of competitive exams, rather than 
ties to politicians or political affiliation (Princeton, 2014).  In addition, it also made it illegal to 
fire or demote federal employees for political reasons.  This first undertaking was not very broad 
and covered only about 10% of the federal workforce.  The Act also created a Civil Service 
Commission to administer the system.  While the Pendleton Act was designed to neutralize 
political influence over the Civil Service, it was not particularly effective because it covered so 
few federal workers and most of them it covered were low-level positions.  For instance, when 
President Benjamin Harrison took office in 1889, 31,000 federal postmaster positions changed 
hands (Legal-Dictionary, 2014). 
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Over time, however, the influence of the Pendleton Act grew.  Contained within its provisions 
was one which allowed the President to expand the coverage of the Act to more and more federal 
positions.  Whether motivated by a desire to cement in place their own appointees for more 
lasting influence beyond their term of office, or by a sincere desire to professionalize and 
insulate the federal workforce from undue political influences, subsequent Presidents routinely 
expanded the coverage of the Act.  President Grover Cleveland, for instance, expanded coverage 
of the Act to 40% of the federal workforce and, today, coverage is almost 90% (Pendleton Civil 
Service Reform Act—American Studies, 2014). 
All the while these changes are occurring, in the background there are compensation decisions 
being made for employees, whether within the patronage system or the civil service system.  The 
purpose of pay (World Bank, 2014), of course, is “to compensate the employee for work done, to 
motivate the employee to perform well and to retain the employee avoiding the need for 
extensive recruitment and training for replacements.” 
Compensation systems under the Civil Service Act were standardized around the concepts of 
fairness and equity for positions of similar levels of responsibility or scope (Nelson, 2008).  In its 
earliest conceptions, the civil service compensation system would allow for annual increases in 
the earliest years of employment and slower rates of increases in the later years; though, over 
time, the increases in later years were accelerated to be annually as well.  This model was 
intended to pay a very senior person at the top of the market rate for a position making it less 
likely that they would leave their position for another one for more pay; at the same time, it 
created more rapid increases (at first) for those at the entry level so that their rate of acceleration 
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in pay compelled them to stay in their position.  The framework, as opposed to the pay rate 
changes governed by political loyalties and rewards of the patronage system, was designed to be 
a replicable structural framework, regardless of the political administration in power. 
Patronage systems were not limited to the federal government either.  Throughout American 
history, state and local governments also employed large patronage systems.  Big city political 
“machines,” so termed for their mechanical efficiency in electing and re-electing party bosses, 
were dominant features of the political landscapes of New York City, Boston, Chicago, Kansas 
City, and many other places.  In rewarding their supporters with jobs, these machines not only 
rewarded people for their past political support, but also motivated them to contribute future 
support as the primary means for them to retain their jobs.  Machines were organized all the way 
down to the lowest units of city blocks with someone assigned to talk to their neighbors regularly 
about the benefits the “machine” provided, what a good job it was doing, and encouraging (and 
in many cases intimidating) neighbors into going to the polls and voting for the “right” candidate 
Legal-Dictionary, 2014). 
Some of the most colorful stories and characters in American political history come from big city 
machines and the “bosses” who ran them.  Among the most colorful was the big city machine of 
New York City, most commonly referred to as Tammany Hall, which dominated city politics for 
about 75 years beginning as early as the mid-1850s (Wiles, 2014).  The most famous Boss was a 
man named William March Tweed, who was widely viewed as having used the machine to 
advance not only the city’s political system, but also to line his own pockets.  An estimated $75 
to $200 million were swindled from the City during Tweed’s tenure as head of Tammany Hall 
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from 1865 to 1871.  Samuel Tilden, who ran for President against Rutherford Hayes in 1876, 
was head of New York State’s Democratic party is credited with rooting out Tweed’s corruption, 
though it took him an entire decade to do so. 
The New York machine may be most colorfully known for a plain-speaking character named 
George Plunkett who liked to deliver lessons in city government administration from his perch 
on the shoe-shine stand.  Plunkett stayed on top for seven decades in the rough and tumble of 
New York City politics.  When asked how he did it, he said: 
“Tammany is the ocean, reform the waves and there is a lot of unofficial patronage to 
ride out the storms if you know the ropes.  Why don’t reformers last in politics?  Because 
they are amateurs and you must be a pro.  Politicians do not have to steal to make a living 
because a crook is a fool and a politician can become a millionaire through ‘honest 
graft.’”  Wiles, 2014, p. 2. 
What Plunkett and Tammany excelled at was organization, integration of new immigrants into 
their political system, and using patronage jobs to instill ongoing loyalty to the machine.  During 
this time in American history, more than half of New York’s populations were immigrants who 
did not speak the language nor understand our laws.  One valuable service the machines did 
provide was the inculcation of those immigrants into the American political system in a way not 
seen today.  Largely, this was done through organizing efforts, not unlike what you see in 
modern political campaigns, but these political organizations were glued together with the 
public’s money:  patronage jobs.  People who were rewarded with a government job had a great 
incentive to keep the machine in power so they would be block captains at the precinct level, 
visiting with the people in the neighborhoods and making sure they knew the benefits the 
machine was providing for them and their families.  At any given time there were upwards of 
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30,000 local precinct captains in the five boroughs of New York and each borough contained 
roughly 12,000 municipal jobs creating a built-in network of loyalists paid for with someone 
else’s money. 
The benefits of the machine extended beyond simply employment.  The highly decentralized 
organization created a network of locally-connected advocates for when individuals had troubles 
with the law (History, 2014).  A criminal judge, for instance, who had been appointed or was 
being kept in office by Tammany Hall, would give special heed to a local ward boss asking for 
leniency for transgressions committed by people who may have been largely ignorant of the law.  
Such efforts were rewarded by those individuals and their families with gratitude expressed at 
the polls in support of the machine.  Those not inclined to remember their benefactors in that 
way would not be so lucky the next time around. 
The machine was also the only potent social welfare institution during this time.  The machine 
was a source of food, coal, and rent money, as well as a job for the poorest of society, among 
them the same immigrants who, upon arrival, had no place to stay and no way to support 
themselves.  As an example of the intimate involvement of the machine in people’s everyday 
lives, in the course of one day, Tammany Boss Plunkett “assisted the victims of a house fire, 
secured the release of six ‘drunks’ by speaking on their behalf to a judge, paid the rent of a poor 
family to prevent their eviction and gave them money for food, secured employment for four 
individuals, attended the funerals of two of his constituents (one Italian, the other Jewish), 
attended a Bar Mitzvah, and attended the wedding of a Jewish couple from his ward” 
(Wikipedia, 2014). 
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Through this use of highly-organized networks and the intricate system of rewards and 
punishments, Tammany Hall absolutely dominated New York City politics.  So much so that 
between 1860 and 1930, anti-machine reformers only held the mayor’s office and control of the 
City for a total of ten years (Wiles, 2014).  This era is sometimes referred to as the Gilded Age, 
however, because, while machines were good at winning elections, they were not as good at 
solving underlying social problems.  Governments at the national, state, and local level were 
preaching laissez-faire policies that had the primary benefits of the economic and political 
system accruing to the robber barons of the time and the least to the average American. In 
addition, ironically, as a machine becomes entrenched, it tends to reserve its largesse for those 
who are already within the system and have historically been unpopular with those marginalized 
on the outside.  The rise of racial minorities in urban settings brought this issue to the fore as 
machines began to be seen as the last defense of white neighborhoods against growing black 
populations (Britannica, 2015).  So, while machines were dominant for a time, they did not last.  
Ultimately, civil service reform efforts beat back the dominance of the machine, even Tammany 
Hall’s dominance.  
New York was not unique in that regard.  Cities and even states across the nation mirrored New 
York’s experience of both the rise and the fall of patronage systems of public employment.  
Famous bosses and their political machines included Frank Hague of Jersey City, New Jersey; 
Ed Crump of Memphis, Tennessee; James Michael Curley of Boston, Massachusetts; Huey Long 
of Louisiana; Gene Talmadge of Georgia; Tom Pendergast of Kansas City, Missouri; Theodore 
Bilbo of Mississippi; Arthur Samish of California; Richard Daley of Chicago, Illinois; and, 
George Cox of Cincinnati, Ohio (Watkins, 2015).   
D i s s e r t a t i o n  | 18 
 
In fact, the Pendergast machine in Kansas City provided the political start for a young, failed 
haberdasher named Harry Truman.  In 1926, Truman was elected through the machine to be the 
presiding county judge, one of the three administrators who ran the county agencies, in Jackson 
County, Missouri outside of Kansas City and rode the city machine all the way into the U.S. 
Senate (Truman Presidential Library, 2013).  Pendergast’s machine was rife with corruption and 
ties to organized crime and, while Truman was never effectively associated with that element of 
the machine, he was dogged during his early tenure in the Senate with being “Pendergast’s man.”  
In 1939, Pendergast was caught taking a $750,000 bribe and went to federal prison at 
Leavenworth; and, while he got out on good behavior after serving just one year, he was 
forbidden as a condition of his parole to ever engage in politics again (a fascinating condition in 
and of itself given his First Amendment rights!).  In an indication of the loyalty that the machine 
could generate, however, despite all of that checkered history, when Pendergast died in January 
of 1945, he was eulogized by then Vice-President and soon-to-be President Harry Truman, 
saying “He was always my friend, and I have always been his.” Watkins, 2014, p. 45. 
The vacillation between how much patronage in government serves the interests of the political 
leaders to effectively govern while maintaining the professionalism and neutrality of the federal 
workplace is an ongoing discussion today.  In 1978, Congress, out of concern that the federal 
bureaucracy was too independent and unresponsive to elected officials, including themselves, 
eliminated the Civil Service Commission and replaced it with the Office of Personnel 
Management, under closer control of the President.  The Act also created the Senior Executive 
Service, which granted Presidents greater authority in assigning top federal supervisory 
employees to the agency of the President’s choosing (Legal-Dictionary, 2014).   
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The major provisions in the Act included requiring performance appraisals for all employees, 
merit pay on a variety of levels but focusing primarily on managerial levels, and modifications 
for dealing with poor performers (Wikipedia, 2013).  This first venturing into merit pay for 
federal employees was a substantial break from the long tradition of automatic salary increases 
based on length of service.  Under the Act, those employees covered by these provisions 
received only half of their annual increases automatically and the other half was tied to their 
performance.  A key part of this new system, however, was that it was designed to be revenue 
neutral.  As such, in order for anyone to benefit from this new performance-based upside salary 
potential, someone else had to financially suffer. 
The major positive impacts of the Act were that it clarified job expectations and began an 
evolving process of defining goals and objectives for federal jobs.  Its greatest failure was in not 
effectively establishing its intended linkage between pay and performance.  This failure had a 
number of causes, not least of which was a lack of adequate funding.  In addition, because the 
Act focused primarily on establishing that link just for managers, it often produced results in 
which managers found themselves receiving less pay than their non-managerial counterparts 
because the counterparts were still under the traditional step-and-grade compensation system, 
which produced higher wage inflation rates.  In addition, these first efforts to define and measure 
job expectations were not particularly well-refined.  As such, some complained that the system 
produced arbitrary results between and among managers’ ratings leaving many to view it as an 
unfair assessment of performance.  Finally, the public’s negative reaction to senior federal 
executives who were assessed favorably and received large salary increases was unanticipated. 
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Reform along these lines continued, however, with the adoption of the Performance Management 
and Recognition System (PMRS) in 1984 (Wikipedia, 2013).  Continued efforts to refine 
performance expectations and measures contributed to greater accuracy in performance 
evaluations.  In addition, the Act provided limits on minimum and maximum levels of pay 
increases to limit the disparity among those employees covered by merit pay provisions.  A 
Performance Standard Review Board was also created for each department to assist in 
developing further credibility in the performance measures used for performance assessments; 
the Act required that a majority of the members of these boards had to be employees covered by 
the merit pay provisions of the Act. 
Although this reform was seen as a significant improvement over the previous effort, PMRS 
lasted only from 1984 to 1991.  Critics continued to cite that the new system, even though 
improved, still contained inadequate discrimination between and among performance levels, did 
not contain adequate performance findings and had little demonstrable evidence that the system 
produced improved performance.  Interestingly, again, it was not the linkage of performance to 
pay, per se, that contributed to the demise of these efforts, but rather that the linkage to pay 
increased the importance of getting the performance assessment done with high accuracy and 
credibility—when the performance assessment wasn’t good enough, the system could not sustain 
itself. 
Subsequently, various federal government agencies continue to dabble in variations on pay-for-
performance compensation systems.  More will be covered on that in the next section.  As of this 
writing, however, there has been no comprehensive system installed in the federal government to 
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link pay with performance.  That does not mean that the tension between civil service and 
political appointment has faded into history.  Policymakers continue to desire to have a highly 
responsive delivery system for their preferred programs and services.  Good government 
advocate continue to desire protections for government employees from undue political influence 
that could motivate them to advance their political superior’s political agendas instead of the 
public’s.  The debate is ongoing. 
Contemporary evidence of this tension and movement between civil service employment 
protected from undue political influence and at-will political employment that is hyper-
responsive to political influence can be seen in recent news reports of delays in serving patients 
at Veteran’s Administration hospitals throughout the nation, which ultimately led to the 
resignation of the head of the Veteran’s Administration Eric Shinseki, and subsequent calls for 
greater flexibility in disciplining and removing federal employees, especially senior leaders, who 
fail to serve well. 
Senior leaders in that instance were accused of covering up long patient waiting times and 
inferior health outcomes, including premature deaths.  When investigations showed that there did 
seem to be a systematic white-washing of information to suit the demands of the department’s 
politically-appointed leadership, the response was not to change the reporting relationships, but  
rather to want to overhaul the people holding those leadership roles.  The political appointees 
were the first casualties, but subsequent calls for reform led to the adoption of provisions that 
allowed lower levels of the Veterans Administration to be hired and fired more easily than other 
similarly-ranked employees within other departments of the government, thereby extending the 
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reach of at-will political appointment deeper into the grades of federal employment than has been 
seen since the 1970s. 
It is hard to conclude that there is one right mix of at-will political employment and protected 
civil service employment.  At-will employment is the dominant form of employment in the 
private sector stemming from the belief that so closely tying the employee’s fortunes to that of 
the enterprise is how to produce the best outcome for everyone.  Verkuil (2015) argues, however, 
that the goals for public service are not so clearly defined.  Further, he asserts that healthy civil 
service protections for public employee guarantees the institutional memory to survive changing 
political administrations and is the equivalent in human infrastructure as roads and bridges are to 
physical infrastructure in maintaining our system of governance.  Yet, he also acknowledges that 
we need both forms of infrastructure to be resilient to changing environmental conditions, both 
political and environmental (hurricanes, terrorist attacks, and so on). 
Those very types of reforms are frequently called for from among citizens and public policy 
advocates as well.  Recently, the Partnership for Public Service (2014) called for a dramatic 
overhaul of the federal civil service system.  In their report, they argued, 
“There is an absence of clarity and consequence regarding individual and organizational 
performance.  Top performers seldom receive sufficient rewards, poor performers are 
rarely fired or demoted, and managers are not held accountable for how well they manage 
employees or the outcomes of the work they oversee. 
What was once a unified civil service system with a set of common rules and procedures has 
become deeply fractured, with numerous agencies having obtained special exemptions from 
Congress that give them greater leeway in setting pay, classifying jobs, hiring and rewarding top-
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performing employees, even while other agencies are saddled with the outdated General 
Schedule (GS) system created in 1940.  As a result, agencies wind up competing among 
themselves for critical talent, as well as with the private sector, and those organizations with the 
added flexibilities end up having a distinct advantage.” Stier & Howell, Jr., 2014, p. 8. 
Movements toward or away from pay-for-performance does not determine the right mix of at-
will versus civil service employment for any point in time, but it is an issue that is contributing 
very much to the dialogue at the periphery.  The fundamental issue is how responsive our public 
employment systems are to making a real difference on the objectives and goals that advance 
public policy outcomes that the public wishes government to pursue.  Note this is not the same as 
saying the advance of public policy objectives that any given political leader wishes to advance.  
What we are left with is a highly decentralized and disbursed leadership model, which makes it 
more difficult for the civil service to be responsive.  Compensation systems feed into that debate 
in so far as they examine the degree to which various models of compensation systems can 
effectively motivate greater advances to those objectives or not.  Can the transparent debate and 
clarification of the appropriate goals and objectives of the civil service through the pluralistic 
political process ever well enough define performance expectations that are measurable and 
achievable such that linking performance to pay has any hope of advancing them more than not?  
Does linking compensation to a performance assessment process advance organizational 
outcomes more than not doing so?  It’s an age-old question that has no easy answer; but, as we 
shall see, that has not prevented many from trying to do so. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 Background of the problem 
Much has been written about merit-based or performance-based pay.  While more of that 
literature pertains to the private sector, there is still a considerable body of research regarding the 
public sector.  Little has been done empirically, however, to gauge the effectiveness of achieving 
desired outcomes through the use of performance-based pay. 
Performance-based pay has been defined in any of a number of ways by various scholars.  For 
instance, Risher (1999, Pg. 9) defines it as “a policy that links annual wage and salary increases 
to employee performance over the prior year.”  Hoerr (1998, Pg. 326) describes it, in an 
educational institution, as “a system of teacher evaluation and remuneration that focuses on 
teaching performance, not just teacher longevity.”  England and Pierson (1990) refer to a merit 
pay guide chart as a ‘look-up’ table for awarding merit increases based on (1) employee 
performance, (2) position in the pay range, and, in a few cases, (3) the time since the last pay 
increase.  At the heart of the matter, a performance-based pay program is attempting to link 
compensation, and specifically future increases in it, to continuing increases in organizational 
and/or individual performance.  As noted by Miller (2014), p. 1, “The message from the top 
down, enunciated at strategy meetings and then emphasized in calibration sessions, is that 
recommended rewards must reflect what the company is trying to accomplish.” 
The philosophy of traditional compensation programs is rooted in a Frederick Taylor-like view 
of the needs of a compensation program (Risher, 1999). Workers were viewed as an extension of 
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the machines and the goal was to make them as efficient and reliable as the machines. What they 
were supposed to do was often documented in lengthy job descriptions. In that era, managers had 
a great deal of discretion to mete out rewards and punishments as they saw fit. As a result, the 
exercise of their discretion to hire, fire, discipline, and increase compensation based on 
favoritism or other reasons that would be illegal today was widespread. Understandably, workers 
rejected this methodology and fought back in the form of the rise of the labor union movement. 
Traditional compensation systems with steps and grades was a management response to the 
outgrowth of labor unions, either in response to them forming or in an effort to avoid them 
forming.  It was an effort by corporate management to reduce discretion given to front-line 
management in, among other things, compensation decisions. These systems were designed and 
administered by human resource professionals.  They were certainly a reflection of their time as 
they were as rigid and structured as the work environments of their time.  Their aim was to 
standardize the rates of increases for employees to eliminate bias and favoritism on the part of 
line managers. 
As Risher (1999, Pg. 324) observed, “Since workers rarely moved from one employer to another, 
it was natural to focus on internal considerations.  The model for job evaluations was developed 
by industrial engineers.  In that environment, a worker’s performance was dictated by the 
machine that he tended; as long as he obeyed the rules and performed adequately, he could 
expect the standard pay increase.” 
It would be difficult to argue that the needs and goals of that emerging industrial era are not 
vastly different than the needs and goals of today’s globalized, information-based society.  Those 
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companies who were the cornerstone of the development of those kinds of compensation systems 
are frequently now fighting for their survival.  We have become a knowledge-based and service-
based economy in which “tending a machine” is the least important task.  We now value 
problem-solving skills and customer service skills to the particular disfavor of those who may be 
more resistant to change. Edward Lawler, head of the Center for Effective Organizations at USC, 
and probably one of the most respected compensation experts, has focused his work on criticisms 
of the traditional compensation model.  He probably did more to influence the demise of these 
systems than anyone.  Lawler’s points, as summarized by Risher (1999), are in Figure 1.   
This transformation in philosophy did not happen overnight, but more and more corporations 
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sought out alternative compensation strategies. 
According to Risher (1999), the early and consistent favorite of the private sector has been 
variations on performance-based pay programs to the point where today they are virtually the 
universal favorite of the private sector.  He reports that surveys of company practice show that 
Figure 1 – Criticism of the Traditional Compensation Model 
 
 Reinforces the importance of the job hierarchy at a time when organizations are trying 
to downplay their hierarchical differences to promote teamwork. 
 Overemphasizes salary grade changes and promotions as the basis for salary increases 
rather than focusing on the need to develop and enhance job competence. 
 Motivates “game playing” and dishonesty as the basis for justifying a higher salary 
grade. 
 Hinders organizational change and downsizing since all job changes have to be re-
evaluated under traditional compensation programs. 
 Perpetuates overly rigid and inflexible rules governing compensation. 
 Creates a sense of entitlement if pay is increased across the board. 
 Takes too much time and costs too much to maintain the program. 
 Requires excessive time to prepare for and make administrative decisions. 
 Perpetuates bureaucratic management. 
 Establishes implicit limits on what employees are willing to do since their pay is 
based on the duties listed in their job description. 
 Creates tension between line managers and the human resources staff who are 
required to defend the program principles and “police” the decision process. 
Lawler, as quoted by Risher (1999, Pg. 326) 
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97% of respondents have a merit pay policy, likening it to motherhood and apple pie within 
corporate circles.  The performance-based pay philosophy has so permeated the U.S. corporate 
culture that we have coined the term “meritocracy” to distinguish our society from others. 
The psychological basis for the wisdom of performance-based pay is contained in expectancy 
theory, equity theory, and reinforcement theory.  These psychological constructs, as outlined by 
Lowery, Petty, and Thompson (1995), play a significant role in determining whether and to what 
extent employees will embrace a particularly constructed compensation model, whether it be 
performance-based or otherwise.  Expectancy theory holds that reward systems that are 
performance contingent should lead to higher levels of performance than systems not based on 
performance.  There are three key building blocks upon which this theory is based.  First, the 
effort-to-performance expectancy, which holds that employees have some expectation as to 
whether a particular level of effort will lead to a particular, desired level of performance.  People 
have to believe that if they put out the effort, the performance will indeed follow.  Second, 
employees also have an expectation about the likelihood of a reward following a particular level 
of performance.  In order for a worker to be willing to invest the energy towards high 
performance, they must believe that to do so will improve their overall conditions and that their 
performance will ultimately be rewarded.  Finally, the rewards must be sufficiently valued to 
elicit the performance-improving behavior.  If these conditions are met, according to expectancy 
theory, then enhanced employee performance should result. 
That said, there are, indeed, some obstacles to the successful application of the theory.  
Employee effort may not result in improved performance for a variety of reasons, including lack 
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of skills or poor management (Marsden, 2003).  Performance may not translate into reward if it 
is inaccurately measured or if there are budgetary constraints.  In addition, the rewards may not 
be as highly valued as in the private sector, perhaps because public employees are motivated by 
other goals, such as the intrinsic interest of their work.  Finally, the rewards, even if valued, may 
not result in extra effort if, for example, employees’ jobs give them no authority or discretion to 
increase their performance.  The boxes marked ‘obstacles’ (Figure 2) provide a good outline of 
the areas on which design of a performance pay plan should concentrate in order to maximize the 
chances of a successful program. 
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Figure 2 – Outline of the 'expectancy' framework 
 
  Marsden, 1998, Pg. 3
Equity theory provides another vehicle for examining the effectiveness of pay on performance 
and overall employee job satisfaction.  According to this theory, also as outlined by Lowery, 
Petty, and Thompson (1995), employees provide inputs to their organization through work effort 
and in return receive outputs from the organization, such as pay.  Employees will compare their 
ratio of inputs to outputs to the ratio of inputs to outputs for other employees.  If they perceive 






• Inadequate skills  
• Weak goal setting 
• Poor coordination
Obstacles: 
• Poor performance measurement 
• Mgt. lack necessary money 
• Mgt.bad faith
Obstacles: 
• Performance rewards not valued 
• Other motivators  more important 
• Conflicts with other motivators  
• Mgt. motives dis trusted
Obstacles: 
• No scope to increase effort 
• Very tight management 
• Already work at max.
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their performance in an effort to correct the inequity.  Thus, if a compensation system, even one 
based on performance, affects an employee’s feelings of equity, performance may be affected.   
Therefore, according to Lowery, Petty, and Thompson (1995, Pg. 477), “a pay-for-performance 
system which rewards higher performing employees with more pay based on their higher level of 
inputs, relative to lower performing employees, should result in feelings of satisfaction.”  Hyde 
(2005, Pg. 5) calls this the true test of performance pay, indicating there must be “sufficient 
variability in pay so outstanding performers receive large rewards, average performers get small 
raises . . .and poor performers get no increase.” 
As also noted by Lowery, Petty, and Thompson (1995, Pg. 475), “The concept of performance-
based pay is so intuitively appealing that it seems almost ludicrous to disagree with it. Most 
people would agree that people who perform at a higher level should be paid more than those 
whose performance is not as high.” Yet, merit-based pay programs have had a significantly more 
difficult time catching on in the public sector.  In fact, they have frequently failed (Risher, 1999).
Reinforcement theory provides the third philosophical basis for performance pay systems.  
Risher (2004) explains reinforcement theory as emphasizing the importance of reinforcing 
desired behaviors by linking consequences with desired results or behaviors in as timely a 
fashion as possible.  This can mean quick rewards for the behavior you want to see more of or 
swift negative consequences for the failure to produce desired results.  Further, the theory argues 
for a variability in the reward cycle such that a reward or “punishment” is not exacted every 
time, which is likely more practical at any rate.  This theory is classic behavior modification. 
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In addition, there is other evidence that indicates that a pay-for-performance system will create a 
greater sense of ownership and, therefore, commitment to the organization that is offering it 
(Brown and Sessions, 2006).  Brown and Sessions (2006) hypothesized a continuum of vesting 
in your organization from those who are working on a fixed-rate to those who have the potential 
for performance pay to those who are self-employed or own the business.  They used an 
experience-earnings profile to determine whether compensation and, by extension, positive 
organizational outcomes are related to the way in which an employee is compensated.  Their 
findings did show a statistically significant difference that followed on their original hypothesis.  
Specifically, performance pay does move an employee along the experience-earnings profile 
from the fixed-rate employee, but not as far along the continuum as the self-employed individual. 
Performance pay has, of late, become somewhat of a management fad among federal agencies.  
It has become the announced compensation philosophy for the Department of Homeland 
Security and the Department of Defense (Risher, 2004).  Risher is doubtful, however, that these 
federal agencies have the systems in place to make their programs succeed.  Risher suggests this 
is not because the employees are so different.  In fact, he documents focus group findings from a 
study of General Services Administration federal employees indicating: 
 Employees want to have their value or contributions recognized and rewarded. 
 Employees want to feel they are accomplishing something they view as important.  
They will work very hard to achieve goals.  It is the desire for a sense of 
accomplishment or achievement that drives performance. 
 Employees want to grow in their jobs and to enhance their competence. 
 Employees look for opportunities to fully use their capabilities and look for 
challenging jobs. 
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Clearly, you could hear the same motivations expressed in a focus group of any private sector 
pool of employees.   
Obviously, in both the public and the private sector, these motivations are not values held by all 
employees.  Workers can get turned off at work from cumulative negative experiences and they 
would then be less receptive to performance pay plans.  Ironically, most of the triggers for such a 
negative orientation are often the result of bad supervision in the first place (Risher, 2004). 
In the rest of the federal service, it began slowly and primarily as an initiative to incent and 
reward senior executives and has slowly worked its way down the food chain (Hyde, 2005).  
Hyde (2005) indicates that while this movement has been progressing slowly for years, it has not 
been without its setbacks.  Historically, the performance appraisal process was based on 
behaviorally anchored rating scales that were notorious for inflated ratings that were not 
necessarily related to any positive organization outcomes.  Reforms are now in process, but 
progress remains slow.  Hyde (2005) notes that in order for this effort to ultimately be successful, 
gains in productivity, however those agencies may define them, must exceed the costs of the 
performance measurement itself.  Further complicating the task is that much federal work is 
multidimensional, done in teams with multiple stakeholders and with multiple objectives.  Hyde 
(2005) references some studies that suggest that linking pay to individual performance may 
undercut things like teamwork, levels of cooperation, and relationships among teams within 
organizations.  In the end, the success of this initiative within the federal civil service is far from 
a settled question. 
There are many reasons why the majority of the public sector has not embraced performance 
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based pay plans as enthusiastically as the private sector.  Greene and Scott (1991) suggest a 
number of reasons why public organizations continue to use traditional time-based pay 
programs. These include that time-based programs allow a public agency to predict its future 
costs with more certainty, it avoids the difficulties associated with performance evaluation, it is 
generally more acceptable to union leaders and in situations where employees do not believe 
management has the ability to fairly administer a merit program, and it greatly reduces 
disagreements (appeal/litigation) over evaluations of individual performance. 
For instance, employee performance evaluations might arguably be more difficult to do in the 
public sector where the more clear objectives of market share and net profit are not available to 
guide decisions as to the quality of employees’ or team performance.  There can be little question 
but that the public sector is more heavily unionized than the private sector and therefore unions’ 
preference for the time-based programs will have a more heavily-weighted impact.  In addition, 
the presence of a political leadership might well contribute to a lack of faith in the ability of “the 
system” to fairly and equitably administer a performance-based program.  Finally, it is not hard 
to conceive of the additional aversion the public sector has to appeals and litigations of salary 
decisions that might be more likely to be opened up under a performance-based program. 
It seems that these reasons would be enough to explain why merit-based programs are more 
prevalent in the private sector than in the public sector, but it is more difficult to see how these 
reasons alone can explain why they are nearly universally used in the private sector and used so 
sparingly in the public sector.  Risher (1999) suggests some additional reasons, including that 
corporate pay programs remain, by policy, shrouded in secrecy where individual pay programs, 
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pay increases, and pay levels are still confidential, making it easier to live with differences in pay 
rates; corporate employees rarely have a protected right to file grievances or otherwise appeal if 
they don’t like a pay decision.  In addition, an intangible difference is the relative obsession with 
performance in the corporate world where every corporate employee knows the bottom line and 
the need to perform better than the competition—the need to sustain and improve high 
performance is an accepted goal providing an unquestioned acceptance of merit pay. 
Risher (1999, Pg. 10) argues, however, that probably the most important difference, albeit 
intangible, is the way in which the public versus the private sector views the application of merit-
based pay programs: 
For reasons that go back in history, the public sector has often pushed for merit pay as a rationale 
for denying increases to poor performers.  In contrast, the emphasis in the corporate world is on 
recognizing and rewarding the better performers.  Few corporate employees are denied increases, 
and that possibility is almost forgotten.  The emphasis on granting extra money means that merit 
pay is much more positively perceived in the private sector than in the public one. 
There could be a variety of reasons for this, including the influence of the added political 
environment at work in the public sector or, possibly, tighter budgets.  Regardless the reason, it 
can easily be seen that, if true, it would have a dramatic dampening effect on support for the 
system.  There wouldn’t necessarily be any benefit to satisfactorily performing employees or 
high performing employees, but there would be a punishment for poor performing employees.  
Where is the constituency to support this plan among employees?  It is a case in point that an 
elected body can substantially influence organizational culture and change initiatives but it 
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cannot sustain them without some consent, even if only grudging, from the managed workers 
themselves.
One finding of a study done by Seay, Smith, and Crews (1995), however, when taken together 
with future demographic changes necessitated by the retiring of the Baby Boom generation and 
the likely resultant workforce shortage, is that performance-based programs seem to be more 
widely accepted by younger people.  In a study examining superintendent versus school board 
chair perceptions of performance based pay programs, the researchers found a statistically 
significant difference in the responses of the interview subjects based on their age.  They found 
that, among superintendents, the age most favoring performance-based pay were those between 
the ages of 31-40 years of age (how many superintendents do you really think there are younger 
than 31?!) While the group who were the least in favor of it were 51 and older.  This suggests 
that the next generation of workers may come with radically different expectations about how 
they expect rewards to be distributed in the future. 
Opposition to performance-based pay in the public sector has been broad and fairly consistent. In 
fact, the summer 2000 convention of the National Education Association, a teachers’ union, 
rejected a rather weak proposal to use performance evaluations to pay bonuses to teachers 
(Lewis, 2000).  Nonetheless, there are examples in the research.  One example is one adopted by 
the Piscataway Township, New Jersey, Public Schools in 1991 (Geiger, 1993).  This particular 
program was adopted for the administrators in the school’s system.  Another example, in a local 
government setting, is the city of Normandy Park, Washington, in which a pay-for-performance 
system is in place for all employees and was designed in a high-involvement way with 
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participation and cooperation from their collective bargaining units (MacReynold and Hopkins, 
1998).  Scott, Markham, and Vest (1996) provide yet another example of a merit pay program 
they are evaluating three years after its implementation at a public transit authority; it was 
available only to non-union managerial, professional, technical, and clerical positions.  There 
are, of course, widely scattered examples across the country, including Hamilton County Ohio 
Department of Human Services (County News, 2002), Fairfax County Virginia (ICMA IQ 
Report, 2007), among others. 
More recently, teachers in three Minneapolis schools and the school district in Waseca, 
Minnesota agreed to participate in a pilot program in which merit increases would be offered to 
teachers who achieve certain benchmarks of performance (Curriculum Review, 2004).  The merit 
increases range up to $8,000, which might explain the teachers’ willingness to pilot the program. 
Subsequently, the Waseca school district ended its pilot program in 2006. Minneapolis, in 
contrast, has expanded the program and now has 14 schools using the system (Office of the 
Legislative Auditor, 2009).
Another Minnesota example is performance pay established within the Dakota County 
Attorney’s Office (Backstrom, 2009).  This system rates the work of the county’s assistant 
county attorneys on a variety of factors, including performance on skills deemed fundamental to 
the practice of public sector law, developmental skills, and personal motivational factors.  
Further, the system establishes different performance levels expected based on the different 
grade associated with the various attorney job classifications. 
Yet another Minnesota example is in Scott County (Abboud & Kemme, 2010).  This 
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performance pay system grew out of necessity from declining tax revenues brought on by the 
crisis of the Great Recession, but was also the outcome of years of building a performance 
culture.  County leadership had spent years building trusting relationships with its union 
counterparts, which led, in part, to securing union leadership for the transition.  Even then, the 
system is very difficult to sustain.  According to Abboud & Kemme (2010, p. 44), “For this 
system to work, it requires flawless execution, trust from employees, and leadership 
collaboration. . . . [A] performance culture requires a clear definition of performance, a solid 
goal-setting process, and a significant investment in education and communication to foster an 
environment of trust. . . . Pay for performance is an extension of the organization’s culture, 
which takes years to build.” 
The trend toward performance pay does appear to be growing, but even that is not a universally 
held view.  W. Edward Deming was a consistent critic of performance pay and, in surveys of 
workers, performance-based rewards and advancement potential often score low on features that 
make up an attractive place to work (Risher, 2004).  Other research suggests that employees are 
not that significantly motivated by the prospect of higher pay (Crum, 2003).  Crum further notes 
that if the pool of resources for performance pay is insufficient, as he argues it frequently is in 
the public sector, then to give the top 20% a pay increase of sufficient size to potentially alter 
their behavior might mean that the next 60% of the workforce would get less than they otherwise 
would have received, producing disastrous consequences for the organization.  Finally, some 
argue that the performance pay will not be adopted until there is a sufficient crisis that is 
powerful enough to drive people to be more willing to experiment with new initiatives (Kramer, 
1995).  So while there is a theoretical basis for performance pay systems, it remains unclear to 
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what extent employees will fully embrace them, especially in public service where the 
connections between pay and performance may be more tenuous and the amount of the reward 
more uncertain and unstable. 
What little research there is available on public sector performance pay systems casts grave 
doubts on the efficacy of such plans (Prentice, Burgess, and Propper, 2007).  In fact, in a May, 
2005 Policy Brief from the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD)(Pg. 14), the opposite was found: 
While performance-related pay appears to motivate a minority of staff in the public sector, a 
large majority just do not see it as an incentive to work better. Extensive staff surveys, conducted 
notably in the United Kingdom and the United States, showed that despite broad support for the 
principle (emphasis added) of linking pay to performance, only a small percentage of employees 
thought their existing performance pay schemes provided them with an incentive to work beyond 
job requirements and in many cases they found it divisive. 
Most government workers, particularly those in non-managerial roles, consider basic pay and 
how it compares to the wider job market as far more important than supplementary pay increases 
for performance. This is because performance rewards are often limited in the public sector, but 
also because job content and career development prospects have been found to be the strongest 
incentives for public employees. PRP (performance related pay) is unlikely to motivate a 
substantial majority of staff, irrespective of the design. 
Marsden, (1993) reports similar findings in that although many public employees thought that 
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linking pay to performance was a good idea (57% of Inland Revenue Tax Service staff in 1991 
agreed performance pay was a good principle), very few agreed that it worked well to motivate 
them within their own performance pay plan.  Even worse, there was substantial percentages of 
employees who said that the operation of their performance pay plan in fact caused jealousies, 
undermined cooperation with colleagues and with management, and that management used 
performance pay to reward their favorite employees.  Apparently the feeling was somewhat 
mutual as line managers who were charged with doing the appraisals reported some loss of 
cooperation from among the rank and file. 
It would seem that performance pay is an idea with broad appeal, but does it have broad 
efficacy?  Many studies have concluded that the impact of performance pay on performance is 
limited, and can in fact be negative (OECD, 2007).  Other studies by the OECD suggest that it is 
very complex and difficult to implement. These studies also conclude that the impact of 
performance pay at the managerial level had failed to achieve key motivational benchmarks for 
effective performance pay, in part, because of poor designs and also because of implementation 
problems.  More importantly, however, the studies also concluded that these systems failed 
because performance assessment is so inherently difficult in the public sector (Marsden, 1993; 
OECD, 2007).  Performance measurement in the public sector requires a great degree of 
supervisory judgment. The definition of good performance itself is quite subjective and complex.  
In the public sector, in particular, there is a great deal of difficulty finding suitable quantitative 
indicators.  In addition, performance objectives often change with government policy and with 
changes in governmental administrations.  
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The International City/County Managers Association (2007) also detailed a number of reasons 
why performance pay programs can struggle in the public sector.  Given limited budgets, if the 
pool for merit increases is similar in size to the former method of step-and-grade increases, then 
merit pay is a zero-sum game—increases given to some are at the expense of those withheld 
from others.  In addition, unless performance management has been done well, many years of 
ineffective reviews or past merit pay abuses may also contribute to resistance.  Evaluation rating 
inflation over time, when performance reviews were not tied to performance may make the 
transition very difficult when employees will need to be more accurately stratified according to 
their real contribution to the organization’s success. Finally, the public sector is much more 
heavily unionized and organized labor’s resistance is common.  The International Public 
Management Association for Human Resources (2007) lists lack of managerial trust as a major 
contributor to failure of merit pay systems. 
There is also an interesting new body of work called Self-Determination theory being advanced 
that studies what motivates human performance from more of a Maslow’s hierarchy sort of 
approach.  Basically, the research suggests that people ought to be paid sufficiently to meet their 
basic needs and then higher-order methods of motivation should be used to enhance performance 
(Pink, 2011).  In a meta analysis of 92 studies, Judge (2010) concluded that there is very little 
correlation, less than 2%, between salary and job satisfaction.  This was true whether controlled 
for region of the world or for rank within an organization.  This is consistent with research from 
the Gallup organization (2006) showing no significant difference in employee engagement by 
pay level.  These works are suggesting that money does not motivate performance. 
D i s s e r t a t i o n  | 42 
 
 
Taken further, work by Deci (1999), synthesizing the results of 128 controlled experiments, 
highlighted consistent negative effects of incentives—from marshmallows to dollars—on 
intrinsic motivation.  Intrinsic motivation, which is related to wanting to do a task for the sheer 
joy or stimulation of doing it, contrasts with extrinsic motivation, which would be focused on the 
completion of a task in order to achieve some kind of external reward unrelated to the task itself.  
Deci’s work suggests that there may be some natural tension between intrinsic and extrinsic 
incentives on human performance.  For example, Deci’s found that for every standard deviation 
increase in reward, intrinsic motivation for interesting tasks decreases by about 25%.  When 
rewards are tangible and foreseeable (if subjects know how much extra money they will receive) 
intrinsic motivation decreases by 36%.  Importantly, however, he also found that for 
uninteresting (rote or repetitive) tasks, extrinsic rewards, like money, actually increases 
motivation.  Deci’s (Pg. 659) conclusion is noteworthy that “strategies that focus primarily on 
the use of extrinsic rewards do, indeed, run a serious risk of diminishing rather than promoting 
intrinsic motivation.” 
Expanding on the question of whether extrinsic rewards versus intrinsic rewards make a 
difference in the motivation to perform various types of tasks e.g. simple, less interesting tasks 
versus more complex or interesting tasks, Weibel, Rost, and Osterloh (2009) also found that it 
does.  Overall, their findings indicate that there is a significant and positive correlation between 
public sector pay for performance systems and organizational performance, but that this effect is 
moderated by task type.  For less interesting tasks, there was a greater positive effect and for 
more interesting tasks, there was actually a negative effect.  In a nursing home setting, for 
instance, performance pay did improve quality indicators of nursing care that were especially 
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routine (Weissert & Frederick, 2013).   
A subsequent study found similar findings, except that the crowding out of intrinsic motivation 
by extrinsic rewards was found to be linked to pro-social activities (Belle, 2015).  In this study, 
Belle found that for activities that have a visible prosocial impact that would maximize an 
individual’s social standing, monetary reward were more effective if they are secret rather than 
open.  In other words, if an individual perceives that the pursuit of the monetary reward is 
perceived by others as greedy, the motivation of the pay is drastically mitigated.  Further, the 
study found that non-monetary rewards did not seem to suffer the same fate. 
This suggests that higher-order or social-order functions may be inhibited by a performance 
based pay system whereas lower order functions are enhanced leading some to conclude that a 
focus on performance management but without the linkage to performance pay may produce 
better outcomes than linking outcomes to pay (Frey, Homberg, and Osterloh, 2013).  For all the 
debate about linking performance to pay, there seems to be much more clear agreement among 
practitioners that the value of an effective performance management system by itself is clear 
(Kavanagh, 2013).  In fact, some suggest that an effective performance management system will, 
by itself, improve strategic decision-making, but also note that other factors, such as effective 
governance and funding diversity also play a role in that (LeRoux & Wright, 2010). 
In addition, the connection between intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation and job satisfaction 
does not appear to be a direct line (Stazyk, 2009).  As might be expected, even if there is a higher 
than average degree of intrinsic motivation among public employees, there is a range of the 
degree to which this is a primary motivation.  Stazyk’s (2009) work suggests that performance 
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pay systems crowd out intrinsic motivation for public service primarily among only those who 
had high intrinsic motivation to begin with.  More importantly his findings indicated that this 
crowding effect had no measurable impact on overall job satisfaction. 
The evidence about this linkage, however, between an intrinsic, public-service motivation versus 
an extrinsic compensation reward is not at all conclusive.  French and Emerson (2014), found 
that the level of intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation varied considerably from one person to the 
next concluding that people come into public service for a variety of reasons, that the reasons can 
be both intrinsic and extrinsic for any given individual, and that the proportion of intrinsic to 
extrinsic can vary from one individual to the next.  Their conclusion was that there is no over-
arching reason why people choose to work in public service and that people who seek security, 
better pay, or better fringe benefits are also attracted to public service within various public 
service roles. 
Motivation is not the only factor either as there is also some evidence to indicate that public 
employees who work in a performance pay system are less happy than those who do not (Choi 
&Whitford, 2013).  This seems to reinforce other findings suggesting public sector workers are 
less in favor of tying their compensation changes to performance factors.  In the private sector, 
54% believe that their salary should reflect their own performance, 36% think it should be based 
on inflation or the cost of living change, and 32% think it should be based on their experience 
(CIPD, 2013).  In the public sector, 55% of workers feel their pay should reflect inflation or 
changes in the cost of living, 36% believe it should be based on individual performance, and 
33% think it should be based on their experience.  It is unclear, however, if these perceptions are 
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based on the differences in experience and exposure of public sector workers versus private 
sector workers to variable compensation systems in general. 
Another recent study (Cho & Perry, 2011) also found a strong correlation between employee 
engagement levels and intrinsic motivations.  Analysing real-world data from a representative 
sample of over 200,000 U.S. public sector employees, the results showed that employee 
engagement levels were three times more strongly related to intrinsic rather than extrinsic 
rewards, but that both motives tend to cancel each other out.  In other words, when employees 
have little interest in external rewards, their intrinsic motivation has a substantial positive effect 
on their engagement levels.  However, when employees are focused on external rewards, the 
effects of intrinsic motives on engagement are significantly diminished.  According to Cho and 
Perry, this means that employees who are intrinsically motivated are three times more engaged 
than employees who are extrinsically motivated, such as by money.  Quite simply, these findings 
suggest you’re more likely to enjoy your job if you focus on the work itself, and less likely to 
enjoy it if you’re focused on money.  Further, and more importantly, they suggest that the more 
people are focused on their salaries, including an emphasis on pay for performance, the less they 
will focus on satisfying their intellectual curiosity, learning new skills, or having fun, all of 
which, arguably, are the very things that make people perform their best.  Pink (2011) suggests 
that extrinsic rewards, by their very nature, narrow our focus. 
Of course, not all empirical evidence points to performance pay being a failure.  Even if the 
intended results aren’t always achieved, there is some data to suggest that performance pay 
systems have often been positively correlated with a more general organizational strategy to 
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redefine the objectives of public service work, to make it more responsive to the needs of 
citizens, or at least, to be better adapted to the wide diversity of expectations placed upon it by 
different groups of citizens (Marsden, 2003).  When performance pay systems have a strong 
focus on goal-setting and organizational objectives, they can provide a conduit through which 
management can communicate the new set of objectives to employees.  There is some evidence 
to suggest that the new organizational objectives are better internalized by employees than in the 
absence of the performance pay system.  As Marsden notes (Pg. 7), “For example, in the British 
tax service, one of the goals of the performance pay system introduced in 1993-94 was to get 
away from defining job performance in relation to a set of fixed standards, and move towards 
objectives that were agreed between line managers and employees. The latter could be more 
easily adapted both to the abilities of individual employees, and to the varied needs of the 
different parts of the tax service.”  In essence, the move to the performance pay plan provided a 
context within which individual objectives could be more meaningfully determined. 
Most recently, advancement of performance pay in the public sector also appears to have been 
significantly impacted by the effects of the Great Recession.  A recent survey by the 
International Public Management Association for Human Resources (IPMA-HR, 2012) finds that 
organizations reporting the use of any form of variable compensation, the most prevalent of 
which is performance pay, dropped from 45 percent in 2007 to 29 percent in 2012.  Overall, this 
appears to have been due to broad cost-cutting strategies related to controlling labor costs, 
including freezing pay, layoffs, hiring freezes, and so on.  This points to another issue with 
performance pay in that changing economic conditions can radically alter the degree to which a 
motivation can be created through compensation during periods when compensation increases 
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are being strangled. 
From an overall perspective, a study by the Office of the Auditor of the Metro Council of 
Portland, Oregon (2004) details twelve factors that it says contribute to the success of 
performance pay systems in public entities and nine factors that inhibit success.  Those factors 
that they indicate advance success are:  
 A compelling, well-defined, fully-articulated and fact-based business need. 
 Employees who are highly motivated by monetary rewards. 
 Clear links between the organization’s objectives, employee performance, and pay. 
 Meaningful rewards consistent with individual, team and organizational achievements. 
 Structured and consistently-applied performance management systems. 
 Measuring the performance pay program itself for success. 
 Employee participation in design, implementation, and monitoring. 
 Full and consistent funding. 
 Continuous training for new and existing managers and staff. 
 Program proponents who lead by example. 
 The switch to performance-based compensation is positioned as an organizational 
development initiative. 
 Continuous flexibility and refinement. 
 Those factors that they suggest inhibit the success of a performance pay program in 
public entities are as follows: 
 Failure to link employee performance objectives to the organization’s objectives 
produces weak support within the organization. 
 Invalid performance appraisals lead directly to program credibility problems. 
 Lack of adequate financial rewards and budget cycle barriers inhibit program success. 
 The performance reward connection is not clear. 
 The performance-effort connection is not clear. 
 Money may not be a prime motivator for some employees. 
 Performance pay can become an administrative burden. 
 Faulty assumptions by performance pay proponents lead to unmet expectations. 
Finally, performance pay programs have failed when participants, policy makers, media, or 
others publicly criticized one or more aspects of the plan, subjecting an entire system to a level 
of scrutiny it could not withstand. 
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Broderick and Mavor (1991) argued much the same up by saying, 
“Our review of existing theory, diverse types of research, and clinical experience 
suggests that there are certain preconditions that appear to be necessary (though not 
sufficient) for pay for performance to do more good than harm:  for instance, ample 
performance-based rewards available to be distributed; participants who are 
knowledgeable about the linkage between their actions and rewards received; credible 
indices of performance; and incentives for those doing the performance appraisal to do it 
well versus incentives for them to not differentiate among subordinates.  To the extent 
that some of these necessary preconditions may not be satisfied in many government 
contexts, there is reason to question whether the prerequisites for beneficial effects are 
satisfied.” p. 36. 
Lawler (1990) probably best summed up the challenges with merit-based pay systems, whether 
they are public sector or private sector.  He points out that in order for a merit system to be 
effective, there must be credible and comprehensive measures of performance and that without 
these it is impossible to relate pay to performance.  He points out that in most organizations, 
performance appraisals are not done well and, as a result, no good measures of individual 
performance exists.  In addition, he notes that in many situations work performance is simply not 
easily measured by focusing on an individual’s performance versus the team’s performance. 
The ultimate conundrum of performance pay is thus accurately and objectively measuring 
performance, something that should arguably be done well for a variety of reasons, including 
giving employees credible performance feedback and creating benchmarks of organizational 
performance.  There are tools to assist organizations with doing this (Poister, 2003), but it 
requires a commitment that many public sector organizations may not have the time, energy, or 
inclination to pursue, especially after cutbacks in staffing in the public sector associated with the 
Great Recession. 
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Lawler (1990) further argues that in the absence of objective measures, most organizations rely 
on the subjective judgments of managers and these judgments are often seen by subordinates as 
unfair, invalid and discriminatory.  As that perception persists, the system simply does not 
deliver the change in performance that it was intended to deliver.  Lawler suggests that these 
problems are not insurmountable, but rather require careful planning and execution.  A study by 
the Metropolitan Council of Portland (2004) concluded that pay for performance for public 
entities can only succeed “when the political climate is right, employees accept it, managers are 
trained to implement it fairly and consistently and agencies monitor it regularly.” p. 2. 
Theorists have also long noted that organizational performance is not simply the aggregation of 
individual performance; organizations are complex social environments creating a mismatch 
between the simplicity inherent in merit pay programs and the complexities of organizations 
(Pearce, 1987).   This question of the proper level of aggregation for performance incentives 
versus group incentives is an interesting area for study all by itself.  One study concluded that 
Americans, for instance, dislike group incentives and prefer individual incentive programs 
whereas Europeans workers appear to get satisfaction from group incentives as well as individual 
incentives (Mogultay, 2013).  Another study found (Haerter, 1992) suggests that there are five 
factors which influence aggregation, which are outlined in Figure 3, below. 




While the public sector has been slow to implement performance-based pay programs, there are, 
indeed, enough instances of its implementation, most commonly among senior executives, to 
take the notion seriously as a matter for study if, for no other reason, than to help discern whether 
Figure 3 – Factors Influencing Aggregation Level 
 
   Favors    Favors Group, Plant or 
Factors   Individual   Total Organization 
 
Technology  Low complexity;  High complexity; 
   individual tasks   interdependent tasks 
   that are not 
   interdependent 
 
Trust   Good supervisor--  Good trust in organization 
   subordinate   Good communication 
   relationships   about organizational 
   high trust of   work objectives and 
   supervisor   performance 
 
Size   Large; individual  Small; individual can 
   Lost in larger system  influence and relate to 
       group and/or plant events 
 
Information System Good measures at  Good measures only at 
   individual level   group or plant level 
 
Union Status  Non-Union   Union or Non-Union 
 
Note:  Factors influencing aggregation level on an individual level carry upward to the 
group, plant, or total organization. 
 
Haerter, 1992, Pg. 26 
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“rising and falling tides of interest in the various incentive plans have more to do with changing 
social, political, and economic fashions than with accumulating scientific evidence on how well 
the plans work” (Blinder, 1990, Pg. 3).  
The idea of this research is to define some bases upon which to begin to judge the degree to 
which public managers are thinking of the full complexities of human motivation when 
contemplating the pursuit of a performance-based pay system.  Was a decision to pursue such a 
system just a philosophical predisposition to pay being based on performance, as it seems to be 
in the private sector?  Was there any contemplation of the nature of public sector work versus 
private sector work?  Was there any contemplation of the impacts providing external rewards 
might have on intrinsic motivation?  Measuring the degree to which this is a thoughtful decision 
by public managers should help to advance the dialogue by future public managers considering 
the same course. 
Statement of the problem 
What are the motivating factors that lead a public manager to institute a performance-based 





 What were the motivating factors for instituting a performance based compensation 




 What measures, if any, were established to measure the success of the advancement of 
those motivational factors for instituting the plan? 
 What are the results of those measures, if any?  Did they achieve what they set out to 
achieve? 
Rationale/theoretical framework 
There is much literature about the fact that performance-based pay programs are popular in the 
private sector and why they are not as popular in the public sector.  What is difficult to find is 
good data to empirically indicate the efficacy of such systems, either in the public sector or the 
private sector.  Expectancy, equity, and reinforcement theory predict that a positive correlation 
will exist between outcomes in organizations that have performance-based pay programs from 
those that do not.  Self-determination theory suggests that, especially where high-level complex 
tasks are involved, the opposite will result.  The private sector’s wild abandon in favor of such 
systems is strong anecdotal evidence of such a correlation, at least for private sector 
organizations (would so many be continuing to engage in the practice if it didn’t work?).  
Intuition suggests that there should be a relationship.  Yet, one wonders whether that is easier in 
the private sector than in the public sector where sales figures are more easily counted versus the 
number of social pathologies corrected. 
Much of the data that does exist, albeit sketchy, is on performance-based pay in the federal civil 
service.  There are substantial differences between the federal civil service with its massive 
breadth and depth of services to that of a local unit of government, such as a county.  This 
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remains true even if the local unit of government is a large, urban county.  A large, urban county 
is still much smaller, more nimble, and less bureaucratic than the federal government; and, as a 
result, trying to determine the efficacy of performance-based pay in counties by looking at 
results from the federal level does not necessarily produce valid results.  Using statistical 
techniques as directly applied to counties that use a performance-based pay system, however, 
should produce results more useful to counties considering such a move and is relatively 
unexplored territory. 
The value of this research, therefore, will be to try to ascertain whether counties in selected areas 
of the country that have pursued a performance pay system had a specific objective or sets of 
objectives in mind when they decided to pursue the course and whether or to what degree those 
objectives are being measured and met. 
Hypotheses 
 There will be a specific set of organizational objectives identified prior to adoption of a 
performance-based pay system. 
 There will be measures of the degree to which the adoption of the performance-based pay 
system advanced the stated organizational objectives. 
 The measures will demonstrate advancement of prior-defined and key organizational 
objectives. 
Importance of the study 
As mentioned in the literature review, public sector organizations have some significant 
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institutional resistance to performance-based pay programs.  Yet, the demographics indicate that 
if public agencies want to attract the best talent, they may need to do a better job of rewarding 
those who perform better than others.  The difficulty of making such a transition in the public 
sector is an extremely significant hurdle to overcome.  Adding to the height of the hurdle is the 
vacuum created by the lack of empirical data to show that the effort is worth it in terms of 
superior outcomes after taking into account the energy necessary to pull it off.  In the absence of 
proof that indeed performance-based pay programs achieve better net outcomes, why would you 
make this transition?   
In the private sector, faith and intuitive belief may be enough; in the alternative, they may more 
easily be able to see the improvement to their bottom line or sales figures, and so on.  In the 
public sector, it is more difficult to evaluate superior performance, which is precisely why this 
study would be so important.  There is ample evidence that a poorly designed and administered 
merit system can do more harm than good (Lawler, 2000).  While this will not end up being the 
definitive study or the final one on the topic, it is necessary to lay a basic exploratory foundation 
upon which further research can be done, the ultimate goal of which will be to determine and 
improve the efficacy of such systems as they will undoubtedly become more prevalent in the 
public sector. 
Assessing the degree to which existing performance-based pay systems have been adopted with 
specific organizational objectives in mind and with measurable results being tracked helps to sort 
through the conflicting research on how to best design and to what purposes such a system 
should serve.  The study should help to shed light on the purposefulness with which existing 
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practitioners have pursued performance-based pay and the degree to which they are thoughtfully 
studying its actual impacts. 
Definition of terms 
For the purposes of this study, these terms will have the following definitions: 
Organizational Outcomes:  clearly defined measures of the organization’s primary objectives of 
performance through measurable results regularly reported. 
Performance-Based Pay Program: any compensation policy that links annual wage and salary 
increases to employee performance on some predetermined period-over-period comparison. 
Employees: the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees employed by the political 
subdivision being examined. 
Employee Engagement:  The rate at which employees  are willing to engage in discretionary 
effort in their jobs as measured through the use of a survey at least once per year. 
Employee Retention: the rate at which employees exit the organization measured as a annual 
percentage of the total workforce. 
Employee Satisfaction: the degree to which employees are satisfied with their work environment 
as measured by a survey with standardized questions at least once per year. 
Performance Distinction:  a noted difference in the performance of two or more employees in the 
achievement of key organizational objectives that the organization wishes to either reward or 
punish. 
Recruitment:  the ability to attract new employees to come to work for the organization as 
measured by some objective measure, such as time to recruit, number of applicants, and so on. 
Stakeholder (Citizen) Satisfaction:  the degree to which stakeholders or citizens are satisfied with 
the quality of the public services they receive as measured by a survey with standardized 
questions administered either annually in a randomized sample or to recipients of services 
immediately following their receipt of the service. 
Senior Executives: those managers, supervisors, or department heads who are paid in the top ten 
percent of the organization’s compensation system. 
Wage Inflation:  the amount of increase in the total wages paid to employees, not counting new 
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or eliminated positions, expressed as a percentage increase over the previous year’s base costs. 
Research design 
The research design will be a qualitative, exploratory pre-experimental design.  Selection will 
not be based on random assignment, but rather on whether a performance-based pay program is 
already in place in the organization or not.  The expectation is that the number of jurisdictions 
that have a performance-based pay program in place already will significantly reduce the 
availability of subject organizations for the study group.  As such, selection will be based on 
screening those that have a performance-based pay system into the study group based on prior 
research to identify such.  While such organizations are clearly the exception and not the norm, 
there should be enough organizations so situated in the public sector that no difficulty is 
expected in locating subjects for the test group.   
Once located, test subjects will be given a standardized interview so as to allow for a probing 
style of questioning that first requires the interviewee to volunteer information free-form so as to 
really explore prior motivation, but become more specific to probe additional potential 
motivators and the degree to which they have influenced decisions.  Further, questions will be 
asked about each identified motivator to explore what specific measures may or may not exist to 
verify that the motivating factors are being achieved and, if so, to what degree. 
Description of research methodology 
The first step in the research will be to identify county government organizations with 
performance-based pay programs.  The plan will be to contact each of the study states’ 
membership associations for counties to identify which of their member jurisdictions meet the 
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criteria of having a performance-based pay system.  As each organization is identified, contact 
will be personally initiated to set up an appointment with the human resources or chief 
administrative officer in each organization with whom to conduct the interview.  At the 
conclusion of the interview, each participant will be asked if they are aware of any other county 
within their state that has also developed a performance-based pay system to verify the 
comprehensiveness of the counties that were identified by the state associations. 
Incentives will not likely be used, depending instead on the extension of the professional 
courtesy of one practicing (and researching) public practitioner to another as the incentive for the 
interview to be conducted.  At the conclusion of the interview, an offer will be made to share 
research results with whomever they wish to designate within their organization.  A follow up 
letter thanking them for participation in the interview and, again, offering to share the results of 
the interview will be sent post-interview. 
Limitations of methodology 
One of the limitations of this study will clearly be the degree to which the researcher can 
construct perfected test groups.  First of all, the number of counties using performance-based pay 
programs will be limited.  Secondly, finding them might become time consuming.  As such, cost 
of constructing a reasonably balanced test group might well be a limitation. 
Since finding a good test study group might be time consuming and difficult, it will be 
imperative that the ones identified willingly participate.  Persistence and the pursuit of 
professional courtesies will become a necessary strategy.  Pursuing the interviews in the context 
of the potential for this researcher to also implement a performance-based pay system for his 
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present employer, which is in fact the case, will also help establish the need for good information 
on which to pursue the extension of the professional courtesy. 
Focus group follow-up would be an excellent way to delve more deeply into survey results to 
provide a springboard for subsequent research topics; however, given how widely dispersed 
geographically the test group is expected to be, it is unlikely that will be financially feasible.  
Adequate records of the participants should be kept on file should some subsequent researcher 
wish to follow up this research in that manner. 
Study delimitations 
One of the delimitations of the study is to focus on counties.  This focus was selected as a way of 
trying to better ensure a healthy independent study group and to work with organizations large 
enough that their adoption might most likely be based on sound human resource strategies 
designed to achieve well-defined organizational objectives.  In addition, given their larger size 
within local units of government, they might more likely have performance-based pay programs 
in place and stabilized than other units of local government that may be, on balance, smaller in 
size.  In addition, the larger the public organization, the more senior executives that the 
performance-based pay program might apply to and therefore the larger the potential population 
as well.  Finally, to limit the study to local governments including only counties allows for a 
cleaner data set in so far as the work of counties are more similar to each other than to transit 
authorities, schools and so on. 
Another of the delimitations is the choice of outcomes for which the research will test.  In 
particular, the outcomes the research will analyze, for purposes of correlation, will be the factors 
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that are identified as having motivated the adoption of a performance-based pay system.  At first, 
the interview will be structured in an open-ended way to probe without bias what the interview 
subject might volunteer as having been their motivation without any prompting.  Following that, 
prompted questions will explore the degree to which identified potential motivating factors might 
have been behind adoption, to include employee satisfaction, employee retention, organizational 
outcomes, stakeholder (or citizen) satisfaction, wage inflation, performance distinction, or 
recruitment.  As such, a delimitation from the identified potential motivators are the limits to 
those offered to the interview subject from the list above.  Finally exploration will occur about 
the degree to which there are measures in place to verify the degree to which these motivating 
factors have been achieved and, if so, to what degree, further delimiting the research to that 
which the subject had put in place prior to adoption.  
Another delimitation will be to limit the research to the states of Wisconsin, Florida, Virginia, 
Maryland, Texas, California, and New York, the reasoning being that they probably have the 
highest ratio of large counties.  The research will also include Minnesota as the author has a 
particular interest in what is happening within the state in which he practices. This may or may 
not affect the external validity of the final results. 
Finally, one other delimitation of the study is the results will need to be stratified by the state 
within which the county is located.  The stratification is necessary in order to make valid 
comparisons of the degree to which state policy may be impacting the adoption rate or the 
measurement of motivating factors related to the adoption of a performance-based pay system.  
Additional analysis may need to be completed and/or adjustments may be need to be done to the 
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final data collected to try to minimize the impact of other independent variables on the survey 
results, e.g. differences in state preferences for particular types of services, different methods of 
controlling for state-to-state variation in the duties assigned to political subdivisions, and so on.   
Selection of subjects 
Subjects will be selected for the test group based on the existence of a performance-based pay 
program in their jurisdiction.  They will be identified by contacting the membership associations 
for each type of public organization in each of the target states to get contact information for 
each member of theirs that meets the operational definition of an existing performance based pay 
system.  It is expected that the test study group will necessarily need to essentially self-select as 
the population of organizations with such a program in place is expected to be relatively low.  
Once the test group is so self-selected, a baseline analysis of critical characteristics, such as 
population, annual expenses, numbers of employees, and so on, will be done to identify the 
relative nature.  Close care will need to be taken to try to minimize external variables which 
might affect the outcomes.  Being an exploratory design, however, such variability is expected to 
a certain degree and should be dealt with more fully in subsequent research or a more 
experimental design. 
Instrumentation 
Instrumentation will be through a survey that will be personally administered.  The survey will 
be one developed for this specific research and designed to capture information on the 
motivating factors that led to the adoption of a performance-based pay system.  In addition, the 
survey will capture population, state, number of employees, annual budget, and how many and to 
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which employee classifications (if appropriate) the performance-based pay program applies.  It 
will be pre-tested by administering it over the telephone to a selected group of the proposed 
participants from the largest organizations involved.  It will then be modified based on the 
feedback received from them.  Subsequently, it will be consistently used with all jurisdictions 
meeting the definitional parameters of the study in the selected states. 
Data collection and recording 
The data will be collected via telephone interview with the study author recording all of the 
responses.  The interviews will be recorded to allow for the researcher to have a free-flowing 
discussion and subsequently record the answers.  Permission for the recording will be secured at 
the beginning of the interview.  The data will be tallied onto an Excel spreadsheet for later 
statistical analysis.   
Because the data has to do with compensation information of public sector organizations, which 
should in all states be deemed to be public information, it is not anticipated that data privacy 
concerns will be present.  If necessary, a coding scheme will be developed to protect any 
confidential information collected, though none is anticipated. 
Data analysis 
In analyzing the data, the jurisdictions will be stratified according to budget size (to approximate 
different sized organizations) and state.  Tallies of the response rates for each of the volunteered 
motivational factors will be compiled, response rates for the suggested motivational factors will 
be similarly tallied and numbers of valid measures of the achievement of the motivating factors 
will also be tallied.  Results will be analyzed and reported on the degree to which there were 
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independently-volunteered motivations, the degree to which each suggested motivation was 
acknowledged, and the degree to which verification is being monitored on the degree to which 
actual achievement of the motivating factors is being done. 
Final presentation of the data will be in a chart form summarizing the major characteristics of the 
responses by stratified category.  Relative frequency indicators will be included within each 
stratified group to indicate the relative prevalence of the variables within any sub-groups.  
Finally, a narrative presentation of the findings and conclusions will be written as part of the 
completion of the study.  It is anticipated that the final results will be in publishable form. 
Discussion of reliability and validity of the study 
As this is a qualitative, exploratory, pre-experimental design, this study is not intended to be 
generalized to the population as a whole, but rather is intended to serve as a launching point for 
more in-depth research.  As such, it could not be considered to have a high degree of external 
validity.  In addition, the internal validity will need further research.  It is possible that there are 
alternative causes of fluctuations in the organizational outcomes measured other than simply the 
performance pay program.  This research should help to show, however, that there is indeed a 
clear set of consistently identified factors that motivate managers to adopt a performance-based 
pay program and to begin to point future researchers in appropriate directions about the degree to 
which it effectively achieves the outcomes those motivating factors represent.  In addition, it 
should help direct future research toward establishing a clearer link and that more sophisticated 
research is warranted to further isolate the performance pay program as the dependent variable 
causing the changes in outcomes.  If the hypotheses are proved incorrect, it will lend additional 
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credibility to undercutting conventional wisdom on the efficacy of performance pay programs. 
In terms of the reliability of the variables, the researcher expects a high degree of reliability in 
the survey responses on the size of the organization.  Reliability will not be as strong as it relates 
to the motivating factors that organizations identify as prior-defined as there may be some 
motivation for the organizations to represent better forethought in adopting a performance-based 
pay system than actually existed, but it should still be fairly high.   
Ethical and diversity considerations 
Participation in the survey is voluntary, though most of the selected states could be expected to 
have some public information statutes, which might statutorily require the release of the data 
being requested.  Incentives would likely improve the survey response rate, but are not planned 
at this time.  Recordings will be made of each telephone interview, but subject permission will be 
sought at the beginning of each taping and, if consent to tape is not given, at the subject’s option, 
either the interview will commence without taping or the interview will be cancelled.  As such, 
there are no ethical considerations with the recording of the interviews.  There appears to be no 
other diversity or ethical considerations involved in this research project.
Overview of proposal 
This research is intended to begin to empirically establish the motivating factors for county 
government organizations in adopting a performance-based pay system and explore to what 
extent they employ measures to validate the success of the program achieving its intended 
purposes and, if available, to what extent in the states of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Florida, 
Virginia, Maryland, Texas, California, and New York.  The target audience for this research is 
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any public administrator or board contemplating the implementation of a performance-based pay 
system.  Funding to cover the cost of the research will come from personal sources.  Additional 
possibilities would include grants from foundations as well as contributions from similarly- 
situated counties, or their professional associations, who might also be interested in the results.  
In the study, counties with performance-based pay programs will be interviewed and the results 
tallied and analyzed to determine what the motivating factors were that led to the adoption of a 
performance-based pay system; what measures, if any, were put into place to track and measure 
the extent to which the program achieved its intended results; and, if available, to what extent 
those results were achieved.  The measures of success for the test are:  Identifying what the 
motivating factors were for the installation of a performance-based pay system; identifying what 
measures, if any, were put into place to track the degree to which the intended results were 
achieved; and, using those measures, where available, identifying the degree to which those 
results were achieved.  These measures are intended to identify what are the primary motivating 
factors that lead to the adoption of a performance-based pay system for county governments and, 
potentially, to show a positive, statistically valid correlation between those county organizations 
employing a performance-based pay program and improved organizational outcomes.  If, on the 
other hand, no specific motivating factors can be identified, or, moreover, if no such correlation 
is shown, it would lend additional credibility to those skeptics who see performance-based pay 
programs as either an institutional fad, something that is counter-productive to organizational 
outcomes, or as something that can more easily apply in the private sector, where widgets are 
easier to count, than in the public sector, where outcomes are much more difficult to measure. 
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Under either circumstance, there is no expectation of a definitive answer to this complex 




Telephone surveys of the IRB-approved dissertation survey were conducted in January through 
March, 2014.  Hamline University’s IRB approval number for this study was received from 
Matthew Olson, Hamline University IRB Chair, on June 20, 2013.  115 telephone surveys were 
conducted using Survey Monkey to collect and store the responses.  16 respondents who had 
been thought to have a performance based pay system in place indicated that they had no such 
system in place, leaving 99 respondents who were able to complete the entire survey. 
Respondents who were interviewed were identified by a number of methods.  Contact was made 
with state associations, as originally planned, within the states that were originally called out for 
study:  Minnesota, Wisconsin, Florida, Virginia, Maryland, Texas, California, and New York.  It 
was apparent early into the process of trying to identify counties within those states that had 
performance based pay systems in place that Minnesota, Wisconsin, Florida, and Virginia were 
states where that would be productive.  Unexpectedly, Maryland, Texas, California, and New 
York turned out not to be for a variety of reasons. 
In the case of Texas, discussions with the Texas association of counties revealed that there was 
only one county executive in the state in Tarrant County.  The Texas association did not think 
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there were any instances of pay for performance that existed within any county in the state.  
Repeated contacts to Tarrant County to ask about their system went unanswered.  In the end, no 
surveys were produced from any Texas county. 
In New York, repeated overtures to both the New York association of counties and the New 
York chapter of the International City/County Manager Association (ICMA), including multiple 
follow-up telephone calls, were unproductive.  Throughout most of the period during which 
interviews with counties were being conducted, no counties in New York had thus been 
identified as fitting the study criteria since no information was forthcoming from the source of 
that.  Moreover, neither association responded to requests to send an inquiry directly to New 
York counties asking if they fit the study criteria.  In the end, through a conversation with the 
staff at the New York ICMA, they suggested one contact person, Ian Coyle, County 
Administrator of Livingston County.  In contacting Mr. Coyle, he was pursuing his own graduate 
studies and, hence, agreed to send out a survey to other ICMA member counties, which, as it 
turns out, are only those counties in New York without an elected county executive.  In the end, 
the study did successfully include five counties from New York. 
A similar experience ensued within California and Maryland as well such that in Maryland, only 
one successful interview was conducted and, in California, only four successful interviews were 
conducted.  As such, within the target states identified at the onset of the research, only 60 
successful interviews were completed and those in New York, California, and Maryland came 
very late in the interview process and only after aggressive attempts to identify study 
participants.  As such, mid-way through the process of identifying counties to interview for 
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inclusion in the study, it appeared that the numbers of successful interviews was going to be too 
few in order to justify any appropriate conclusions, even exploratory ones, and the decision was 
made to expand the scope of states to include in the research.   
Inquiries were then made to expand the scope to include any state bordering on one of the 
originally targeted states or those with an active ICMA chapter, which ended up including, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Washington, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, 
West Virginia, Colorado, Arizona, Iowa, Oregon, Delaware, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island, Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, Alabama, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, 
interviews were conducted within the following states:  South Carolina, Iowa, Illinois, Georgia, 
Washington, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, North Carolina, Kansas, Idaho, Arizona, Michigan, and 
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Characteristics of the county respondents show that performance pay is not limited to any 
particular-sized organization or community.  Figure 5, depicts the range of county sizes and 
Figure 6, below, depicts the community sizes of the counties included. 
Figure 4 – Proportion of Respondents by State 
 





Figure 5 – Range of County Size 
 
Figure 6 – Community Size of Counties 
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Scheduling times for the interview at a time that would be mutually agreeable turned into one of 
the most significant challenges and required multiple callbacks and messages.  Consistent with 
the IRB-approved plan, respondents were told that participation was voluntary and were asked 
for their permission about recording, when it was used.  It became apparent as interviews were 
being conducted that all necessary information was able to be collected and input as the survey 
was being administered and, as a result, recording interviews was discontinued early on in the 
process and the question requesting permission to record was dropped.  Interviews were 
collected over a three month period. 
During the course of the interviews, an unexpected delimitation emerged.  The focus of the 
research questions was on the original motivation for the pursuit of a performance based pay 
system.  In a small minority of cases, typically concentrated in those counties in Virginia, North 
Carolina, and Minnesota where performance based pay systems have the longest established 
history of use, the person that was being interviewed, usually the Human Resources Director 
and/or the County Administrator, was not employed by the organization at the time of inception 
of the program.  In those circumstances, the interviewee was asked to answer the questions based 
on the organizational history that had been passed along to them and to use their knowledge of 
the organization’s culture to inform their best estimates as to the most appropriate responses.  
Incidence of this delimitation was sufficiently low as to not be believed to have substantially 
altered the findings. 
One of the hypotheses about this study was that it would find that a substantial portion of the pay 
for performance systems in place would show that the systems were dominated as being applied 
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to only Senior Executives of the county.  The hypothesis was based, in part, in the belief that 
these were relatively new systems in most places and, therefore, there might be more 
experimentation with them among non-union groups, especially among senior executives.  The 
results did not bear that out to be true.  As figure 7, below, illustrates, the vast majority of county 
pay for performance systems were applied not just to Senior Executives.  
 
This question of to whom pay for performance systems are applied became more interesting 
when inquiring about the number of systems that were applied within collectively bargained 
environments.  As figure 8, below, illustrates, the rate of adoption in collectively bargained 
environments is relatively low and those that are in place are primarily confined to Minnesota.  
More importantly, the research design failed to take into account which states were “Right to 
Work” states and which had more liberal laws protecting the rights of public employees to 
Figure 7 – County Pay Performance Systems Availability 
 





This became quickly relevant in that Right to Work states rarely had to even consider the union 
issues associated with a performance pay system as they rarely had unions to contend with in 
advancing such systems.  Not surprisingly, perhaps, the states with the highest percentage of 
instances in which a pay for performance system was applied to 100% of its employees also 
tended to be those states that were Right to Work states, which can be seen in Figure 9, below.  
Interviews with practitioners in Minnesota clearly identified the speed of possible adoption and 
resistance to it among public employee unions as major obstacles to overcome.  So it is all the 
more surprising to find that Minnesota was one of the states with the highest incidence of pay for 
performance systems among those this study could identify. 
Figure 8 – Pay Performance Systems Applicability to Collective Bargaining Units 
 




In addition, interviewees from Wisconsin also noted the dramatic impact that the adoption of Act 
Figure 9 – Right to Work States 
 
Source:  National Right to Work Legal 
Defense Foundation, Inc. 
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10 in 2011 had on their adoption of performance pay systems.  Most of the systems that have 
been adopted in Wisconsin were systems that were put in place after Act 10 was adopted; 
interviewees regularly cited the radical drop in public employee union membership in Wisconsin 
as foundational in their decisions to revamp their compensation practices in line with 
performance pay.  It was clear in many of those conversations that there had been much greater 
reluctance to go down that path while public sector unions were strong.  Evidence from the study 
strongly suggests that the prevalence of strong public employee unions has a chilling effect on, 
but does not completely extinguish the adoption rates of performance pay systems. 
In what might very well be a statement about the prevalence of and strength of public employee 
unions in the targeted states, Figure 10 shows the percent of the workforce to which performance 
pay is applied among the respondent counties.  Clearly, the vast majority of systems applied to 
almost all employees.  The targeted states did end up being disproportionately right-to-work 
states and, in the case of Wisconsin, just recently joined that group, but even in a state with 
strong public employee unions, like Minnesota, where the organization decides to pursue a 
performance pay program, it is typically looking for it to become the new standard for how it 
compensates its employees. Moreover, Figure 11 results show that many of these performance 
pay systems have been in place for a significant length of time.  Many of those longer running 
systems were in Right to Work states on the east coast, including Virginia, North Carolina, and 
South Carolina, quite a few of which had been in existence for 20 or more years.  In states like 
Minnesota’s with strong public employee unions, it was much more likely for those systems to 
be at 8-10 years or less.  In those states with strong public employee unions, it became clear in 
the interviews that a strong executive and board commitment to a compensation system other 
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The basis for this research was to test three hypotheses: 
 There will be a specific set of organizational objectives identified prior to adoption of a 
performance-based pay system. 
 There will be measures of the degree to which the adoption of the performance-based pay 
system advanced the stated organizational objectives. 
 The measures will demonstrate advancement of prior-defined and key organizational 
objectives. 
Figure 10 – Percent of Workforce Where Performance Pay System Applies 
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During the interviews, respondents were asked to self-identify what they thought the motivations 
were for the adoption of their performance pay system.  Figure 12 details the rates at which 
certain things were self-identified as being a motivation.  Noteworthy, and probably not 
surprisingly, distinguishing employees’ performance was, far and away, most frequently 
identified as a motivation for the adoption of a performance pay system being cited by 83.9%  of 
respondents.  The next highest self-identified responses were improved organizational outcomes 
(47.3%), employee satisfaction (34.4%), limiting wage inflation (12.9%), with the rest of the 
answers all at under 10%.  The list of potential responses was fixed and the interviewer was 
simply listening to hear if answers were volunteered within the established categories.




When respondents were prompted with a listing of the same potential motivators and asked if 
these items had been part of their motivation, answers changed, as outlined in Figure 13.  When 
prompted, respondents much more frequently cited performance distinction at 97%, followed by 
employee engagement at 85.9%, organizational outcomes at 84.8%, employee retention at 
73.7%, employee satisfaction at 71.7%, stakeholder satisfaction at 59.6%, limiting wage inflation 
at 31.3%, and attracting Millenials was lowest at 19.2%.  The order of the top answer did not 
change, but employee engagement edged out improved organizational outcomes for second place 
and limiting wage inflation fell from the third most frequently cited answer in the self-identified 
Figure 12 – Performance Pay Systems Motivating Factors 
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list to the second lowest cited answer in the list of prompted choices. This seems to suggest that 
the motivations that respondents self-identified exhibited a significant tendency to over-simplify 
their motivations for the adoption of their performance pay system; but, when given a range of 
choices, frequently gravitated toward a multitude of motivations.  This may highlight a 
communications challenge with employees about the strategic organizational purposes that those 
organizations adopting such systems are pursuing; if there are many reasons for the pursuit of 
such a system, but only few are offered, might that not lead to more confused employees and 
thereby create more difficulties in trying to achieve the true objectives?      
 
Figure 13 – Performance Pay Systems Motivating Factors 
 




In examining the degree to which respondent counties are using an empirical measure to gauge 
the effectiveness of its performance pay program at achieving the intended objectives, the results 
are pretty stark.  As Figure 14 shows, there is a nearly five-to-one margin of respondents who 
have absolutely no measures in place to evaluate the degree to which their performance pay 
program achieves the objectives they identify that it is intended to achieve.  This seems 
especially noteworthy given the trend of local governments toward a more outcomes-based, data-
driven approach to decision-making in recent years.  The adoption of a performance pay program 
appears to be driven by something other than an empirical objective, which will be discussed 
more in the findings section below. 
Figure 14 – Performance Pay Systems Empirical Measures 
 




The lack of empirical measures did not prevent respondents from forming or expressing an 
opinion on whether they thought their performance pay program was achieving the objectives it 
was intended to achieve.  Figure 15 shows that a clear majority of over 60% believe that it is 
achieving its intended objectives in whole or at least in part.  Interestingly, however, there is a 
notable percent of over 20 percent of respondents who did not feel as if the programs were 
achieving its intended objectives, which will, as well, be discussed in the findings section below. 
Finally, there was also a notably significant number of respondents that simply indicated that it 
was too early to tell as their program was too new. 
Figure 15 – Performance Pay Systems Meeting Objectives 
 




CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Discussion of Hypotheses Findings 
In nearly every case, respondents were able to quickly answer with a plausible set of answers in 
regards to what objectives their performance pay program was intended to achieve at its 
inception.  There were often multiple responses that indicated that there had, indeed, been 
discussion and thought put into why their organization had decided to embark on this path.  
Moreover, their responses indicated that they had a good understanding of at least some of the 
likely outcomes they could achieve and some reservations about the limitations of what such a 
system could achieve. 
Not surprisingly, when the question was posed as an open-ended question there were fewer 
responses than when it was a closed-ended list of possibilities supplied to them.  This could be 
attributed to any number of factors.  It could be that their recollections had faded and, especially 
in the case of those counties whose systems were more than 8 years old, it seems as if that’s a 
very likely reason for the disparity.  It could also be that it is simply the difference between the 
human mind’s ability to engage in recall versus recognition.  It could, however, also potentially 
reflect that there was not as thorough a consideration of potential objectives as respondents 
would have liked to convey; or, that respondents wanted suggested objectives to have been part 
of their initial deliberations whether that was, in fact, the case or not. 
What is more interesting, perhaps, is how the responses changed between the open-ended and the 
closed-end questions.  In the open-ended question, only four results garnered response rates 
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greater than 10%, which were, in order of frequency, drawing performance distinctions, 
improved organizational outcomes, employee satisfaction, and limiting wage inflation.  In the 
closed-ended question, response rates for all questions exploded such that only one response had 
a response rate less than 30%.  Moreover the ranking of the top four responses changed.  The top 
four responses in the closed-end question were, in order, drawing performance distinctions, 
employee engagement, improved organizational outcomes, and improved employee retention.  
Limiting wage inflation which had been in the top four responses in the open-ended question 
dropped all the way to second-lowest ranked answer in the closed-ended question. 
It is interesting to note that the more altruistic values of employee engagement and employee 
retention so significantly outpaced the more fiduciary value of controlling labor costs between 
the two questions.  Employee satisfaction, which was in the top four in the open-ended question, 
was only narrowly knocked out of the top four answers in the closed-ended question.  Both 
drawing performance distinctions and improving organizational outcomes stayed in the top four 
no matter which way the question was asked.  An area of future potential study is the degree to 
which the more altruistic value might represent the values that practitioners want to believe is 
motivating them and to what degree the fiduciary value is actually driving them.  These findings 
do lend credibility to the theory that improving organizational outcomes and drawing 
performance distinctions between and among varying levels of employee performance are 
consistent motivations for the adoption of a performance pay system. 
Maybe the most interesting finding related to the hypotheses of this study is the absolute dearth 
of objective measures to evaluate the effectiveness of performance pay programs at achieving the 
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objectives they were put in place to achieve.  An overwhelming 80% of respondents had no 
objectives measures in place and no efforts underway to acquire them.  The strong sense in 
conducting the interviews was that there was a much stronger philosophical basis for the 
adoption of a performance pay program than it was something that needed ongoing evaluation.  
For the vast majority, it was as though paying people on the basis of their individual 
contributions was to be accepted as an article of faith without the need to demonstrate its 
effectiveness.  This seems to be a different standard than is being applied to many of the 
organizational objectives of county governments nationwide where the development of objective 
measures of the degree to which the organization is actually, in fact, advancing its mission is 
becoming more and more commonplace.  It does not appear to display the same intellectual rigor 
in the two parts of our practice. 
Among the small minority who were measuring the effectiveness of their system, the measures 
they most frequently gravitated to did reasonably relate to at least one of their intended 
objectives.  For instance, there were a few who evaluated the performance rankings that were 
given to employees at the macro level to examine the spread of employee ratings.  In so doing, 
they were effectively evaluating the degree to which the system was producing the kinds of 
distinctions between and among employees that they had intended for it to achieve.  This will be 
discussed further in the section below on other general findings.  The most frequently cited 
measure reported, from among the less than 20 percent who cited having a measure at all, was 
retention rates, which does effectively measure the degree to which the intended objective of 
managing employee retention rates is being achieved.   
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A couple of other respondents used annual employee satisfaction surveys as a measure of the 
degree to which their system was advancing employee satisfaction.  In these latter two instances, 
however, while the measures are reasonably related to a stated objective of their performance 
pay program, there are many other contributing factors to employee retention and satisfaction 
such that it is much less clear to what degree their organizations’ performance pay program was 
motivating change in those measures versus other unrelated factors, such as the economy, labor 
shortages in particular job classes, quality of supervision, and so on. 
Finally, some respondents in that small minority of respondents who indicated they were 
measuring the effectiveness of their performance pay program cited measures that could most 
generously be characterized as surrogate measures for the objectives that they stated they had 
intended for the system to achieve.  Among these were references to absenteeism rates, market 
pay rates, and ties to performance-based budgeting.  While these are important and laudable 
things for an organization to measure, the research question here is whether they would be 
reasonably related to the stated objectives cited for the adoption of their performance pay 
program.  That connection seems more distant and less clearly related than the others mentioned 
by some respondents.  That said, they may be decent surrogate measures for the intended 
objectives, a practice fairly common in trying to evaluate the achievement of other organizational 
objectives, such as environmental protection, protecting the most vulnerable in our society, and 
so on. 
Probably most importantly to these questions was how few organizational objectives 
practitioners identified that they were attempting to achieve in their program; and, how few had 
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measures of objectively evaluating the degree to which they we actually achieving it.  Only 20% 
could cite any measure and, among the 20%, extremely few could cite more than one measure 
and no one had established a system of measurement that was directly linked to the stated 
objectives they were pursuing.  Within the context of managing to achieve specific results, the 
evaluative practice was exceptionally thin. 
Consistent with the clear finding that the adoption of a performance pay program was more a 
philosophical article of faith, it was not so surprising to find that a strong majority of respondents 
generally felt that it was achieving its intended objectives.  For many, it seemed almost a self-
fulfilling prophecy or something to be taken on faith like the goodness of motherhood and apple 
pie.  It is hard to escape the conclusion that this confidence is more rooted in political principles 
than it is in good human resources or organizational management practices.  Many respondents, 
for instance, talked about how this had been initiated by their governing board as a strategic 
objective.  There are many things, however, that are initiated through the political process, such 
as protecting the environment, that have not necessarily led to the separation between the 
achievement of the political objective and the good, solid administration of how that objective is 
to be measured and advanced.  Quintessentially, Woodrow Wilson’s politics-administration 
dichotomy seems on display here, but there has not seemed to be the same degree of intellectual 
rigor put into the administration end of the equation in relation to performance pay programs as 
is regularly applied to other administrative advancements of political objectives.  It seems almost 
as if the administrators are so convinced of the rightness of the political objective that it does not 
require as rigorous an administrative practice to prove the effectiveness of one compensation 
strategy over another.  There are now a sufficient base of performance pay programs in place 
D i s s e r t a t i o n  | 86 
 
 
among counties around the nation that the question of what type of employee compensation 
system produces better organizational results is open to scrutiny and good practice.  If the answer 
to that question is already taken as an article of faith, then the concern becomes that we are 
blinded to the need to empirically analyze it. 
There were also, among some of the respondents who thought that performance pay programs 
were not meeting their intended objectives, some who seemed just as philosophically pre-
disposed against the success of a performance pay program and such an article-of-faith 
conclusion is equally troubling regardless of which side of the argument the conclusion is leaped. 
That said, there were some clear-eyed skeptics, both among those who identified that the 
performance pay program was not achieving its intended objectives and, refreshingly, among 
those who indicated that they thought it was.  From among this small subset, some of the most 
interesting and useful observations could be distilled and will be discussed more in the 
discussion of general findings below.  This was a group of questioning, doubting, cheerleading, 
and thoughtful practitioners who anecdotally offered suggestions for other practitioners which 






performance pay seem to have a healthy recognition that performance pay is not a panacea.  
Many responding proponents of performance pay systems discussed warping influences it had on 
“You will get what you incent and, to that extent, we get what we ask 
for. To the extent that we don’t always ask for the right thing, it can 
be counter-productive. It does achieve the administration of an 
effective compensation system that attracts and retains talent. It also 
does help us focus employee energies where we want them to be; it 
just requires us to be more strategic in what we direct them to and 
that is mostly a good thing.” 
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human behaviors, such as spawning competition that was at times unhealthy, the tendency for 
managers to engage in grade inflation, demotivating influences on those not being rewarded as 
greatly, and so on.  That said, many of those same respondents also argued that performance pay 
could not be evaluated in a vacuum; it had to be compared to the alternative systems of employee 
compensation and, among those alternatives, the traditional step-and-grade or flat-Cost-of-
Living-Allowance (COLA) systems also have warping influences on human behavior.  These 
respondents argued that you have to consider all of the pros and cons of each and, in so doing, 
many of them concluded that performance pay systems had fewer negative warping influences 
than other systems.   
Some of the warping influences of traditional compensation systems frequently cited by 
responding proponents of performance pay systems included that those employees who work the 
least are receiving disproportionate rewards to their effort or results than those who are working 
harder and/or achieving more, 
rewards are unrelated to the 
advancement of organizational 
objectives or advancement of the organization’s mission, a step-and-grade system coupled with a 
COLA increase drives wage inflation above market norms, and so on.   
“The step and grade system is equal pay for unequal 
work and that’s just wrong.” 
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Responding proponents of performance pay systems also, however, widely acknowledged that a 
step-and-grade system or flat-COLA system was substantially easier to administer and that an 
organization should only pursue a performance pay system if it had the interest, was willing to 
develop the capacity, and was willing to allocate sufficient managerial time and resources to do a 
high-quality job.  In the absence of 
that conscious commitment, it was 
widely agreed that a poorly 
administered performance pay system 
can do more harm than good.  This was reinforced in the work of Daniel Pink (2011).  It was 
widely understood that the success of a performance pay system was significantly dependent on 
the quality of the content and administration of the performance management system.  
Importantly, respondents strongly indicated there was good reason for any organization to adopt 
a high-quality performance management system regardless of whether they wished to link 
compensation practices to it; but that, if you were going to link compensation practices to the 
performance management system, it was essential that the performance management system 
have high-quality content and be well-managed in its execution. 
Some respondents from both among proponents and opponents of performance pay systems 
indicated that they did not believe that compensation was a very effective motivator for future 
performance, but proponents indicated they did think it was a good reward for past contributions.  
Organizations with the most well-developed systems discussed broad ranges of strategies to 
“Prior to implementing this, a lot of employee 
evaluations were not completed. After going into this, 
we’ve achieved much higher rates of participation. 
Employees are also asking what they need to do to 
achieve the higher level of pay.” 
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reward past performance and motivate future performance.  Among those strategies most 
frequently cited, but beyond the scope 
of this research, were employee 
recognition programs, employee 
service awards, employee tenure 
awards, training and development investments, ensuring employees are given challenging and 
stimulating work, appeals to the intrinsic motivations of public service work, appeals to the 
nobility of the mission of county government, and so on.  In short, this subset of proponents who 
also reflected the limited efficacy of pay as a motivator reflected that performance pay systems 
would not create a high-performing organization by itself, but that, when coupled with other 
thoughtful strategies that take into account what we know about what motivates human behavior, 
it can and should be a part of that constellation of strategies. 
One of the greatest challenges in the performance pay movement over the course of the last 
number of years has been the impact 
that the Great Recession has had on 
wage movements of any kind in the 
public sector.  When the 
compensation system is premised on 
using an extrinsic motivator, the absence of the availability of resources to provide an extrinsic 
motivator has had a chilling effect.  Many respondents noted that they believed the Great 
Recession had dealt their programs a setback in terms of their ability to continue to reinforce the 
strategic aims of their systems.  What this reinforced in the broader sense was that the amount of 
“It hasn’t been funded for five years.  Even before, 
when we were funding it, the amount it was funded 
was so minimal that it was hard to distinguish 
between those who met expectations and those who 
exceeded them. This really limits the motivation that 
the differential provides.” 
“There are clearly now objectives and measures that 
if you achieve them you will be rewarded. I’m not as 
sure or confident that this system means we are 
achieving more in our organizational workplans or 
advancing the mission.” 
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incentive that the reward can provide is directly linked to the perceived value of the amount of 
the reward offered. 
The most frequently cited problem associated with performance pay programs was the tendency 
for managers to engage in grade 
inflation.  Many respondents felt that 
some managers did this as a way of 
motivating their employees by 
making them feel better through a 
more positive performance ranking, 
and some respondents felt that some managers did this as a way to get raises to people who they 
believed deserved pay increases, sometimes in contravention of organizational policy in regards 
to the compensation system.  It is important to note here that many of these behaviors are 
frequently present (and maybe even more prevalent) in a traditional performance management 
system that has no ties to compensation practices, such as performance pay.  In systems where 
there is an established linkage between pay and performance, however, these “alternative” 
motivations for manager performance within the traditional performance management system 
had the distinct effect of disabling an organization’s strategic linkages of pay to performance and 
what that linkage was intended to advance in terms of higher performance or advancement of 
organizational objectives. 
Many respondents who noted this dysfunction toward grade inflation referred to this dynamic 
using terms like “motivations” or “pressures within the system” or “checks and balances.”  They 
“We are suffering significant grade inflation and, 
because it is inadequately funded, it has led 
managers to abuse the review process to give passing 
grade to employees in order to get them a raise that 
they then sometimes want to fire for poor 
performance.  When that happens, the system is 
impairing our ability to manage to truly good 
performance.” 
D i s s e r t a t i o n  | 91 
 
 
argued that there were natural pressures built into a supervisor-subordinate relationship in which 
the supervisor wants to reward people who work for them and recognize them for the assistance 
they provide in essentially advancing the supervisor’s standing within the organization, career, 
salary, department’s objectives, and so on.  For a manager to be required to draw performance 
distinctions, they suggested, can be disruptive to that relationship, something a manager 
intuitively perceives.  Interestingly, some perceived this pathology to be even more prevalent 
among elected department heads.  As such, these respondents indicated there needed to be 
strategic counter-pressures developed within the system to offset this “natural” pressure.  Among 
the most frequently cited strategies: 
A frequently cited best-management practice was to have a goal or target that the organization 
expected in terms of what their performance rating system would produce.  In other words, what 
was the target or goal for how employee performance ratings would be distributed.  Since this is, 
in a performance pay system, then linked to compensation, there should be a goal for how the 
ratings would be distributed in order to manage the financial impacts of the system.  Some 
referred to this as their bell-curve target, a reference to bell-curve grading in education, and, most 
of those who spoke of this, spoke of intentionally weighting the bell curve toward a higher than 
average rating.  As an example of this type of weighting the system toward positive ratings, an 
organization could plan to see a performance rating distribution of 5% of its employees scored as 
exceptional, 15% as exceeding expectations, 70% as meeting expectations, 5% needing 
improvement and 5% as unsatisfactory. 
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Some used this target curve as a forced-ranking system in which each manager was only allowed 
to give out a fixed number of “exceeds” ratings, a fixed number of “achieves” ratings, and was 
required to have a fixed number of 
“needs improvement/unsatisfactory” 
ratings.  This strategy is identical to a 
bell-curve grading system in 
education where the performance of 
the group determines how the various performance rating levels of individuals must be graded.  
This was the least frequently cited strategy as many felt that it forced an unnatural circumstance 
that did not allow managers to take into account realities of performance in the day-to-day world 
where project assignments or other circumstances might lead to a bona fide need or desire to rate 
people differently than a forced-curve ranking would require. 
The more frequent best-management practice cited was to use this target rating curve more 
loosely as a guide to evaluate the performance of their managers within the context of how 
closely each manager made their 
targeted ranges, not as a forced 
ranking, but as one evaluation criteria 
in the performance rating of their 
supervisors.  In other words, one of 
the key performance accountabilities 
in the performance review process for supervisors was how well they had administered the 
performance management process of their subordinates using the targeted goals for performance 
“The failure has primarily been that it has had to be 
underfunded because of the Great Recession. The 
underfunding has required us to put limits on the 
number of really high performers. This has always 
been a struggle within the public sector, even before 
the Great Recession. We always had to place internal 
limits on the number of superior performers.” 
“It provided a consistent method of completing 
employee performance reviews and held managers 
accountable to completing them. It achieved the 
goals we had, but did cause some problems, such as 
some Department Directors using this as a way to get 
their employees’ more money so we developed an 
internal review team to look at those with very high 
ratings or very low ratings.” 
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ratings distribution as a normalizing standard.  Each organization gave different weight to this 
performance expectation and in no case was it the only key performance indicator for their 
supervisors, but it was a significant weight in most cases.  In other words, each supervisor or 
manager was held accountable to how closely they achieved the target curve, not in a strict sense 
that it had to be done exactingly, but in a general sense, allowing for variation to some degree. 
Another best-management practice cited was to analyze the results of performance ratings within 
the organization and to cross-tab it by various criteria, such as by departments, by supervisors 
versus non-supervisors, by male versus female, and so on to see if there were any enlightening or 
disturbing trends that would suggest the system is not performing in expected ways such that 
corrective action can be taken.  Many organizations who use this best practice enhance it by 
transparently sharing this analysis as part of management team meetings and openly discussing 
its implications for their performance in the administration of the performance management 
system.  Many others also enhance this by doing the same with all employees. 
Another best-management practice cited was to use the management team en-masse to check the 
performance rating behaviors of individuals within the group by doing what was referred to most 
frequently as “internal calibration.”  
The model here is to assemble your 
managers and require them to show 
all their ratings and present 
information to the group on the basis 
for any of their “outlier” ratings, those 
“The system we used before produced about 80% of 
employees rated at “achieves.” We modified it and, 
afterward, used the management team to calibrate 
the results.  We drove the results toward a bell 
curve—not forced rankings—but pushed toward a 
bell curve.  It helped highlight who were the 
superstars and also highlighted who were the 
employees deficient in performance that we needed to 
more effectively deal with.” 
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that deviated from the middle or average or achieves ranking that a variation of a bell curve 
would suggest is where most employees would reside.  In so doing, if a manager was rating 
disproportionately high, low, or average, it could be called out for open discussion about how 
that conclusion was arrived at and whether it was justified by the facts.  What the group is 
looking for is that each manager is applying a consistent rigor, discipline, and managerial 
courage to their rankings and, by using the group to review the rankings, the system should better 
minimize supervisor bias or favoritism.  According to Miller (2014), calibration makes it easier 
for managers to deliver difficult performance reviews and creates camaraderie and broader 
exposure among leaders and top talent within larger organizations. 
The most robust performance pay systems utilized more than one and, in a few select cases, 
almost all of the best management strategies listed above.  The more best management strategies 
that were employed, the more subtly nuanced was the discussion regarding the limitations and 
influencers on human motivation in complex, dynamic organizational systems and the more 
quietly confident were these particular practitioners that their performance pay system was 
superior to the traditional step-and-grade system or a flat-COLA system. 
Recommendations 
The research demonstrates that those who pursue a performance-based compensation system for 
purely philosophical reasons that dig no deeper than because they think it will improve 
performance over the step-and-grade system are missing the most important considerations that 
will lead it to success.  Not surprisingly, the systems identified in the research that most 
commonly failed were in circumstances in which the result of the existing performance 
D i s s e r t a t i o n  | 95 
 
 
assessment system, regardless of its own efficacy, were simply tied to compensation.  What was 
clear is that simply linking employees’ compensation to a flawed performance assessment 
process will do little good and, probably, great damage to the advancement of an organization’s 
objectives. 
What came clearly through the research and the BMPs is that the quality of the performance 
assessment system matters a great deal and that any hope of making an empirical difference in 
advancing an organization’s objectives through this kind of system is dependent on a high-
quality performance assessment process.  Yet, anything short of perfection in a performance 
assessment process will create tensions and behaviors that will be detrimental to the 
advancement of organizational objectives.  It would seem, in the end, that there is a very real and 
extremely delicate balancing equation here that must be struck:  the performance assessment 
system has to be very, very good—good enough that the advantages it brings in focusing and 
marshalling the human talent resource toward the advancement of organizational objectives 
produces more advancement of those objectives than the negative implications it will also bring.  
As the quality of the performance assessment process improves, so, too, will its potential to, on 
balance, do more good than harm; but, conversely, the lower the quality of the performance 
assessment process, the greater the potential that linking it to performance will do more harm 
than good. 
To that end, the research pretty clearly points out the easiest thing to do:  maintain the status quo.  
Keep using the traditional step-and-grade compensation system to reward employees based on 
their length of service.  It does not require sophistication of measurement systems, it does not 
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require defining the measurable outcomes that represent the value proposition that the public 
expects public agencies to accomplish, it engenders many fewer employee issues and grievances.  
In short, the manager’s life will be much easier. 
But that gets to a rather fundamental question about what is the leadership role of public 
administrators who are organizationally “in charge,” e.g. Chiefs of staff, Agency heads, city and 
county administrators, school superintendents?  There is, after all, a value proposition between 
the public and its government:  The public expects certain deliverables or outcomes and the 
government attempts to deliver them in the best way they can.  To be sure, there are vigorous 
debates between and among citizens and elected policymakers about the size and scope of 
government—to what ends should our government capacity be put?  From a purely 
administrative point of view, however, once that size and scope is defined by the duly-elected 
representatives in this democratic republic, can we not all agree that the value proposition for 
that size and scope ought to be as vigorously pursued as possible?  How could leaders ever 
conclude that good is good enough? 
As the purchaser of the service—the master of the value proposition—how is the public to 
understand the degree to which the public promise—that reverent covenant that the government 
will, in point of fact, make a real difference—is achieved?  Is it good enough to be able to 
demonstrate that the public servants tried their hardest?  Or does the public expect that their 
government will actually achieve something, that public problems will be solved, that public 
good is tangibly advanced? 
Considering something tangible like roads and bridges, the answer is clearer.  The public hired 
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us to build and maintain roads and bridges.  When bridges fall down, we fail.  When roads don’t 
get plowed after snowfalls, we fail.  When engines fall out of cars because of the ride quality, we 
fail.  And so measurable ways have been developed to see that these things either don’t happen 
or do happen in the way we want them to.  There are bridge sufficiency ratings to measurably 
evaluate the ongoing conditions of bridges; there are performance targets for when a road ought 
to have dry pavement following a snowfall; and, there is a ride quality index to measure 
inflections in road surfaces so we know how smooth the road is.  Taken together and aggregated, 
evaluation of our system of bridges, our snowplowing performance, and our road maintenance 
performance take place against identifiable targets. 
Findings then support that at, say, the level of a highway department, evaluation of the degree to 
which the individuals that comprise that department are collectively achieving the value 
proposition as it relates to roads and bridges.  At the department level, we can effectively 
measure and evaluate the degree to which we are achieving the outcome that comprises the value 
proposition.  It is still difficult to identify the degree to which an individual engineering aide or 
snowplow operator has contributed to the department’s performance outcome.  That requires 
“unbundling” the contributory actions taken by the individual to the achievement of the 
departmental outcomes.  At the department level, you can focus on the outcome that is the value 
proposition; but, as you move to the individually- contributing employee, you are more likely to 
focus on the inputs they contribute that you know will produce a given outcome.  This isn’t a 
perfect science as there are other variables that influence the outcomes as well, e.g. weather 
variations, cost of salt, oil prices, and so on, that also contribute to the outcome of effectively 
maintaining roads and bridges, but it is better than paying no attention to the outcomes and what 
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actions lead to us achieving more of them. 
Realistically, this work is exceptionally difficult.  There are few places where that is more true 
than in any of the public sector’s human service fields, e.g. social services, public health, and 
public safety.  The public has determined, for instance, that chemical dependency has many 
deleterious effects on society and wants limits placed on the actions of people whose dependency 
leads them to anti-social behaviors, such as public drunkenness, crimes, child abuse or neglect, 
and so on.  Public agencies hire chemical dependency social workers and counselors to work 
with members of the public struggling with chemical addictions in order to advance that value 
proposition.  How, in these circumstances is the public to know that their investment is making a 
difference?  How is the CD worker or Social Worker going to move the needle on the prevalence 
of CD issues manifesting themselves in the society at large?   
It could be expected that in an agency attempting to link pay to performance on such outcomes 
for the Social Worker to balk and point out that they cannot control whether or to what extent 
people choose to drink to excess.  Conversely, however, if what the Social Worker is saying is 
that they cannot move the needle, then doesn’t it beg the fundamental question as to why we are 
asking the public for their precious resources to try?  Conventional historical wisdom leaves this 
tension unresolved.  It suggests that we accept as an article of faith that the Social Workers 
efforts will make a difference, and that, since it cannot be proven, we should accept their best 
effort as good enough.  Growing public distrust in its public institutions stems, at least in 
significant part, from the perpetuation of this sloppy bargain—one in which citizens continue to 
be asked for more and more of their hard-earned treasure to advance social experiments, the end 
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achievements of which are all-too-frequently never shown.  Where the achievements are more 
easily verified and known, e.g. roads and bridges, while debate is still present, public support for 
these investments runs higher. 
And, yet, in the CD world, what prevents us from measuring chemical dependency rates at the 
departmental level.  To be sure, there are many contributing factors influencing those rates, but 
the most productive avenues to advance that public value proposition are contained entirely 
within the richness of that public dialogue.  For the individual Social Worker, we do know the 
inputs that we are asking them to achieve, inputs that we ask them to achieve because we believe 
based on our knowledge, experience, and the latest research, that they are the best ways for us to 
achieve higher success rates than other potential actions.  We can measure those inputs and hold 
the Social Worker accountable for the degree to which they achieved the inputs, both in terms of 
quality and quantity.  We can measure the societal addiction rates and hold departmental leaders 
accountable to the degree to which they are applying efficacious strategies and adapting to 
changing realities. 
It is in this crucible that we see that what is key to the advancement of the public value 
proposition is less about the mechanics of the compensation system or its tie to performance than 
it is to the quality, intensity, and credibility of the performance assessment process.  Isn’t it 
interesting to note that none of the best management practices identified in the previous section 
have to do with compensation system mechanics and all of them have to do with increasing the 
credibility of the performance assessment process?  Setting aside for a moment the linkage of 
pay-for-performance, isn’t it critically incumbent upon every public leader to be able to hold a 
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highly credible, high quality, thoughtful, interactive, and rich performance discussion with every 
employee that works for them to convey how well the employee is or is not advancing the value 
proposition they were hired to advance?  Isn’t this a proper demand by the public paying for the 
freight? 
A common reason offered for the failure to advance this kind of highest-quality performance 
assessment process is that public leaders are overwhelmed and do not have the time or the 
resources to do it justice.  It would seem that this argument has ruled the day—or, cynically, it 
seems as if it has ruled every day.  But what could possibly be more important than for a 
supervisor to maximize the return on the public’s human capital investment?  What could 
possibly be more important?  In the end, the failure to do so means that, arguably, the most 
important and, interestingly, the most difficult of the supervisory leadership tasks is left to 
languish to its own ends.  It’s hard not to speculate as to whether it is because it is so very 
difficult that it is so often avoided.  To what purposes is a supervisor’s, a manager’s, a leader’s 
day put that supervising, managing, and leading takes a back seat? 
Moreover, in the absence of effective evaluative tools to measure the relative contributions of 
each employee, then the normal variations present in every human endeavor will be allowed to 
perpetuate leaving an uneven return on the human capital investment from one employee to the 
next.  This variation means that some measure of the public’s human capital investment is 
wasted.  Worse, it is accepted as unavoidable.  Efforts in the private sector to LEAN out 
processes or to apply Six Sigma strategies to reduce variations in customer experience are 
designed to minimize this very type of variation in processes replete with the human experience, 
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but efforts to do so in public agencies is negligible at best. 
How can it not be argued that the failure to advance public administration practice to as 
effectively as possible evaluate the achievement of the various public value propositions and the 
maximizing of the single greatest investment made in it—the human capital investment—is the 
single greatest failure in a discipline that claims to make government both more effective and 
more efficient?  Practitioners and academics have spent considerable energy debating the 
effectiveness of linking pay to performance and very little on advancing the evaluation of actual 
performance.  If practitioners had a highly credible, high quality, interactive, and rich evaluation 
process, would anyone seriously argue that those employees who advance the bargain more 
shouldn’t be compensated more?  When this research was begun, it appeared the right question 
was whether employees’ compensation ought to be linked to performance.  What is now more 
apparent is that the compensation component is just the mechanics at the end of the performance 
assessment process and that the success of those compensation mechanics to drive improved 
performance will rise and fall on the quality of the performance assessment process.   
Some will continue to argue that what counties do cannot be measured—then how would anyone 
know if counties are making any difference?  In the absence of knowing that, why would citizens 
want to invest any more in counties and their work?  What is clear is that if practitioners want to 
advance pay-for-performance in the public sector, then they need to spend a lot more time on the 
performance side of that statement than on the pay side of it.  What is equally clear is that even if 
practitioners do not want to link pay to performance in the public sector, then they ought to 
spend a lot more time on the performance side of that statement anyway because maximizing the 
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return on the human capital investment is, arguably, the most important thing they do—in fact, 
the very thing they were hired to do.  Advancing the public value proposition and maximizing 
the return on the single greatest public investment in that value proposition—human capital—
demands no less.  As for the public leader that can’t find the time to do that, it begs the question 
of what they are spending their time on? 
What this research reveals is that too many practitioners who are adopting performance pay 
systems are doing so because they believe that it is philosophically right.  They are not applying 
the same rigor to testing whether this organizational objective is being actually achieved through 
empirical measurement versus that they simply believe it is the “right thing to do.”  At the same 
time, what the research qualitatively also shows equally clearly is that there a very limited few 
practitioners who are taking this practice so seriously that they are applying rigorous best 
management practices to the application of this management technique.  We can learn a great 
deal from those limited few about how we can advance organizational outcomes through a 
stronger performance management and assessment system regardless of whether we tie those 
strategies to the additional management strategy of linking pay to it as well.  Those who are 
developing a rigorous performance assessment and management practice stood out in the 
research as those who could actually discuss what they were accomplishing at something deeper 
than a platitudinous level.  What was fascinating to then note was that if you had rigor, 
discipline, and best practices in the performance assessment and management process, how much 
easier it was for those practitioners to link pay in with greater confidence that it would help the 
organization and not hurt it. 
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So, what can the research tell us about how to construct such a rigorous and robust performance 
assessment and management process?  All of the BMPs earlier identified speak to this very 
question.  In addition, one of the key findings of the research is that advancing organizational 
outcomes was one of the primary drivers for instituting a performance based compensation 
system; at the same time, there was remarkably little discussion about which specific 
organizational outcomes were attempting to be advanced by the institution of the system or 
which organizational outcomes were actually advanced by the institution of the system.  There 
were almost no systems that were being empirically tested to see if the system was achieving the 
results it was intended to achieve.  One of the key recommendations that this study advances, 
therefore, is the clear need to be much, much more purposeful in the purpose and design of the 
performance assessment process. 
Seeing a comprehensive system in use may help to illuminate how such a system is both 
constructed and administered.  To that end, one organization’s system, designed and built using 
some of the findings of this research is offered as potentially instructional and is therefore 
presented here as a case study.  It is still too early to tell if, on balance, this system does more 
harm than good, but it will help to advance the research question and it is, therefore, offered as 
such.  The following recommendations come from that context and are presented here in that 
format. 
Crow Wing County, MN:  A case study 
Much of the discussion about effective performance assessment programs focuses on either the 
forms used or the rating scale used.  Interestingly, very little of either of these was mentioned by 
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respondents to this research and, on reflection, that is likely with good reason.  The most 
important thing to remember in the development of a highly effective performance assessment 
process is to create clear expectations for an employee about that which the organization wants 
them to contribute and that those actions are reasonably related to and expected to advance 
things that are linked to that which the organization is attempting to accomplish.  Stated another 
way, there should be clear expectations for the employee and a clear line-of-sight alignment 
between what the employee is being asked to do and what the organization is trying to 
accomplish. 
There is no one right way to accomplish this, but the following is offered as one county’s 
experience in designing, constructing, and implementing a robust performance assessment and 
management process and linking that to compensation.  Many of the practices and approaches, 
though not all, were informed by this research.  The research is not definitive on the ultimate 
organizational value provided by linking pay to performance, but, for those practitioners who 
believe strongly in that approach, the research was clear that having high credibility in the 
performance assessment process was critical.  In addition, the research identified clear 
connections between what those interviewed perceived as highly credible practices, or BMPs, 
and how they would operate in a system of practices to maximize the chances of success. 
To that end, the experience of Crow Wing County is not offered here as the only path to pursue, 
but, rather, it is offered here because its path was informed by this research.  The BMPs 
identified within this research were incorporated into their practice.  The qualitative findings 
produced in the research were incorporated into its system design.  There were other resources 
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drawn from, such as the Balanced Scorecard, that was not part of this research.  The hope is that 
in seeing it woven together and, maybe more importantly, how it was woven together will be 
instructive to the reader about how they might go about creating a similar framework for their 
organization. 
Most importantly, conveying organizational meaning and alignment is key.  To do that, it should 
be easy to tell your organization’s “story.”  Below is a framework for an organizational Strategy 
Map (Figure 16) as a simplified way to begin to spread and inculcate your organization’s story: 
 
Figure 16 – Organizational 
Strategy Map 
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As such, the beginning is the end.  One must first start with the end in mind.  What kind of future 
are the leaders hoping to create through the work of your organization?  They need not limit that 
question to just the contributions of the organization, but may also think of their organization as 
part of a larger community system and how their contributions will add to the work of others.  
This seems especially appropriate to a public organization.  In doing so, organizational and 
political leaders contemplate the difference they hope to make through the efforts put forth 
through their organization.  How far into the future they choose to look is subjective, but it 
should clearly reflect a future that is not yet here and will be a significant stretch for the 
organization to accomplish.  When properly constructed, this is the vision for the organization. 
At this point, it also seems appropriate to suggest keeping it simple.  The most effective vision 
for an organization is one that is shared by everyone in the organization.  While that is likely an 
impossibility that everyone will share it, that is the goal and so the simpler you can keep this, the 
further it will advance throughout the organization and the more impact and effectiveness it will 
carry.  The ultimate goal is broad understanding of what the organization is trying to accomplish 
and subsequent alignment of the performance expectations with it. 
The next question should reflect what the organization will do to achieve bringing about that 
vision of the future.  This is fundamentally the “what” questions that should define, at a very, 
very high level, what your organization will do to achieve its future state.  Finally, the 
organization should define the “how” question very broadly.  How will the organization go about 
doing the things that it identified needed doing in order to bring about the future state it wants to 
create.  Typically, these are expressed as values that are the most important to the organization to 
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hold dear as you travel the proverbial path. 
Through this kind of exercise, a vision, mission, and values statement is created that should 
quickly convey the most important things to know about the organization.  This becomes your 
organizational “brand.”  There is a great deal of variation in the practice of setting the preceding 
for organizations’ and a diverse consulting network upon which organizations can draw.  As 
such, there is no one right answer, there is only the answer right for your organization, but, again, 
keep the end in mind.  In designing this to create clarity and alignment in a performance 
assessment system, keep it simple.   
It is critical that this version of who the organization is should be spread far and wide and that it 
be as close to a guidepost for daily action as it can be.  To that end, many organizations create 
attractive ways to convey it.  Figure 17 is an example of how Crow Wing County’s mission, 
vision, and values are conveyed: 




The vision, mission, and values of an organization should be thought as expansive.  They answer 
the question of why anyone would want to get out of bed in the morning to go and work in your 
shop.  They should inspire that the work you do is important and that it makes a real difference in 
the world at large—otherwise, why bother?  High performance organizations, private or public, 
Figure 17 – Vision, Mission, Vales Statements 
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are inhabited by highly motivated people who aspire to things greater than themselves.  
According to Sinek (2011), “Great companies don’t hire skilled people and motivate them, they 
hire already motivated people and inspire them.  Unless you give motivated people something to 
believe in, something bigger than their job to work toward, they will motivate themselves to find 
a new job and you’ll be stuck with whoever’s left.” 
In the end, however, no one can be all things to all people.  There is a limitless supply of good 
things to do and a limited supply of resources with which to do them, so you must choose.  
Choosing what the organizational priorities are for an organization, the next step, can be seen as 
that first exercise in disciplining the organization to working on only those things that you have 
chosen to advance from among the infinite range of possible good things.  And, so, the 
appropriate question is, what are the most important things for this organization to do within the 
scope of who we are that will do the most to advance us to our vision?  (As an aside, you might 
also consider that your organizational structure contributes greatly to how these organizational 
priorities are driven and think about creating an organizational structure that is organized around 
your organizational priorities to drive performance within business units that is aligned to the 
organizational priority, but that is outside the scope of the design of this research). 
From these organizational objectives, define strategies and subsequently tactics.  This is the point 
that many organizations fall into the trap of thinking that financial objectives are the only thing 
that motivates the organization—a trap easier for private sector concerns to fall into than others.  
The reality, however, is that there will be no financial success for any organization, including a 
private concern, unless it identifies value that it will offer in exchange.  Selling a poor product 
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will not deliver financial return.  Delivering a product at the right pricepoint for the value that it 
delivers and having that pricepoint be profitable within the cost of producing it is what will 
deliver financial success.   
In the public sector, organizations can easily fall into that same trap:  how do we have the lowest 
property taxes?  Well, the obvious answer is to do nothing because then you will not have any 
property taxes.  If you want to cut the cost of snowplowing in half, it’s easy:  take twice as long 
to plow the snow.  Here, too, it is the intersection of competing priorities--finance being one of 
them-- that defines the service/value “sweet spot” that is right for every community and the 
pluralistic opinions contained within.  It is because of these competing priorities that the 
Balanced Scorecard methodology has become so attractive for so many organizations to ensure 
that they have strategies to advance not just one priority at the expense of the others and to 
achieve “balance” in their strategic perspective. 
The Balanced Scorecard methodology does this by using four perspectives:  Financial, 
Customers, Internal Processes, and Learning & Growth.  Returning, then, to the organizational 
priorities that the organization decided to put the organization’s purposes to, within each of the 
perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard, what are the things the organization must do really, 
really well in order to accomplish your organizational priorities?  The answer to that question 
becomes your strategies.  In the end of the design of the performance assessment process, 
absolutely every employee performance measure should be tied back and “linked” to one of 
these strategies and that linkage ought to be reviewed and revisited with employees every year as 
part of their review.  That said, it is equally important to know that the Balanced Scorecard 
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methodology is only appropriate in the senior echelons of the organization where a holistic set of 
objectives are actually expected.  It does no good, for instance, for a custodian without budget 
authority to have a financial goal. 
Crow Wing County’s strategy map quickly and comprehensively tells the story of this 
organization, who they are, what they do, how they want to be known while doing it, and what 
they need to do to in order to do it well: 
 
 
Figure 18 – Organizational Priorities 
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A more updated version of this, designed to state these objectives in less jargon language, 
produced the following strategy map: 
Figure 19:  Crow Wing County Strategy Map 
 
This process of beginning with the end in mind is essentially one of cascading from what it is 
that the organization is trying to achieve throughout the layers of the organization to what you 
expect from each individual contributor.  Once you have an idea of what the organization’s 
purpose, priorities, and strategies are, you can now begin the process of asking the question, how 
will we know when we’re making progress or have arrived?  This is the beginning of the process 
of defining key performance indicators for each of the organizational priorities.   
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The most well-known method for setting key performance objectives is the S.M.A.R.T. method.  
S.M.A.R.T refers to the acronym that describes the key characteristics of meaningful objectives, 
which are Specific (concrete, detailed, well defined), Measureable (numbers, quantity, 
comparison), Achievable (feasible, actionable), Realistic (considering resources) and Time-
Bound (a defined time line).   
SMART objectives are the stepping stones to the achievement of individual, work group, 
departmental and organizational goals and are detailed below. 
Specific  
Specific means the objective is concrete, detailed, focused and well defined.  Specific means it is 
results and action-orientated.  Objectives must be straight forward and emphasize action and the 
required outcome.  
To set specific objectives it helps to ask:  
WHAT needs to be done?  
WHY is it important?  
WHO is going to do what and who else need to be involved?  
WHEN will it be completed?  
HOW will it be done?  
Diagnostic Questions  
 What exactly will be done, with or for whom?  
 What strategies will be used?  
 Is the objective well understood?  
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 Is the objective described with action verbs?  
 Is it clear who is involved?  
 Is it clear where this will happen?  
 Is it clear what needs to happen?  
 Is the outcome clear?  
 Will this objective lead to the desired results?  
Measurable  
If the objective is measurable, it means that the measurement source is identified and actions can 
be tracked as progress towards the objective is made.  Measurement is the standard used for 
comparison.  For example, a measurable objective may state 50% of the files are to be scanned 
by a certain date.  The measure is 50%.  As it’s so often said if you can’t measure it, you can’t 
manage it!  It’s important to have measures that will encourage and motivate along the way. 
This may require interim measures.  
Diagnostic Questions  
 How will I know that the change has occurred?  
 Can these measurements be obtained?  
Achievable  
Objectives, unlike aspirations and visions, need to be achievable, a stretch, but not so great that 
achievement is unrealistic.  
Diagnostic Questions  
 Can it be done in the proposed timeframe?  
 Are the limitations and constraints understood?  
 Can it be done with the resources we have?  
 Has anyone else done this successfully?  
 Is this possible?  
Realistic  
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Realistic means that you have the resources to get it done.  Resources, such as skills, time, 
people, finances, equipment, etc. may be necessary and must be considered to ensure the 
objective is realistic and achievable.  While keeping objectives realistic, ensure they are a stretch 
and keep in mind they may require a change in priorities to make them happen.  
Diagnostic Questions  
 Are the resources available to achieve this objective?  
 Do priorities need to be shifted to make this happen?  
 Is it possible to achieve this objective?  
Time-Bound  
Time-bound means setting a deadline for the achievement of the objective.  Deadlines need to be 
both achievable and realistic.  Timeframes create the necessary urgency and prompts action.  
Timeframes may be stated in many ways including a specific date such as December 1st or a 
quarter such as by the end of third quarter or annual such as by the end of the calendar year or 
the end of the current rating period.  
Diagnostic Questions  
 When will this objective be accomplished?  
 Is there a stated deadline?  
So, for instance, for county government, it is not hard to imagine that the organizational priority 
of providing a safe and effective transportation infrastructure is the responsibility of the county’s 
transportation division, frequently referred to as a Highway Department (and interestingly so 
since highways are not the only mode of transportation, but that, too, is a topic for another day.)  
So what are the things county leaders should pay attention to that will help us to evaluate the 
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degree to which a county highway department is creating a safe and effective transportation 
system for it constituents?  Put another way, what measurable outcomes would illuminate how 
well they are advancing the value proposition that the public hired the county to achieve in 
creating and maintaining a safe and effective transportation system? 
Setting SMART goals is a good approach to defining performance measures in ways that will 
convey meaning and understanding that is shared, realistic, and achievable.  Using the SMART 
methodology to set goals, however, does nothing to ensure that the goals that are set are smart 
things for the organization to do.  Put another way, a goal can be SMART, but not be wise.  Care 
needs to be taken to ensure that the well-defined goal is a goal towards something that really 
matters to the organization.  Will achieving the goal truly advance the organization closer to 
achieving its mission and vision? 
As such, there are no one set of right answers.  They are the right answers for your organization 
and you should consider them not in terms of a destination, but rather in terms of a journey.  First 
attempts at these will be less than perfect—the whole system will be less than perfect, so ask 
whether what you are landing on is creating more good than more harm.  Here’s an example of 
Crow Wing County’s list of KPIs for their highway department (Figure 20): 
 




As noted earlier, human services KPIs are more difficult to construct.  As such, here is an 
example of the KPIs constructed for Crow Wing County’s balanced scorecard for its human 
services field (Figure 21): 
Figure 20 – Highway Department Key Performance Indicators 




Cascading from these outcomes to contributory inputs at the contributing employee level is a 
matter, once again, of creating and discussing alignment about what actions will most likely 
contribute to what outcomes that the organization is seeking.  By cascading, you are trying to 
establish and follow the cause-and-effect linkages that lead from the desired goals for the 
 
Figure 21 – Community Services Key Performance Indicators 
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organization to the actions that a contributing employee can reasonably take that will drive 
positive change in that outcome.  So, for instance, if the goal is a safe and effective transportation 
system, what are the expectations of the public for when the roads should be plowed after a 
snowstorm?  By when should there be different variations on dry wheel paths?  Does the 
standard vary by traffic counts?  Which snowplow route is assigned to which driver and how 
well did each do on hitting the performance targets after each snow event.   
It is sometimes helpful when trying to think about the cause-and-effect linkages to think in terms 
of leading indicators versus lagging indicators.  A leading indicator is something that would be 
an input into a process—something that would be done so that something downstream would 
happen.  A lagging indicator would be something downstream in the process toward the end and 
would tend to be closer to the outcome that was the desired result of the process.  It is common 
that the outcomes or lagging indicators are present the higher up the organizational ladder you 
progress and the leading indicators are those closer to the contributing employee level.   
As an example, if an outcome that you are trying to achieve is low rates of communicable 
diseases in the population, then the lagging indicators would be things like rates of measles, or 
mumps, or influenza—whatever specific objectives you are targeting for low rates among the 
population.  A mid-process indicator might be the number of vaccinations administered.  A 
leading indicator might be the number of immunization clinics held or the number of home visits 
conducted.  In other words, it is expected that the contributing employee will hold “X” number 
of immunization clinics or conduct “X” number of home visits in the belief that in doing so they 
will administer “Y” number of vaccinations and that, in so doing, the organization will impact 
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the community’s rate of measles or mumps or influenza thereby reducing the rate of transmission 
of communicable diseases within the community. 
Simple examples such as these, where the cause-and-effect linkages are more obvious, useful as 
teaching tools, but they do not adequately reflect the complexity of real life in county 
government and the difficulty of establishing clear and compelling cause-and-effect linkages in 
all cases.  Doing so in areas such as child protection or chemical dependency are much less clear.  
What actions, taken by contributing employees, will contribute to reductions in chemical 
dependency rates in the community?  What actions taken upstream of the need for a child 
protection intervention could reduce the rate of child protection interventions?  Complicating 
matters considerably are the wide and deep array of other forces acting in society that also 
impact those very same things.  And, yet, if the organization does not think it can impact the 
rates of chemical dependency or child protection interventions, then why would it invest limited 
and precious public resources in doing so?   
There must, at some point, be a leap of faith that the actions you take at the service delivery level 
will impact those types of outcomes and there must be accompanying accountability to the 
efficacy of those actions in order to create appropriate pressures for the system to be flexible, 
adaptive, and creative in changing tactics that don’t do so in favor of trying new ones that may.  
That accountability should be present throughout the system from top leaders to contributing 
employees.  Regardless of whether the system is tied to compensation, this kind of assessment of 
the efficacy of effort to the stated objectives is necessary to avoid the creation of moribund 
systems that never adapt—a chief criticism of public systems.  Tying it to compensation simply 
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ups the ante and reasonable people will likely disagree on the wisdom of doing so.   
In terms of good performance assessment, the pursuit of perfection is the enemy of the 
achievement of the good.  In complex and dynamic systems of human interaction, perfection is 
impossible.  Creating a system with the best work you are capable of with the best knowledge 
available at the time influenced by experience up to that point is key.  Staying open to 
adaptations that you believe will add credibility to the system is key.  Recognizing that it can 
never be perfect is key.  Thomas Jefferson once said, “On no question can a unanimity be 
achieved.”  Remembering that improving the system towards its most perfect form while 
recognizing that it can never fully achieve that should not dissuade you from the valiant effort 
toward that lofty goal. 
Toward that end, below is an example of Crow Wing County’s efforts to define organizational 
objectives in snow plowing to the key performance indicators that will demonstrate the 
achievement of public value for a highway department more specifically as it relate to their snow 
plowing targets and the drivers assigned to each road: 




Figure 22 – Organizational Objectives for Key Performance Indicators 




Figure 22 – Continued 




Figure 22 – Continued 




Figure 23 – Priority and Level of Service Planning  




Figure 24 – Priority and Level of Service Outcomes  
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There are a variety of good reasons why throughout all of this process, organizations should seek 
high employee-involvement processes and open, transparent dialogues in order to define all of 
these things.  First, and foremost, if credibility with employees is a critically key component in 
the eventual success of the performance assessment process, then what better way to hard-wire 
that in than to involve the people who are subject to it in its application?  That applies just as 
much in system design as it does on an on-going basis in system modifications going forward.  
The Gallup organization (2015) estimates that as much as 70% of employee’s engagement in 
their work—the degree to which they are willing to exert discretionary effort at the margin—is 
based on their relationship with their direct supervisor so this is as much about return on 
investment in employee productivity as it is in doing it because it’s the right thing to do.  Second, 
employees who perform work are always going to be most knowledgeable about what the work 
entails.  They may not be able to add perspective to the question of what the organization is 
trying to achieve, but they do know best what they have been doing.  The richness in the 
dialogue is the degree to which those two things are or are not in alignment. 
In addition, working in the public sector has some distinct advantages when designing “new” 
systems as plagiarism is not only allowed, it’s encouraged.  In the vein that there really are no 
new ideas, practitioners in the public sector are regularly accustomed to other practitioners 
asking if they have any experience with such and such.  An inquiry through professional 
associations will always return multiple results and those results, from multiple sources, can 
inform the judgment of a practitioner and their colleagues about what might best represent your 
organization’s desires.  To that end, an example of Crow Wing County’s efforts to define key 
performance indicators for a highway maintenance technician would be as follows: 




Likewise, an example of key performance indicators for Crow Wing County Child Protection Social 




 Provide intake services as assigned.  
 Conduct client assessments as assigned. 
 Investigatory actions including interviews and site visits if needed.  
Measure: 
Figure 25 – Key Performance Indicator Matrix  
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 Case Plans:  Out of Home placement Plans will be completed within 30 days of placement and 
case plans will be completed within 60 day of case opening. 
Case Management: 
Description: 
 Appropriate interventions to address client service needs and protect client welfare. 
 Formulate client service plans based on assessments.  
 Ongoing assessment and plan revisions to effectively address client needs to maximize client 
functioning.  
 Manage active case load, providing counseling, advocacy, service coordination and assessment, 
achieving service plan objectives and initiating modifications as necessary to achieve stated 
outcomes, address client needs, maximize client functioning and protect client welfare. 
 Develop discharge plans including aftercare resources, ongoing support services and crisis 
planning to effectively address client needs. 
Measure: 
 TCM hits are 80% of eligible clients 
Documentation: 
Description: 
 Clear concise documentation to be maintained within the SSIS case record. 
 Ensure the accurate and timely recording, retention and retrieval of case files. 
 Ensure that written documentation and reports are concise and professional. 
 Comply with all regulations relating to client confidentiality, closely guarding the privacy of 
client records and information to assure full compliance with MN data Practices, HIPAA and all 
other regulations regarding client confidentiality. 
 Ensure compliance with agency and program financial parameters, completing required 
documentation to account for service costs and maximize reimbursement in accordance with 
program requirements to maximize the recapture of revenue associated with programs and 
services provided. 
 Accurately completes and enters all required information into job specific software programs. 
Measure (Mandatory): 
 SSIS Documentation (100% of time reporting will be completed by the 10th of the month). 
 All cases to be closed within a timely basis of the service/care coordination end date. 
In addition to specific and measurable performance outcomes, the system should also construct soft skill 
outcomes that the organization is going to value.  Competencies for contributing employees to the 
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organization may be different than for senior leaders such as in the following competency model 
example:  




Competencies can also be developed for the organization that reflect soft-skill competencies that the 
Figure 26 – Professional Development Competency Model 
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organization will value for all employees.  There are a variety of sources for those kinds of ways to 
“brand” what your organization will value as important.  Here is an example from one county that grew 
out of this research using competencies from the Lominger Competency Series, 5th Edition: 
 
 
Figure 27 – Core Competencies  




Once the key performance indicators are constructed for each of the job classes, they need to be 
assembled into a coherent system that applies to all employees.  Forms need to be designed or software 
systems installed to capture and communicate the information.  Expected supervisory practices such as 
how often there should be status meetings with employees need to be identified.  Coaching managers on 
good performance coaching techniques needs to be provided.  There are a myriad of tiny details to work 
out to ensure that the system is executed institution-wide in a fair, consistent, and equitable manner. 
To that end, it is important to design in safeguards to protect employees from issues of rater or supervisor 
bias or favoritism.  Two practices that are recommended for that purpose would be the calibration of the 
results of the ratings between and among supervisors and managers in the system and an appeal process 
for an employee to challenge the rating they have received with a neutral third-party.  Both are important 
practices to ensuring that the employee feels like they have some outlet to protect themselves from a 
supervisor who they believe practices favoritism in their performance rankings.  Below is an example of 
one county’s performance assessment system framework containing these safeguards as well as tools and 
resources for both employees and managers to navigate the process with clear and shared expectations: 
















The purpose of this program guide is to provide a resource to help team members implement a 
performance plan for those they supervise; a performance plan that clearly articulates performance 
expectations and is aligned with the strategic priorities of the organization, department, workgroup and 
the individual role. 
 
 
This program guide is also intended to be a resource for performance plan participants, promoting an 
understanding of the process, the role of the individual in performance planning and also guidance for 
completing the self evaluation portion of the performance plan. 
 
The County’s Expectations Regarding Performance Management 
Aligning resources to accomplish organizational priorities is one of the most important functions of 
managers and supervisors. The supervisor is accountable for ensuring each team member has clearly 
defined performance plans including key performance measures, core competencies, department 
and/or role specific competencies, project assignments and developmental initiatives. 
 
 
As you prepare to develop a performance plan, begin with a review of the county’s mission, vision and 
values. They are the foundation on which we build; the mission speaks to what we do, the vision speaks 
to where we’re heading and the values reinforce how we work.  These foundational pieces, together 




Our organization uses performance tools such as the Balanced Scorecard to identify and communicate 
key strategic priorities for the organization. We’ve selected the balanced scorecard approach because it 
ensures focus on four important perspectives; our customer, our financial performance, our work 
processes and our people. For information on Crow Wing County’s guide to the Balanced Scorecard 
review the Managing for Results Implementation Guide. 
 
 
Figure 28 – Performance Management and Planning Process 





Strategy maps are a component of the balanced scorecard.  The strategy map identifies key strategic 
priorities and objectives for the organization. The county’s strategic priorities and objectives are 
developed as part of a strategic planning process involving the county board of commissioners, elected 
officials and senior management.  Understanding the organizations priorities is an important step in 
developing the strategic priorities and objectives that are unique and specific to your department. 
 
The county strategy map provides direction by identifying the big-picture goals for the organization. 
This information is cascaded through the organization to create alignment, ensuring department 
priorities and objectives support the important strategies of the organization. Department strategy maps 
identify the strategic priorities and objectives for the department. The departmental priorities and 
objectives translate into individual roles and include key performance measures, competencies and 
assignments that are specific to the individual role and ensure the accomplishment of the departmental 
and organizational objectives. 
 
Individual roles are defined in job descriptions. The supervisor is accountable for creating job 
descriptions for each individual role in their department.  This includes determining what duties are 
important to include in a job, what qualifications are needed to fulfill those duties and what level of 
performance is needed to meet the strategic priorities and objectives of the department and 




Performance management also involves filling the job with the best candidate, training new team 
members and providing continuous coaching to clarify expectations.   Management of performance is 
important to being a good supervisor and introducing the performance plan early, when an employee 
joins the department, serves as an effective means for communicating expectations and helping staff 
understand how their role links to the strategic priorities of the organization and department.  All 
supervisors are expected to participate in a performance management program with their staff. 
 
Performance Management Definition 
Performance management is an ongoing, continuous process of communicating and clarifying job 
responsibilities, priorities and performance expectations in order to ensure mutual understanding 
between supervisor and employee. It is a philosophy that values and encourages employee engagement 
and development through a style of management which provides frequent feedback and fosters 
teamwork. It emphasizes communication and focuses on adding value to the organization by promoting 
improved job performance and encouraging skill development. Performance management involves 
clarifying the job duties, defining performance standards, and documenting, evaluating and discussing 
performance with each employee. 
 
Figure 28 - Continued 




Performance Management Objectives 
 Promote understanding of the mission, vision, values, strategic priorities, key objectives 
and expectations for the department and organization. 
 
 Cascade the strategic priorities and key objectives of the organization to departments and 
individual roles to ensure alignment with and achievement of important organizational 
and departmental priorities. 
 
 Promote proactive performance planning and communication between supervisors and 
employees. 
 
 Identify and resolve performance improvement needs through early intervention and coaching. 
 
 Recognize quality performance 
 Serve as a resource for administrative decisions such as promotions, succession 
planning, strategic planning, and performance based pay. 
 
Performance Plan Development 
 Performance management is considered a process, not an event. It follows good management 
practice in which continual coaching, feedback and communication are integral to success. 
 
 The Performance Plan is primarily a communication tool to ensure mutual understanding 
of work responsibilities, priorities and performance expectations. 
 
 The Performance Plan is job specific. The major duties and responsibilities of the job 
are defined and communicated as the first step in the process. 
 
 The Performance Plan contains  performance measures for each major duty/ responsibility. 
The performance measures are clearly defined and communicated. 
 
 The performance planning process encourages employee involvement and participation. 
 
 The developmental initiatives section is used to identify opportunities for professional 
growth within the assignment and for future career interests and succession planning. 
 
Figure 28 - Continued 
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 Documentation of performance is an important component of performance management. 
Quarterly and midyear performance discussions are encouraged. 
 
 The overall  performance rating is intended to reflect the individual's actual performance 
in relation to the performance criteria established in the performance plan for the entire 
evaluation period. 
 
 Supervisors are evaluated on successful administration of the plan and ongoing 
performance management responsibilities. 
 
 Training for supervisors and employees is available through the county’s human resource 
representatives. 
 




 Communicate and clarify  major job duties, priorities and expectations at the beginning of 
the year or when a new member joins the department. 
 
 Establish and communicate performance standards. 
 
 Monitor ongoing performance through observation, discussion, etc. 
 
 Document performance, identifying successes and opportunities. 
 
 Provide continuous coaching and constructive feedback in a timely manner. 
 
 Hold performance discussions throughout the year; quarterly and semi-annually 
is recommended. 
 
 Correct unsatisfactory performance and reinforce effective performance. 
 
 Help employees develop skills and abilities for improved performance. 
 
 Provide necessary resources and information needed to ensure accomplishments of key results. 
 
Available Resources 
Human Resource staff are available to provide consultation with supervisors interested in developing 
a performance management plan. Individual and/or group training on all aspects of Performance 
Management is provided upon request. 
 
Performance Planning Cycle 
 
Common Review Date 
The county’s performance planning cycle aligns with the calendar year. All employees receive an 
annual performance appraisal that accounts for performance in the preceding calendar year. The year-
end appraisal is completed in January.  The calibration and rating approval process occurs in February. 
Rating communication occurs in March and performance based pay awards, for participants in the 
performance based pay program, are processed the first pay period in April and effective retroactively 
to January 1. The planning calendar is outlined below: 
 
Figure 28 - Continued 




June – December:  Budget planning begins in June and concludes with adoption of the final 
budget during the last board meeting in December.  Budget planning generally identifies resources 
available and resources needed, including organizational, departmental and role specific projects 
and initiatives. 
 
Developing your individual employee performance plans in coordination with the budget planning 
process ensures the performance plans align with important goals and commitments identified for the 
coming year. 
 
January:  Performance results from the preceding year are summarized in January. Employees 
complete their self evaluation and supervisors finalize their evaluation. Performance plans for the 
coming year are finalized. 
 
February:  Performance rating recommendations are made by the supervisor and the approval and 
calibration process is completed. The calibration process requires supervisors to support rating 
recommendations with data that demonstrates a basis for an exceeds or exceptional rating.  This also 
applies to an in-development or unsatisfactory rating. This process ensures rating equity across the 
organization.  The calibration process is facilitated by the county administrator or his/her designee and 
may include elected officials, senior managers and leadership team members. All performance plan 
ratings require approval of senior manager in charge. 
 
March: Rating communications occur; performance results from the preceding year are finalized and 
discussed with staff. Performance based pay awards are communicated. 
 
April: Performance based pay awards, for participants in the performance based pay program, are 
processed the first pay period in April. First quarter progress reports are completed. 
 
Quarterly Progress Reports 
Quarterly progress reports are recommended. These are update meetings to check progress, readjust as 
needed and ensure performance is on track to meet critical goals. Quarterly progress reports generally 
occur in April, July and October; year-end results are finalized in January. 
 
New Hires 
Staff joining the organization during the first three quarters of a calendar year will receive a 
performance evaluation at the conclusion of that calendar year, consistent with the  performance 
planning cycle.  Staff joining the organization during fourth quarter, will be eligible to a full 
performance 
evaluation at the conclusion of the following year, consistent with the  performance planning cycle. 
 
 
Transfers, Promotions and Job Changes 
Staff changing jobs and/or departments during the year will receive a performance evaluation from their 
current supervisor.  The evaluation will incorporate feedback from the prior supervisor and the rating 
will reflect the combined performance. 
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In determining performance standards, consider the following: 
 
 What does a good job look like? 
 How many or how much is needed? 
 How long should it take? 
 When are the results needed? 
 How accurate or how good is acceptable? 
 Are there budget considerations? 
 Are there safety considerations? 
 Are there legislative or regulatory requirements? 
 What results would be considered satisfactory? 
 What condition will exist when the duty is well performed? 
 What is the difference between satisfactory and unsatisfactory performance? 
 
 
Common Standards Applicable to all Crow Wing County Roles 
The county has identified four  core competencies that are common to all jobs. The core competencies 
identify standards and behaviors that are expected from everyone. For example, all team members are 
expected to demonstrate customer service excellence. This is only one of the four core competencies 
that are common to all county jobs and contained into each employee’s performance plan. 
 
Common Standards Applicable to Everyone in a Particular Group 
There may be one or more competencies identifying common standards and behaviors that are 
expected from everyone in a particular workgroup or role.  For example, compassion is a core 
competency for all community service jobs and referenced in each member’s performance plans. 
Technical learning is a competency assigned to all technology positions and referenced in each 
member’s performance plan. 
 
To assess competencies and determine which are important to your workgroup or a given role, review the 
competency listing found in the Lominger resources including the FYI Book or the competency sort 
cards.  These resource materials are available in most departments and also the human resource office. 
 
Putting It All Together 
 
 
Introduce the Performance Plan 
The performance plan is introduced at the beginning of the calendar year and when a new employee 
joins the department. The performance plan provides focus and direction, helping to ensure team 
members have a clear understanding of key priorities, performance measures and outcomes expected 
for the coming year.  The performance plan can be updated as the year progresses to accommodate 
changes in project assignments, key priorities and/or performance measures. 
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Document Job Performance 
It is important to document performance over the entire year. Good documentation procedures help to 
reduce the possibility of rating errors, as referenced in the next section.  Be sure to make notes 
of performance successes and items to recognize as well as opportunities and performance that 
did not achieve expectations. Good documentation is important in justifying evaluations and 





 A record of a discussion – never done in isolation 
 Factual, not inferential 
 
 
Performance documentation may focus on: 
 
 Actions of the employee: 
"Joe’s month end documentation was incomplete, missing important data and leaving the department 
unable to prepare accurate utilization reports. This matter has been discussed with Joe on two prior 
occasions. Immediate and sustained improvement is necessary. 
 
 Results of job performance: 
"A mentoring program pilot for at risk families was initiated during the current rating period; a program 
that would not be possible without Mary’s expert work in securing $250,000 in grant funding.” 
 
Documentation should be in written form and shared with the employee. 
 
Evaluate Job Performance 
In evaluating performance, always compare actual performance to the performance standards as 
determined at the beginning of the evaluation period.  Review the performance measures, competencies, 
project assignments and developmental objectives contained in the performance plan. Compare the 
stated objectives to the actual results achieved, using your notes, the employees notes and other sources 
of feedback to obtain an accurate accounting of performance. 
 
Sources of Feedback 
The most common source of performance feedback is the supervisor and the  emplo y ee’s  self - 
assessment. Performance feedback can also include reviews from peers and customers or anyone in 
contact with the employee. 
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Factors Impacting Performance 
Before discussing performance assess factors that may have had an unanticipated negative or positive 
impact on performance.  Consider: 
 
 Unanticipated events that redirected work activities 
 Staffing issues 
 Lack of proper equipment 
 Excessive work load fluctuations 
 Working conditions 
 Delays from internal or external sources 
 Unclear objectives or performance standards 
 Policy changes 
 
Assigning the Performance Rating 
The county uses a five point rating scale. A five point scale is the most commonly used rating format. 
The overall performance rating should be reflective of the performance in its entirety for the rating 





Prior to communicating the performance rating to the review participant the performance plan and 
recommended rating is subject to review and approval. This process is designed to minimize the 
potential for rating errors. For additional information regarding the approval process click on the 
following link: Calibration. 
 
Common Rating Errors 
 Leniency: Giving everyone high ratings regardless of actual performance 
 Central Tendency:  Clustering all employees in the middle performance categories. 
 Recency: Focusing on a recent performance rather than the entire rating period. 
 Halo Effect:  Letting one favored trait or work factor influence all other areas of performance. 
 Horns Effect:  Allowing one negative incident to unduly influence more positive 
performance elements. 
 Contrast: Evaluating an employee in relation to another rather than actual performance 
in relation to job duties, goals and stated performance standards. 
 Past Performance:  Rating on past performance rather than current year performance. 
 Biased Rating: Allowing personal feelings toward employee to influence rating. 
 High Potential:  Confusing potential with performance. 
 Guilt by Association:  Evaluation influenced by employee's associations rather 
than performance. 
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Hold Performance Discussions 
The performance review discussion is one of the most important processes a supervisor completes. This 
is a time to have a more formalized discussion about performance and it should reflect the day to day 
coaching that has transpired throughout the year. It should be undertaken with great care and 
preparation, as the way you handle it can have significant impact on the morale and future performance 
of your staff members. Formal performance discussions should be held at least once a year. Coaching 
should occur on a frequent basis. Informal performance update discussions are also valuable and 
recommended quarterly, at a minimum semi annually. 
 
Prepare for the discussion 
Establish date, time and suitable private location. Notify the participant well in advance; providing the 
date, time, location and what to prepare. Consider providing an outline of discussion items: 
 
 What questions do you have about your job such as priorities, the purpose of 
particular activities, goals for the future? 
 What barriers affect the performance of your job? 
 How do you spend the majority of your time? 
 What are you doing that you think doesn't seem to add value? 
 What do you think you should be doing that you are not? 
 What ideas do you have about processes that could be changed to provide better customer 
service, eliminate waste or make work easier? 
 How can I help you succeed? 
 
 Review responsibilities and expectations. Compare actual performance to the performance 
standards. Consider the following: 
 
 What has performance been over the entire evaluation period? 
 What performance expectations were met or exceeded; list specific examples. 
 What performance standards were not met; list specific examples. What can be done 
to improve performance? 
 Were expectations reasonable and attainable? 
 What factors may have affected performance or been beyond the employee's control? 
 What has informed my opinions about the employee's performance? Have I been fair 
and objective? 
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Conduct the Discussion 
 Schedule the performance review meeting in advance to allow both parties sufficient time 
to prepare for the meeting. 
 Conduct the performance discussion in a private area with no interruptions. 
 Provide a relaxed setting. Clearly explain the purpose and format of the discussion. 
 Start on a positive note; this is an opportunity for recognition and coaching, 
identifying successes and improvement opportunities. 
 Discuss each component of the performance plan.  Use documentation to discuss 
specific instances of performance. 
 Give credit for achievement and work done well. Give specific examples and mention 
resulting benefit to the organization. 
 Focus on important performance measures and goals.  Minor infractions of little significance 
can be discussed when they occur and dropped unless you see a trend developing. 
 Apply effective communication skills.  Encourage engagement by asking open-ended 
questions gaining insight to the employee's assessment, comments and suggestions. 
 Focus on performance, not personality. Describe behaviors, not personality traits or attitudes. 
 Constructive feedback focuses on the specific behavior or action not the individual. Discuss 
positive as well as unsatisfactory performance. Provide specific examples and explain why 
these behaviors are problematic or how they benefit the organization. 
 Avoid comparisons between employees. 
 Seek to understand the presence of any barriers or constraints impacting performance. 
 Work for understanding, rather than complete agreement. Be supportive and seek 
to understand what you can do to be of greater help. 
 Avoid surprises; performance problems need to be addressed at the time of occurrence.  If 
performance has not improved, discuss it again and develop an action plan. The 
performance review discussion is not the place to mention it for the first time. If poor 
performance is significant, a performance improvement plan should be considered. 
 Avoid common rating errors in forming your opinion of performance.  Receive feedback 
in a constructive manner.  Listen carefully and seek to understand what is being said. 
Don't interrupt.  Ask questions – get more information. 
 Review the major job duties and performance standards to determine if changes need to 
be made for next year. 
 End the Performance Review Discussion on a positive note. 
 
Appeal Process 
The county offers an appeal process as a method for addressing and reconciling differences relating 
to the performance rating.  Click on Appeal Process for additional information. 
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Crow Wing County Performance Plan Document 
 
The following instructions relate to completing the performance plan document. The participant’s 
self- assessment process is explained in greater detail at the end of this section. 
 
Position Objective 
This section helps create focus, using a few key sentences to highlight the primary purpose of the 
position, the reason it exists. This information is generally contained in the job description in the 
position objective section. You’ll likely find a few sentences that serve to define the primary 
purpose of the position. These can be used to complete this section of the performance plan 
document. 
 
Strategic Goal Alignment 
Aligning people and resources to meet the strategic priorities of the organization, the department and 
the work team are critically important. Use this section to reflect critical goals and priorities that are 
relevant to the position. Review the  county strategy map, the department strategy map and related 
mission, vision and values statements to identify important priorities that help guide the focus of the 
position and ensure strategic priorities and critical goals are achieved. 
 
Key Performance Measures 
Using performance tools such as the balanced scorecard has increased the county’s focus on results that 
matter. These are performance measures that help to ensure that critical goals and priorities for the 
organization and department are achieved. The job description describes the work that is performed; the 
accountabilities assigned to the role. Most often these responsibilities are described as tasks such as 
process mail, perform reception duties, operate equipment, or prepare reports.  The performance 
measures speak more specifically to the outcomes expected. These generally contain a clearly 
articulated benchmark or performance target that provides clarity as to what is expected, how much, 
and by when. Look to the department scorecards and key performance measures for identification of 
the important priorities. Translate those into actions required from each of the roles you supervise, for 
example, “answer all calls by the third ring” or “return messages within one business day” or 
“accurately process all applications within three business days”. 
 
Core Competencies 
The four  core competencies speak to the culture at Crow Wing County. They shape how work gets 
done, what’s valued and important. For us it is about results, relationships, work processes and service 
to our customers.  Every performance plan contains these four core competencies. Our organization 
uses the Lominger Competency Set. Resources such as the Lominger Leadership Architect 
Competency Sort Cards and For Your Improvement, a developmental guidebook, provide clear 
definitions on skilled versus unskilled behaviors for these four core competencies as well as 
developmental coaching tips. 
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Department or Role Specific Competencies 
This section identifies additional competencies the department has identified as being important to the 
operation or individual role.  Often these identify skills or abilities the department would like to develop 
or holds as critically important for the success of their operation. As a general rule, there should be no 
more than 1- 4 department or role specific competencies.  Competencies such as functional/technical 
skills, decision quality and priority setting are examples of department or role specific competencies. 
Resources such as the Lominger Leadership Architect Competency Sort Cards and For Your 




This section is used to identify important projects that require completion or have milestones that will 
be due during the performance plan cycle. Project assignments may include individual projects, team 
projects, department and potentially county-wide initiatives. Projects are generally closely related to 
the work assignment and involve something that is in addition to the day to day accountabilities. 
 
When completing the project assignment section it is important to identify what is expected to occur 
and by when. The acronym SMART is used to provide guidance for clearly communicating project 
assignments. Click SMART to link to more information on writing  SMART goals. 
 
Project assignments are often initiated by the individual staff member. These would be job related 
initiatives the staff member would like to commit to during the coming rating period.  The project 
should be something of value that benefits the organization and supports the departments and/or 
organization’s strategic priorities and/or objectives. 
 
Developmental Initiatives 
This section is used to identify training, experience and skill development opportunities for both the 
current role and future career interests. Consider succession planning including the development of 
internal candidates for future staffing needs. Developmental initiatives may include traditional 
educational tracks including post secondary education, seminars and workshops. Development also 
includes processes such as cross training, mentoring assignments and project assignments that build 
skills and increase knowledge.  When communicating developmental initiatives use the SMART 
process as a guide for clearly stating the expected action and outcome. 
 
Review of Job Description 
Keeping job descriptions current and relevant to the work assignment is an important component of 
performance communications. At the beginning of the performance planning cycle a review of the job 
description will help promote common understanding of the position purpose and accountabilities. 
Changes should be noted as they occur to ensure the description remains relevant and a clear 
representation of the role. At the conclusion of the performance planning cycle it is again important to 
review the job description and alert human resources of any changes needed. In situations where there 
are significant and material changes in the job duties refer to the  Compensation Administration Guide to 
assess whether a reevaluation of the position is appropriate. 
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The county uses a five point rating scale. A five point scale is the most commonly used rating format. 
The overall performance rating should be reflective of the performance in its entirety for the rating 
period. The “achieves” rating is reflective of “A” level performance. It is used to describe performance 
that has achieved expectations, where key goals and performance outcomes have been achieved after 
considering any environmental factors that may have had a positive or negative impact on performance. 
 
 
The performance rating is applied at the end of the performance planning cycle, covering the period of 
January 1 to December 31. The rating period would be less for individuals who start their employment 
during the year, representing year to date performance for those whose employment started prior to 
fourth quarter. Individuals who start their employment in fourth quarter will not receive a performance 
rating for the current year; their performance planning cycle will incorporate the fourth quarter of the 
current year and a full year for the upcoming performance planning cycle. 
 
 
The rating definitions are contained on the performance planning document. For reference, the 
“Achieves” rating is representative of effective performance; think of it as being the equivalent 
of receiving a letter grade “A” rating. 
 
 
The ratings of “Exceeds” and “Exceptional” are reserved for those situations where performance 
has surpassed expectations. Often this involves work products or activities that have gone beyond 
the scope of the assignment and have had a positive impact on the work unit or organization. 
 
 
The “In Development or Needs Improvement” applies to situations where performance is not achieving 
expectations; one or more critical goals are not met. Previous discussion regarding the performance 
improvement needs should have occurred prior to the rating assignment.  A follow-up review is required 
in six months. 
 
 
An “Unacceptable” performance rating identifies situations where performance is not meeting 
expectation and has not adequately progressed following coaching.   A follow-up review is required 




Performance ratings require the approval of the supervisor and senior management member who 
oversees the department. This oversight is intended to ensure consistency among raters. Supervisors 




An appeal process is available to staff members who disagree with the performance rating. For 
represented staff the appeal process involves the business agent, a county representative and third 
party neutral from the bureau of mediation services. The three person panel will receive up to ½ hour 
of presentation from the employee and ½ hour from the rater. The panel will issue a bench decision 
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which will serve as the final and binding rating. The non contract staff will have access to a 
similar appeal process; the panel will include the county administrator, an elected official and 
personnel committee representative. 
 
 
Completing the Self-Assessment 
The self assessment is an important component of the performance management process.  It serves as 
your reflection on the contributions of the past year as well as your thoughts on the future. This is an 
opportunity to inventory your accomplishments, include feedback and recognition that has been 
received throughout the year as well as areas for improvement and opportunities for further 
development. The self assessment helps keep us focused on the mission critical priorities and the key 
objectives associated with our role, the department and the organization. 
 
 
Self-Assessment Paper Work 
As the year begins use your copy of the current year’s performance plan to log self assessment data, 
recording accomplishments, milestones, notes and recognition received as well as opportunities and 
developmental activity as they occur.  Capturing performance accomplishments and opportunities in 
real time makes the year end completion much smoother. We highly recommend adding comments to 
your copy of the performance plan throughout the year. 
 
 
You will be notified when your self-assessment is due. When preparing your self-assessment allow for 
a couple of hours of quiet uninterrupted time. Review the performance plan document, any notes you 
made throughout the year, and documents or records that you have to reflect on. Consider projects or 
assignments that you would like to commit to in the coming year, also consider developmental or 
training opportunities to build needed skills and prepare for future assignments or career opportunities. 
 
Using an electronic copy of your performance plan, enter your self assessment comments under the 
employee comment section for each area of the performance plan. Refer to the instructions for  The 
Crow Wing County Performance Plan for further information. 
 
 
Forward the completed self-assessment to your supervisor. The supervisor will add their assessment 
comments and arrange for a time to meet and discuss the evaluation content. At the review discussion it 
is important to clarify the points of difference and ensure understanding of performance expectations 
for the future. 
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Performance Based Pay Administration 
For Performance Based Pay Participants 
 
Wage Adjustment Matrix 
For performance based pay participants, (consult labor contract for eligibility), the wage adjustment 
matrix is developed annually.  It represents the annual wage adjustment opportunity.  The adjustment 
amounts are designed to be market competitive, considering local market data, regional and national 
data. Sources such as the economic cost indicator, local and regional surveys of private and public 
agencies and local economic conditions are considered in the development of the annual wage 
adjustment matrix. The wage adjustment matrix is subject to collective bargaining for represented 
 
positions. In the case of multi-year labor agreements, a wage adjustment matrix is established for each 
year of the agreement. 
 
Effective Date 
Performance based pay adjustment awards are processed the first pay period in April and effective 
retroactively to January 1. 
 
Prorated Performance Based Pay Awards 
Staff, in a performance based pay eligible position, who join the organization during the first three 
quarters of the year, are eligible for a prorated performance based pay award based on the number of 
full months worked during the year.  For example an individual who started their employment in mid 
march would have 9 full months of employment. The prorated formula applied to the wage adjustment 
would be as follows:  9/12 = 75%. 
 
 
Staff receiving an “in development or needs improvement” rating during their annual review may be 
eligible for a prorated wage adjustment after 6 months.  If the mid-year evaluation reflects improvement 
to an “Achieves” performance rating or above, the individual is eligible to receive a prorated portion of 
the corresponding wage adjustment reflected on the current year wage adjustment matrix. The mid-year 
prorated formula is 50% representing a wage adjustment earned for ½ of the current rating period. 
 
Staff receiving an “Unacceptable” rating during their annual review may be eligible for a prorated 
wage adjustment after 6 months.  Eligibility for a wage adjustment requires two consecutive quarters of 
an “Achieves” rating or above.   The proration formula is either 50% or 25% of the annual performance 




Contact the human resource department for additional information and resources relating to the 
performance management and planning process. 
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In addition, because the calibration process is so important to the overall credibility of the rating system 
for the organization, there should be additional guidance provided on the calibration process.  Crow Wing 




Calibration Purpose:  Calibration is a process that brings various team leaders together to jointly review 
rater assessments to ensure ratings across the organization are consistent, appropriate and properly 
distributed. Calibration is not to be confused with forced ranking where managers are required to force 
ratings to achieve specific rating percentages. While the county has a predicted rating model to help 
forecast salary budgets, there is no forced ranking requirement at Crow Wing County. 
 
Calibration sessions typically include supervisors who are responsible for conducting performance 
evaluations, reviewers which are the next level of management responsible for reviewing the content 
and closely examining the employee evaluations, the department head or senior leader accountable 
for the workgroup and a calibration leader to facilitate the session. 
 
The calibration process provides a forum for the discussion of employees’ performance with the goal 
of ensuring supervisors apply similar standards for all employees and eliminate biases to the greatest 
extent possible.  Calibration relies on an honest and confidential dialogue among supervisors, 
reviewers and the responsible department head. 
 
Calibration Timing: Calibration occurs after a supervisor has: (1) received the employee self-
appraisal; (2) completed the supervisor appraisal comments and ratings; (3) routed it for approval; 
and (4) addressed any revisions requested by the reviewer.  The calibration occurs BEFORE the 
reviewer approves and returns the evaluation to the supervisor. In all cases, calibration occurs 
before the scored performance evaluation has been shared with the employee. 
 





















Figure 29 – Calibrating Performance 
D i s s e r t a t i o n  | 150 
 
 
Step 1. The performance appraisal is opened for scoring on December 1
st
. Departments assign 
specific due dates for employees to complete their self-appraisal. 
 
Step 2. The supervisor completes their portion of the appraisal including the performance ratings 
and routes the appraisal to their reviewer for approval. Departments are accountable for managing 
this process by assigning specific completion dates. 
 
Step 3. The reviewer reads the appraisal, looking for constructive supervisory comments and 
ensuring evaluations are thorough and logical and contain specific examples of performance, results 
achieved and behaviors. If the reviewer decides a supervisor should alter a particular evaluation, the 
reviewer sends the evaluation back and waits for revision. 
 
Step 4. The reviewer prepares for calibration by viewing Trakstar Reports for their reporting area 
examining the ratings distribution, performance history and rater bias reports to highlight any trends 
that warrant follow-up.  The reviewer, or supervisor as assigned, prepares the documentation needed 




is the target date for completion of this initial process. When completed, the 
reviewer contacts human resources to schedule a calibration meeting.  A calibration meeting is 
scheduled between the designated reviewer, the department head or senior leader accountable for 
the workgroup and a calibration leader to facilitate the session. 
 
Supervisor’s attendance at the calibration session may or may not be required based on the 
department structure and perspective of the reviewer and/or department head. In all cases it is 
essential that calibration participants have an in-depth understanding of the performance ratings for 
their employee appraisals. 
 




Step 1. At the calibration meeting participants look at ratings distribution for all participating 
departments as an early indicator of rating trends.  This helps ensure use of the ratings are being 
consistently and fairly applied to all employees irrespective of reporting relationships and/or 
departmental assignments. 
 
Step 2. The reviewer presents the individual employee ratings. The discussion content includes 
performance relating to key performance measures and rating; core competencies – those with the 
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Step 3. Calibration meeting participants may ask questions about specific ratings or interpretation 
of ratings and may suggest adjustments based on the discussion of performance, results and behaviors 
considered and documented when determining the rating or their own experiences with the employee. 
 
Step 4. Re-review ratings distribution report against the predicted ratings model.  If distributions trend 
higher or lower than the predicted model, revisit employee ratings that were on the cusp between 
ratings to determine if they are rated appropriately. 
 




Achieves Exceeds Exceptional 
5 - 10% 60-70% 15-20% 5% 
    
Step 5. Following the discussion, reviewers send any appraisals requiring revision, back to the 
supervisor. After the supervisor makes the revisions, the appraisal is sent again to the reviewer for 
approval. 
 
Step 6. The reviewer approves the evaluation and forwards it to the supervisor who meets with the 
employee to review the content and ratings.  If changes are needed, the supervisor reengages the 
approval process with the reviewer prior to completing the appraisal.  When the process is complete, 
the appraisal is approved by the supervisor and employee. 
 
Calibration Tips 
 Communicate County/Department Goals.  Goals for each area should be communicated in 
advance and as thoroughly as possible so employees understand how their daily work 
contributes to the success of the county/department, and so that employees understand the 
measures on which they will be evaluated. 
 Educate supervisors.  Ensure supervisors understand what calibration is, why it is necessary, 
how it works, and what their roles are. 
 Understand the ratings.  Understand the performance ratings and their intended application. 
 Support the process.  Be open about the process, but maintain confidentiality outside of the 
calibration meeting. 
 Do your best.  The calibration process is new to us; there will be a learning curve.  It is our 
commitment to helping each other in building a performance management and rating process 
that has a high level of integrity and reliability across the entire organization. 
 Get the right people involved.  Make sure that the calibration participants can adequately 
represent the employee appraisals being discussed by articulating what the employee has 
accomplished and can respond appropriately to questions or challenges from the group.  If 
questions arise, make sure the supervisor is available to clarify them. 
 Set appropriate ground rules for meetings. Participants must feel open to challenge and 
debate.  They must also feel comfortable asking their peers for advice if they need help in 
determining or communicating a rating. 
 Leverage the information gathered during the process.  The power of calibration goes 
beyond performance ratings. These discussions yield important insight into the county’s 
talent and overall development needs. 
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 Calibration ensures supervisors are well versed in the definitions and the application of 
the rating scale. 
 Calibration ensures supervisors have objective and measurable examples of performance, 
results and behaviors that support the basis for the particular rating assigned to an employee. 
 Calibration prepares supervisors for improved performance discussions with their 
employees. 
 Calibration exposes talent to a larger group of managers, promoting internal 
development and succession planning. 
 Calibration supports our performance based pay process by ensuring consistency in our 




(E): Exceptional An Exceptional performance rating identifies situations in which performance 
significantly surpasses expectations and where the work product and results achieved represent 
exceptional and unique contributions, those having or very likely to have a significant and positive 
impact on work unit, department or organization. The Exceptional rating is generally reserved to 
recognize unique and extraordinary performance, most often associated with a specific accomplishment 
of great significance. 
 
Think of the Exceptional rating as one that distinguishes an exceptional performance accomplishment 
– the top 5% county wide.  Using the golf analogy it’s like scoring an eagle.  It is a career highlight, 
performance accomplishments that are highly unique and impactful. Expect a fair amount of churn in 
those receiving the Exceptional rating.  It is reserved for the individual who is leading innovative 
practices that have a significant impact on county and/or department performance. It implies that all 
of the criteria under the Exceeds rating were met plus the frequency, size and/or scope of the 
accomplishments more than exceeded expectations; they demonstrate extraordinary initiative, 
extraordinary innovation and extraordinary pro-active leadership for the role. The rater should easily 
be able to identify the accomplishments that caused this individual to stand out from the rest – what it 
was that placed them in the top 5% of all employees. 
 
(EE): Exceeds Expectations An Exceeds Expectations performance rating identifies situations in 
which performance meets and frequently surpasses expectations and where the work product and 
results achieved represent contributions to the work unit, department or organization that are 
significant and beyond the traditional expectations of the role. The Exceeds Expectations rating is 
used to recognize performance that extends beyond achieving the performance requirements and 
general expectations associated with successful performance in the role. It will often involve 
project work or other contributions that extend beyond the critical goals and performance measures 
established for the role. 
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Think of the Exceeds Expectations rating as one that applies to a unique and impactful 
accomplishment. Using the golf analogy it’s like scoring a birdie. It implies that all of the criteria 
under the Achieves rating were met plus there were accomplishments that demonstrated significant 
initiative, innovation and pro- active leadership for the role.  The rater should easily be able to 
identify the accomplishments that caused this individual to stand out from the rest – what placed 
them in the top 20% of all employees. 
 
(A): Achieves An Achieves performance rating identifies situations in which performance 
consistently achieves expectations and where the work product and results achieved are reflective 
of successful performance. The Achieves rating is awarded to recognize highly effective 
performance where the most critical goals and performance measures have been successfully met. 
 
Think of the Achieves rating as being the equivalent of a letter grade A or a par score in golf. This 
is representative of really good work, a strong contributor to the organization, one whose 
performance is aligned with department and county vision; whose project assignments were 
effectively completed and whose performance was aligned with the core competencies. The 
Achieves rating is a mark of highly effective performance. 
 
(I): In Development or Needs Improvement An In Development or Needs Improvement 
performance rating identifies situations in which performance did not consistently achieve 
expectations in one or more areas, and/or one or more of the most critical goals were not met.  A 
development plan to improve performance must be outlined, including timelines, and monitored to 
measure progress. A six-month review to evaluate progress is required. 
 
(U): Unsatisfactory An Unsatisfactory performance rating identifies situations in which performance 
was consistently below expectations in most areas of responsibility, and/or reasonable progress 
toward critical goals was not made. Significant improvement is needed in one or more important 
areas. A plan to correct performance must be outlined, including timelines, and progress reports 
completed monthly to measure progress. A three-month review to evaluate progress is required. 
 
Employees New to the Role When rating performance it should be relative to expectations given, 
time in the job and experience on entry.  For example, a new employee whose learning curve is 
progressing as expected in all areas might receive an overall performance rating of Achieves in year 
one even though there are ongoing training and development needs relating to job mastery.  On the 
other hand, a well- 
experienced new hire who is not progressing as expected may receive an In Development or 
Unsatisfactory 
performance rating.  It will be important to set performance expectations at hire with clear milestones 
for first year performance. 
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All of what has preceded in this section of one county’s choice for recommended components of an 
effective performance assessment program—something that can compellingly be argued should be done 
by every organization that mobilizes human talent toward some kind of shared idea of what you want to 
accomplish.  What remains are the components of an effective compensation framework that is based on 
the outcomes of that performance assessment process.  After the voluminous parts of the performance 
assessment process, it is shockingly simple how easy it is to tie compensation to the outcome of the 
performance assessment process.  Here are the relevant provisions from Crow Wing County’s 




1.   Desired Outcomes of Meeting 
 
 
2.   Confidentiality 
a.    It should go without saying that the information discussed and the resulting outcomes should be kept 
confidential by all managers involved. Nonetheless, participants should be reminded of the expectation 
regarding confidentiality at the start of the meeting. 
 
3.   Clarify Standards 
a.    Review of the rating scale/s and scale definitions used in the performance evaluation process. 
 
4.   Performance Trends of Group 
a.    Examination of the performance distribution of the business unit, including how the 
distribution compares to the previous performance period and/or desired distribution. 
 
5.   Alignment with Business Unit Results 
a.    Discussion of the linkage between initial performance ratings with the results produced by the business 
unit. 
 
6.   Individual Presentation 
a.    Review of each employee’s performance rating/s and the supporting rationale behind the rating/s. 
 
7.   Rating Adjustments 
a.    Modification of ratings, as necessary, to accurately reflect performance over the 
performance period. 
 
8.   Next Steps in the Performance Management Process 
 
 
Figure 29 – Continued 
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compensation policy that support their performance based pay program:  
 





ARTICLE 2.0: SALARY ADMINISTRATION  
2.0 Pay Matrix  
The pay matrix is a compensation schedule establishing pay grades and rates of pay for each 
grade level. The pay matrix may be adjusted by the County Board to reflect:  
 The prevailing pay rates in both public and private sector competitive labor markets.  
 The financial condition and fiscal policies of the County.  
 Other pertinent economic considerations.  
The human resource director will annually review the grade structure, applicable salary ranges, 
market data and other relevant data to assure market competitiveness. Recommended changes to the 
compensation schedule due to organizational modifications, external market factors, programmatic or 
administrative considerations or other relevant issues will be proposed to the County Board for 
approval. 
2.02 Wage Adjustments  
For performance based pay participants, (consult labor contract for eligibility), the wage 
adjustment matrix is developed annually. It represents the annual wage adjustment opportunity. The 
adjustment amounts are designed to be market competitive, considering local market data, regional and 
national data. Sources such as the economic cost indicator, local and regional surveys of private and 
public agencies and local economic conditions are considered in the development of the annual wage 
adjustment matrix. The wage adjustment matrix is subject to collective bargaining for represented 
positions. In the case of multi-year labor agreements, a wage adjustment matrix is established for each 
year of the agreement.  
Figure 30 




That salary matrix that supports this compensation system is also pretty simple and straightforward.  
Crow Wing County’s example supplied below will show a traditional step-and-grade system on the top 
portion and a performance-based system on the bottom: 
Performance based pay adjustment awards are processed the first pay period in April and effective 
retroactively to January 1. Performance based pay adjustment awards are processed the first pay period in 
April and effective retroactively to January 1. Staff in a performance based pay eligible position, who join 
the organization during the first three quarters of the year, are eligible for a prorated performance based 
pay award based on the number of full months worked during the year. For example an individual who 
started their employment in mid-March would have 9 full months of employment. The prorated formula 
applied to the wage adjustment would be as follows: 9/12 = 75%. Annual wage adjustments for bargaining 
unit staff shall be implemented in accordance with the applicable labor agreement. 
 
Figure 30 – Continued 




Figure 31 – Current Salary Ranges  
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Significance of Findings 
Performance based compensation in counties across the nation is concentrated in a few key states and, 
overall, is still quite rare.  As frustrations with issues associated with the traditional step-and-grade 
compensation system and the attendant wage inflation it produces grows, there seems to be a very slow 
incline in the number of counties gravitating toward performance based compensation systems.  
Conceptually, the idea of basing compensation on performance is intuitively quite appealing to 
practitioners, but the reality of doing it well is a significant barrier to its more widespread adoption.  
Moreover, the idea of basing compensation on performance is widely appealing but the reality of 
designing a high degree of credibility and acceptance into the performance assessment process is not 
frequently even on the radar of those who aspire to such a system.  The research demonstrates quite 
clearly that the idea or philosophy is more frequently embraced much as one might embrace motherhood 
and apple pie as good in the abstract. 
The research makes equally clear that the reality of a performance based compensation system is much, 
much more dynamic, complex, and enormously difficult.  Moreover, few organizations seem willing to 
invest the significant time and the rigor necessary to design, implement, and operate a performance 
assessment and management system that will truly advance organizational outcomes.  The research 
revealed that those few who are and who do stand out as beacons for good practice in the dark.  Not 
unlike the difficulty that Social Workers face in trying to stabilize families that have mental health and 
chemical dependency problems which manifest themselves in child abuse or neglect.  Not unlike local 
government planning professionals trying to protect environmental assets that are being bombarded with 
impacts, both natural and unnatural, from an environmental system that is far too complex for us to begin 
to understand.  Not unlike local government public health professionals who are trying to impact 
population-based health behaviors like getting people to exercise more, stop smoking, or eating better.  
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Not unlike local government transportation planners trying to design highway systems that meet the needs 
both of those who want fast and effective transportation systems with those whose backyards such 
systems are being proposed to run through.   
The reality of local government is that they regularly hire trained professionals and expect them to make 
positive impacts in environments that are enormously dynamic, complex, and difficult.  These people are 
regularly hired and then asked to make a tangible difference on social outcomes that are difficult to 
measure and that are simultaneously being impacted by countless other influencers.  Despite that, local 
government professionals do it anyway.  It is done so in the belief that well-trained, competent 
professionals can positively impact the outcomes in all of those public policy arenas despite the 
seemingly insurmountable obstacles.  They do it anyway.  Those embracing well-constructed and well-
executed performance assessment systems seem to be doing the same.  Those tying such well-constructed 
and well-executed performance assessment systems to the employee compensation system seem to be 
saying that if we believe that an individual Social Worker can make a difference, then we should expect 
the same of the person charged with supervising them, though to slightly modified ends.  Those creating 
and overseeing such systems seem to be saying that unequal work for equal pay in the traditional step-
and-grade system is the equivalent of giving up on supervisors trying to make a difference. 
The mechanics of the performance assessment system are quite difficult, but the mechanics of the 
compensation portion of a performance-based compensation system are relatively easy.  The driving force 
for the connection between them has much more to do with philosophy and, when done well, drive than it 
does with the pursuit of the perfect system.  After all, no system can be perfect; each will have pros and 
cons, strengths and drawbacks.  Only time can tell, ultimately, if the drive and the philosophy produce 
more good than harm in comparison to other alternatives, such as the step-and-grade system.  In terms of 
future opportunity for study, it would seem that testing the efficacy of the various compensation systems 
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and trying to isolate their relative contributions to the advancement of specifically-identified 
organizational objectives would help to determine whether or to what extent the competing philosophies 
do or do not make a bigger difference at what the organization is pursuing. 
Conclusion 
Adopting a performance pay system is not something to be entertained lightly.  It requires more 
work, more discipline, more 
managerial courage, more training, 
more support, and will cause more 
heated internal conversations about 
performance ratings and 
compensation than more traditional 
alternatives.  You must be able to live with more tension.  It is equally clear that the traditional 
systems create more rewards for those doing the least effort and for those doing the least to 
advance an organization’s mission than a performance pay system—they will also create more 
harmony.  The traditional system relies almost exclusively on the intrinsic motivation of 
employees who seek employ in the public service.  A well-crafted and executed performance 
management system that incorporates best management practices designed to thoroughly and 
constantly review the system’s efficacy and fairness, coupled with a market-driven performance 
pay system, coupled with a robust set of additional strategies to create a high quality of employee 
worklife (recognition programs, tenure recognition and other similar environmental programs) 
does seem to have the potential to create a higher-performing, more mission-driven focus linking 
employee performance to organizational results.  But, if an organization cannot or will not make 
“It is a huge culture change and it takes time. Some 
employees really appreciate that it does allow for 
recognition of their extra efforts. Having leaders in a 
role where compensation makes a difference requires 
a lot of training. Constantly trying to tweak the 
system is necessary. It probably takes three to five 
years for people to understand what it is and what it 
isn’t and to train leaders to differentiate well.” 
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the necessary investments for all of that to be true, or cannot live with an environment in which 
creative tension is not only allowed but encouraged, it is equally clear that a poorly administered 
system has the potential to do more harm than good. 
Maybe even more importantly than that, as pointed out by Risher (2015), what government 
leaders have failed to appreciate is that management systems do not deliver effective 
management.  Government agencies need a talented, committed team of executives to deliver the 
promise of mission statements.  Risher suggests that the most important ingredient is not the 
management framework, but rather it is the leaders within the system and the culture they 
nourish routinely within it.  He suggests that the softer skills, those most difficult to define, such 
as being able to deftly manage large groups of people and organizations with varying and 
competing interests are the kinds of skills necessary to succeed in this endeavor.  It may seem 
that cobbling together such a team of talented executives is impossible in the public sector; but, 
one wonders if, like running the 4-minute-mile was once thought of as unthinkable, whether 
someday this could become the norm.  If society ever hopes to develop high-performing public 
organizations that can become more than just subject to the latest management fad du jour, we 
best hope that it does. 
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Appendix A: Proposed Cover Letter to State Associations: 
Date 
724 1st St. SE 
Little Falls, MN 56345 
 
Laurie Klupacs 
Acting Executive Director 
Association of Minnesota Counties 
125 Charles Avenue 
St. Paul, MN 55103-2108 
Dear Mr. Mulder: 
My name is Timothy Houle and I am a doctoral candidate in Public Administration at Hamline 
University in St. Paul, MN and also the County Administrator for Crow Wing County in north-
central Minnesota.  I am in the process of conducting my doctoral dissertation on the prevalence 
and efficacy of performance-based or merit pay in county government jurisdictions. I am 
requesting your assistance in identifying any organizations within your association that may fit 
that criteria.  I am writing to let you know in advance I will be calling within the next week to 
ask for your assistance with identifying counties within your state that might fit that criteria in 
the hopes that the advance notice might make it easier to find that information. 
Specifically, I am interested in identifying any county that has a performance-based or merit 
based pay program in place and contact information for the person that might best be able to 
answer questions as to the basis for its adoption and its subsequent effectiveness in the 
achievement of organizational outcomes.  
The content of this research is limited to the states of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Florida, Virginia, 
Maryland, Texas, California, and New York so your assistance is very important to advancing 
my research. This is an important study in advancing the dialogue within public sector 
organizations using empirical data to support or dispute advancing performance-based or merit 
pay in the public sector. In return for your participation, I would be happy to supply you with a 
copy of the research report with findings.  I know your time is limited and valuable so I am all 
the more grateful.  As such, I want to thank you in advance for your assistance.  I may be 
reached with any questions at thoule01@gmail.com.  Please expect my phone call within the 
next week. 
Sincerely, 
Timothy J. Houle 
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Appendix B: Letter to Selected Jurisdictions: 
Date 
724 1st St. SE 
Little Falls, MN 56345 
 
Will Volk 
Employee Relations Director 
Dakota County 
1590 Highway 55 
Hastings, MN 55033-2372 
Dear Mr. Volk: 
My name is Timothy Houle and I am a doctoral candidate in Public Administration at Hamline 
University in St. Paul, MN and also the County Administrator of Crow Wing County in north 
central Minnesota.  I am in the process of conducting my doctoral dissertation on the prevalence 
of and efficacy of performance-based or merit pay in county governments. Your organization has 
been identified as one of those that fit my research criteria. I am writing to ask your assistance in 
supplying information about your organization’s practices relative to my research topic. 
Specifically, I am writing to request your participation in a brief telephone interview that, along 
with similar interviews from other similarly situated counties, will be compiled and analyzed as 
part of my research project.  I will be calling within the next week or so to try to schedule the 
interview at a time that works for you and am writing to give you advance notice regarding the 
nature of my call. 
The questions that I propose to ask will have to do with the circumstances that led you to 
adoption of the system and how it is working in actual practice.  I expect the survey to take 
approximately 60 minutes or less to complete.  Most of the information for the responses to the 
interview questions will be readily at your disposal as I will be asking about your experience.  
There is a possibility that a small amount of data may need to be compiled by you or others 
within your organization, depending on the answers to the questions and the ready-availability of 
that data.  Most of the research information will be garnered from your answers to the questions 
in the interview. 
This is an important study in advancing the dialogue within public sector organizations using 
empirical data to support or dispute advancing performance-based or merit pay in the public 
sector. In return for your participation, I would be happy to supply you with a copy of the 
research report with findings. Thank you in advance for your assistance. I know your time is 
limited and valuable so I am all the more grateful. 
Sincerely, 
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Timothy J. Houle 
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Appendix C:  Survey Instrument Performance-Based Pay Survey 
Notice to the Participants:  I would like to tape record this interview so that I might refer back to 
it as source material beyond that which I can write during the interview.  It would also allow me 
to more fully participate in the interview if I do not have to write your responses while we are 
having our conversation.  The recording will be used exclusively for the purposes of my 
research. I would not share the recording with anyone else for any other purpose and, at the 
conclusion of publication of my dissertation, I will destroy it.  I will not be identifying any 
interview subject by name without their expressed permission by an e-mail sent to me 
authorizing the same.  If you would prefer I did not record the interview, I will respect those 
wishes and we can conduct the interview without it being recorded.  May I have your permission 
to record the interview?   
Yes or No 
Organization Name:________________________________________ State:________________ 
Name of Person Completing Survey:_____________________________________________ 
Title:____________________________________________________ Date:________________ 
Population of Jurisdiction (2010 Census):_______________________ 
Annual Budget:____________________________________ 
Number of FTE Employees:______________________________ 
Definitions of Terms: 
Organizational Outcomes:  clearly defined measures of the organization’s primary objectives of 
performance through measurable results regularly reported. 
Performance-Based Pay Program: any compensation policy that links annual wage and salary 
increases to employee performance on some predetermined period-over-period comparison. 
Employees: the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) public employees per capita employed by 
the political subdivision being examined. 
Employee Engagement:  The rate at which employees feel valued, supported, and connected to 
their organization as measured through the use of a survey at least once per year. 
Employee Retention: the rate at which employees exit the organization measured as a annual 
percentage of the total workforce. 
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Employee Satisfaction: the degree to which employees are satisfied with their work environment 
as measured by a survey with standardized questions at least once per year. 
Performance Distinction:  a noted difference in the performance of two or more employees in the 
achievement of key organizational objectives that the organization wishes to either reward or 
punish. 
Recruitment:  the ability to attract new employees to come to work for the organization as 
measured by some objective measure, such as time to recruit, number of applicants, and so on. 
Stakeholder (Citizen) Satisfaction:  the degree to which stakeholders or citizens are satisfied with 
the quality of the public services they receive as measured by a survey with standardized 
questions administered either annually in a randomized sample or to recipients of services 
immediately following their receipt of the service. 
Senior Executives: those managers, supervisors, or department heads who are paid in the top ten 
percent of the organization’s compensation system. 
Wage Inflation:  the amount of increase in the total wages paid to employees, not counting new 
or eliminated positions, expressed as a percentage increase over the previous year’s base costs. 
Does your organization have a performance-based pay program (Y or N): ____________. If yes, 
go to question 2 and, if no, are you considering one (Y or N) __________.   
If no again, thank them for their time. 
Is this program available only to Senior Executives (Y or N):______________________ 
Is this system applied to any collective bargaining units (Y or N):___________________ 
Approximately what percentage of employee classifications is this system available 
to:_______________ 
How long ago did you adopt your first version of this system? 
⁯   Less than one year ⁯  1-2 years  ⁯  3-4 years 
⁯   4-5 years   ⁯  6-7 years  ⁯  8 or more years 
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Open-Ended Question:  What would you identify as the motivating factors that led to the 





Check any of the list of motivating factors listed below that are independently volunteered: 
⁯   Employee Satisfaction ⁯  Employee Retention ⁯  Organizational Outcomes 
⁯   Stakeholder Satisfaction ⁯  Limit Wage Inflation ⁯   Performance Distinction 
⁯   Employee Recruitment ⁯  Attracting Millenials ⁯  Employee Engagement  
⁯   Other:_______________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________Would 
you identify any of the following as having been one of your motivating factors?  If so, please 
explain: 
⁯   Employee Satisfaction ⁯  Employee Retention ⁯  Organizational Outcomes 
⁯   Stakeholder Satisfaction ⁯  Limit Wage Inflation ⁯   Performance Distinction 
⁯   Employee Recruitment ⁯  Attracting Millenials  ⁯  Employee Engagement  
⁯   Other:_______________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 





Have you put into place any specific measures of key organizational performance that you would 
suggest would support your conclusions?  If so, please explain.  Can I get a copy of any 








Can you send me a copy of any policy or source material that would outline your jurisdiction’s 
performance-based program, if applicable, including eligibility criteria and/or to what sub-sets of 
the organization to which it would apply?  Yes or No 
Are there any questions you have of me?  
______________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
Do you wish me to send you a copy of the research when it is completed?  If so, I will need an e-
mail address to send it to: 
E-mail address:   __________________________________________________________ 
I want to thank you sincerely for taking the time to allow me to interview you for my research.  
Your participation in this survey is critically important to the validity of the research results. If, 
upon reflection, you have anything else you wish to let me know about or follow-up on, please 
direct any questions you may me at thoule01@gmail,com or 218.330.5032. Thank you so much 
for taking a moment out of your busy day to help me!   
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Appendix D:  List of Counties Interviewed 
The Efficacy of Performance-Based Pay in Selected County Governments: 
What Motivates Adoption and Is it Achieving What was Expected?  
List of Counties Interviewed    
     
State County Contact Title Complete 
Wisconsin St. Croix Tammy Funk Human Resources Director 1/27/2014 
Wisconsin Waukesha James Richter Human Resources Director 1/23/2014 
Wisconsin Washington Joshua Schoemann Administrative Coordinator 1/16/2014 
Wisconsin Iowa Curt Kephart County Administrator 1/16/2014 
Wisconsin Marathon Brad Karger County Administrator 2/17/2014 
Wisconsin Manitowoc Bob Ziegelbauer County Executive 1/16/2014 
Wisconsin Chippewa Frank R. Pascarella County Administrator 1/16/2014 
Virginia Albemarle Lorna Gerome Director of Human Resources 1/17/2014 
Virginia Arlington Jeanne Wardlaw Compensation Division Chief 1/17/2014 
Virginia Augusta Faith Souder Human Resources Director 1/22/2014 
Virginia Botetourt Mary Blackburn Human Resources Director 2/7/2014 
Virginia Campbell Shameka Davenport Deputy Director HR 1/22/2014 
Virginia Carroll Michelle Dalton Human Resources Director 1/27/2014 
Virginia Chesterfield Scott Zaremba Human Resource Programs 1/27/2014 
Virginia Culpeper Stacey Bertsch Human Resources Director 3/5/2014 
Virginia Fairfax Leslie Amiri Human Capital Devel. Director 1/22/2014 
Virginia Frederick Paula Nofsinger Human Resources Director 1/22/2014 
Virginia Greensville Alice Whitby County Administrator 1/27/2014 
Virginia Hanover Janet Lawson Human Resources Director 3/20/2014 
Virginia Isle of Wight Brandy White Human Resources Director 3/13/2014 
Virginia James City Rona Vrooman Human Resources Coordinator 1/17/2014 
Virginia Loudoun Jeanette Green Human Resources Officer 2/21/2014 
Virginia Montgomery Karen Edmonds Director of Human Resources 1/17/2014 
Virginia Pittsylvania Kim Van Der Hyde Finance Director 3/13/2014 
Virginia Roanoke Joe Sgroi Director of Human Resources 1/22/2014 
Virginia Rockingham Steve Riddlebarger Director of Human Resources 1/22/2014 
Virginia Stafford Shannon Wagner Human Resources Manager 1/21/2014 
Virginia York David Gorwitz Human Resources Director 1/17/2014 
Maryland Montgomery Kay Beckley Business Operations Manager 3/13/2014 
California Sonoma Lynn Durrell Human Resources Analyst 1/24/2014 
California Santa Barbera Jeri Muth Human Resources Director 3/17/2014 
California Marin Larry David Director of Human Resources 1/22/2014 
California Napa Suzanne Mason Director of Human Resources 1/22/2014 
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Minnesota Ramsey Gail Blackstone Human Resources Director 1/27/2014 
Minnesota Scott Jack Kemme Employee Relations Director 1/17/2014 
Minnesota Carver Kerie Anderka Employee Relations Director 1/17/2014 
Minnesota Anoka Melanie Ault Human Resources Director 1/15/2014 
Minnesota 
Yellow 
Medicine Ashley Sornie Personnel Coordinator 1/15/2014 
Minnesota Dakota Nancy Hohbach Employee Relations Director 1/15/2014 
Minnesota Aitkin Bobbie Danielson Human Resources Manager 1/16/2014 
Minnesota Nicollet Jamie Haefner Human Resources 1/15/2014 
Minnesota Olmsted Dale Ignatius Human Resources Director 1/15/2014 
Minnesota Sherburne 
Roxanne 
Chmielewski Human Resources Director 1/15/2014 
Minnesota Lyon Carolyn McDonald Human Resources Director 1/22/2014 
Florida Monroe Kevin Madok Director of Strategic Planning 3/3/2014 
Florida Citrus Brad Thorpe County Administrator 3/13/2014 
Florida Manatee Karen Windon Deputy County Administrator 3/3/2014 
Florida Marion Dr. Lee Niblock County Administrator 3/6/2014 
Florida Leon Vincent Long County Administrator 3/18/2014 
Florida Sarasota Joanie Whitley Human Resources Director 3/7/2014 
Florida Lake Robert Anderson Director of Human Resources 3/4/2014 
Florida Hillsborough Helene Marks Chief Financial Officer 3/18/2014 
Florida Pasco Dr. Marc Bellas Human Resources Director 3/4/2014 
Florida Pinellas Robert LaSala County Administrator 3/6/2014 
New York Madison Ryan Aylward Director of Labor Relations 3/21/2014 
New York Yates Sarah Purdy County Administrator 3/21/2014 
New York Cattaraugus Jack Searles County Administrator 3/27/2014 
New York Wayne Jim Marquette County Administrator 3/24/2014 
New York Livingston Ian Coyle County Administrator 3/13/2014 
South 
Carolina Aiken Dorothy Simmons Human Resources Director 1/16/2014 
South 
Carolina Anderson Phyllis McAlister Human Resources Director 1/16/2014 
South 
Carolina Greenville Debra Ham Human Resources Director 1/16/2014 
South 
Carolina Greenwood Rhonda McAlister Human Resources Director 1/16/2014 
South 
Carolina Lexington Joseph Mergo, III County Administrator 1/16/2014 
South 
Carolina Orangeburg Venyke Harley Personnel Director 1/24/2014 
South 
Carolina York Lisa Davidson Human Resources Director 1/16/2014 
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Iowa Black Hawk Jerald Clyde Human Resources Director 1/22/2014 
Iowa Bremer Shelly Wolf County Auditor 2/7/2014 
Iowa Buchanan Cindy Gosse Auditor 1/22/2014 
Iowa Butler Liz Williams Auditor 1/22/2014 
Iowa Johnson Lora Shramek Human Resources Director 1/22/2014 
Iowa Polk Tony Bisignano Human Resources Director 2/7/2014 
Iowa Linn Lisa Powell Human Resources Director 1/24/2013 
Iowa Scott Mary Thee Human Resources Director 2/10/2014 
Illinois McLean Bill Wasson County Administrator 2/7/2014 
Illinois Peoria Lori Curtis Luther County Administrator 2/24/2014 
Illinois Kendall Jeff Wilkins County Administrator 3/13/2014 
Illinois Lake Barry Burton County Administrator 3/6/2014 
Illinois Champagne Deb Busey County Administrator 3/5/2014 
Illinois McHenry Peter Austin County Administrator 1/27/2014 
Georgia Gwinnet Elizabeth Bailey Human Resources Manager 1/24/2014 
Georgia Fulton Valerie Handley Interim Personnel Director 2/27/2014 
Georgia Cobb Tony Hagler Human Resources Director 1/22/2014 
Washington Lincoln Shelly Johnston Auditor 1/22/2014 
Washington Island Melanie Bacon Human Resources Director 2/10/2014 
Washington Whatcom Karen Sterling Goens Human Resources Manager 2/11/2014 
Pennsylvania Bradford Mark Agutter Human Resources Director 2/21/2014 
Pennsylvania Lycoming Ann Gehret Director of Administration 3/4/2014 
Pennsylvania Monroe Bonnie Ace-Sattur Human Resources Director 3/13/2014 
Pennsylvania Dauphin Faye Fisher Human Resources Director 2/26/2014 
Kentucky Boone Jeffrey Earlywine County Administrator 3/5/2014 
North 
Carolina Scotland Susan Butler Human Resources Manager 3/17/2014 
North 
Carolina Union Mark Watson Executive Director of HR 3/17/2014 
North 
Carolina Craven Amber Parker Human Resources Director 3/13/2014 
North 
Carolina Transylvania Sheila Cozart Human Resources Director 3/10/2014 
North 
Carolina Franklin Kelly Faulkner Human Resources Manager 3/7/2014 
North 
Carolina Yadkin Lisa Hughes Deputy County Mgr-Finance 3/14/2013 
North 
Carolina Catawba Cynthia Eades Human Resources Director 3/13/2014 
North 
Carolina Durham Troy Joyner Sr Human Resources Analyst 3/21/2014 
North 
Carolina Forsyth Karen White Asst Human Resources Director 3/17/2014 




Carolina Granville Michael Felts County Manager 3/7/2014 
North 
Carolina Guilford John Dean Human Resources Director 3/10/2014 
North 
Carolina Halifax Tony Gupton Human Resources Mgmt Dir 3/27/2014 
North 
Carolina Mecklenburg Julissa Fernandez Class and Comp Director 3/14/2014 
North 
Carolina New Hanover Mark Francolini Human Resources Director 3/13/2014 
North 
Carolina Surry Sandra Snow Human Resources Officer 3/7/2014 
North 
Carolina Cumberland Fred Starling Human Resources Consultant 3/11/2014 
North 
Carolina Wake Dennis Schoch Human Resources Manager 3/21/2014 
Kansas Cowley Jeremy Willmoth County Administrator 3/10/2014 
Kansas Finney Randy Parkington County Administrator 3/13/2014 
Kansas Harper Al Roder County Administrator 3/10/2014 
Kansas Douglas Craig Weinaug County Administrator 3/13/2014 
Idaho Kootenai Skye Reynolds Human Resources Director 3/21/2014 
Arizona Yuma Felicia Frausto Human Resources Director 3/18/2014 
Arizona Pinal Cathy Bohland Human Resources Director 3/18/2014 
Arizona Coconino Erica Philpot Asst Human Resrouces Director 3/18/2014 
Arizona Yavapai Wendy Ross Director of Human Resources 3/18/2014 
Michigan Kent Holly Hartley HR Mgr for Benefits & Comp 3/18/2014 
Michigan Washtenaw Verna McDaniel County Administrator 3/27/2014 
Alabama Baldwin David Brewer County Administrator 3/27/2014 
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Appendix F:  Dissertation Proposal Defense Certification 
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Appendix G:  Curriculum Vitae 
Timothy J. Houle 
________________________________________________________________________ 
EDUCATION: Little Falls Community High School, Little Falls, MN, 1981 
Hamline University, St. Paul, MN 
Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, 1985 
Master of Arts in Public Administration, 2004 
Doctoral Candidate in Public Administration, Expected Graduation 2014 
Special emphasis on English Writing, Political Science, Public Speaking, Philosophy and 
Ethics. 
EXPERIENCE: Crow Wing County, Brainerd, MN 
2008 – Present: County Administrator.  Chief Administrative Officer for the County.  
Provide dynamic, vibrant, strategic vision for the future of Crow Wing County 
government.  Statutory clerk to the County Board.  Primary advisor on administrative 
issues affecting all facets of county government. Responsible for strategic planning, 
budgeting, public relations, organizational results produced and accountability 
management.  My position requires the ability to confidently switch from one 
professional situation to another with ease. I frequently analyze overall organizational 
trends, synthesize these into concepts and language the public understands, and respond 
accordingly.  
Key Accomplishments with Crow Wing County: 
Average annual levy increases for budgets during my tenure 2009-2013 is .356% 
increase.  Levy change for budget years 2011-2013 reflect a reduced levy of 4%. 
In response to economic crisis and resultant State of Minnesota budget crisis, reduced 
2010 operating expenses by over $4.0 million (from a $70 million budget base) and 
eliminated 49.8 FTEs (from a 451 FTE base).  Positioning the County for further budget 
cuts of approximately $3.5 million for 2011 budget. 
Reorganized structure and form of entire county government.  Created department 
structures centered on the customers’ served: Land Services, Community Services, Public 
Safety, and Transportation.  Proposing creation of Administrative Services restructuring 
at present.  Instituted Senior Management Team and Leadership Team to replace 
traditional Dept Head model. 
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Led renewed focus within organization on customer service excellence as a component of 
overall strategy toward organizational excellence.  Customer service satisfaction survey 
results typically reflect 90% of customers satisfied with the quality of services received, 
both internally and externally. 
Launched initiative to manage for results with performance standards, measures, and 
accountabilities for the organization, divisions, managers, and employees.  Key 
outcomes-based performance measures have been identified for every employee county-
wide and been integrated into their annual performance reviews.  This has positioned the 
organization for discussions with bargaining units about instituting pay-for-performance, 
which has been a County Board priority, to replace the existing step-and-grade 
compensation system.  It also positions the organization for movement from a traditional 
rule-bound workplace to a more result-oriented workplace facilitating a transition to a 
ROWE workplace with more flexibility in staffing, hours, and methods. 
Instituted LEAN six-sigma process improvement methodology within business units 
leading to substantially improved customer results while lowering costs.  Initiating such 
processes has become a key performance indicators for senior managers. 
Created priority setting process to rank county “books of business” to inform the 
judgment of policymakers as they made budget reduction decisions. 
Morrison County, Little Falls, MN 
1994 to2008: County Administrator.  Chief Administrative Officer for the County. 
Provide dynamic, vibrant, strategic vision for the future of Morrison County government.  
Statutory clerk to the County Board.  Primary advisor on administrative issues affecting 
all facets of county government. Responsible for budgeting, human resources, labor 
relations, public relations, pursuing legislative goals, purchasing, and building 
maintenance.   
Key Accomplishments with Morrison County: 
Led national award-winning citizen-based public/private partnership to reduce 
methamphetamine use in Morrison County resulting in reduced drug arrests and reduced 
meth arrests even with stepped up interdiction efforts.  Project was selected by the 
National Association of Counties as one of 12 national winners of a Sustainable 
Communities Award, also selected as among top four. 
Successfully secured public support for and County Board approval of a recreational 
trails master plan for the county.  Sought and received numerous grants to support trail 




Worked successfully with state and federal legislators to secure funding and 
authorization for a channelization project on the Mississippi River upstream of the Little 
Falls dam. 
Led the county through its first strategic planning process in ten years. 
Successfully implemented many new technologies to Morrison County, including fully 
integrated GIS/parcel data systems, digital telephone system, county-wide local area 
network, data imaging system, voice mail, and so on. 
Successfully led transition out of the direct provision of home care services. 
Successfully negotiated repeated contracts with four different collective bargaining units. 
Successfully led transition of county employees from a traditional vacation/sick leave 
program to a combined flex leave program. 
Successfully reorganized to create and staff a separate Information Systems (IS) 
Department. 
STAR TRIBUNE, Newspaper of the Twin Cities, Minneapolis, MN 
1986 to 1994: Primary Market Area Resource Manager/Field Team Leader.  
Responsible for resource allocation, budgeting and financial tracking, human resource 
administration, and department leadership for an organization with annual total budget 
of $30 million.  My position required creativity and consistency to fairly manage and 
administer complex policies and procedures such as hiring, progressive discipline, 
termination, and so on for both union and independent employees.  Participated in long 
range strategic planning including the collection and analysis of pertinent information. 
Key Accomplishments with the Star Tribune: 
Led transformational change of the division from a very traditional, hierarchical 
organizational structure to self-managed work teams.  Measures of cost went down 
significantly.  Measures of service improved dramatically.  Employees’ quality of work 
life was measurably improved. 
Center for Rural Policy and Development, St. Peter, MN 
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2007 to Present: Board of Directors.  Appointed by Governor Tim Pawlenty and 
reappointed by Governor Mark Dayton to serve as a county representative.  
Organization works to provide high-quality, non-partisan research on issues of 
importance to Greater Minnesota, such as broad-band access, challenges associated with 
increasing diversity, best practices for rural school districts in the face of declining 
revenues, and so on.  Chaired the Executive Search Committee to replace a vacancy in 
the Executive Director’s position.  Currently Chair the Research Committee. 
Minnesota City/County Managers Association, St. Paul, MN 
2005 to Present: Second Vice-President; Past Co-Chair, Conference Planning 
Committee.  Served multiple years on Executive Board helping to plan and lead 
professional association to provide for networking and professional development needs 
of city and county administrators throughout the State of Minnesota and currently in line 
to become President in 2014.  Past Chair of 2007 conference planning committee to plan 
and organize annual MCMA Spring Conference. 
Minnesota Association of County Administrators, St. Paul, MN 
1997 to Present: Past President(2000).  Executive Committee.  Served with the Board 
of Directors (1997-2001) to plan, implement, evaluate, and participate in training and 
professional development opportunities to enhance the professional standards and 
performance of the administration of county government statewide. 
Key Accomplishments with MACA: 
Led strategic planning process for the statewide organization to ensure maximum benefit 
to county administrators and their member counties in training, professional networking, 
idea exchanges, and so on, and to operationalize this planning to ensure its application 
into the future. 
Standardized the organizational structure under an organizing model using an Executive 
Committee and standing committees focusing on Professional Development, Technology 
Applications, and Legislative Involvement. 
VOLUNTEER 
ACTIVITIES: Crow Wing County United Way, Current Board of Directors President 
   Morrison County United Way, Board of Directors, Past President 
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Brainerd Lakes Area Economic Development Corp, Ex-Officio, Board 
   Brainerd, MN Rotary Club 
Crow Wing County FEMA, Board Chair 
Catholic Charities of the Diocese of St. Cloud, Board of Directors, Past President 
Morrison County Healthy Communities Collaborative, Board of Directors 
Community Technology, Inc., Board of Directors 
Past Church Trustee 
